213 Conn. 500 | Conn. | 1990
Lead Opinion
The dispositive issue in this appeal is the validity of the trial court’s orders requiring the defendant to submit to a series of psychiatric examinations before the defendant filed notice of his intent to rely on the defenses of insanity and extreme emotional disturbance. A jury of twelve found the defendant, Russell F. Manfredi, guilty of manslaughter in the first degree, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) (2),
The defendant was arraigned on March 11,1985. The court, Doyle, J., set bond at $150,000 and barred the defendant from any contact with his children pending further review of the situation. On March 13,1985, the defendant moved for a modification of his bond. In support of this motion, the defendant presented the testimony of Walter A. Borden, M.D., who had briefly visited the defendant two days before the hearing. Borden testified that the defendant was “in a state of confusion, emotional confusion, depression, grief, [and] shock,” and recommended that “he should be in a psychiatric hospital for a relatively short period of time.” Following a hearing, the court, Purtill, J., revised the defendant’s bond to include a condition that he enter a hospital for psychiatric treatment and remain at that institution as long as required by his treating physician. The defendant was released on bond and entered John Dempsey Hospital on March 16, 1985.
On March 26, 1985, the state submitted a motion requesting a psychiatric examination of the defendant pursuant to Practice Book § 760
The defendant thereupon moved for a protective order in connection with Zeman’s psychiatric examination. Specifically, the defendant requested that: (1) no examinations be conducted without the presence of counsel; (2) the examinations be limited to matters concerning his competency to stand trial; (3) no question be asked of him relating to the events surrounding the death of his wife; and (4) any matters of substance elicited from him not be communicated to anyone other than himself or his counsel. The court, E. Y. O’Connell, J., denied the motion, noting that, although the defendant had not yet filed notice of intent to rely on a defense of mental disease or defect, he had already introduced
In accordance with the trial court’s order, Zeman began a series of psychiatric examinations of the defendant in April, 1985. When the defendant refused to complete the examination process, the court, E. Y. O’Connell, J., granted the state’s motion to compel and, also in response to a request from the state, ordered the defendant to submit to psychological testing. In response, the defendant requested that the court order Zeman not to communicate to the state any information, with the exception of his diagnosis, that he might obtain during his examinations of the defendant. The state indicated that it was not opposed to a protective order that prohibited the state from obtaining substantive evidence concerning the crime.
The examination process resumed, with Anne Marie Phillips, a clinical psychologist, conducting the psychological testing of the defendant and Zeman examining him on several additional occasions. In total, Zeman
At trial, the defendant took the stand and admitted that he had in fact killed his wife.
The state presented both Phillips and Zeman to rebut the defendant’s defenses of insanity and extreme emotional disturbance. Phillips testified that it was her opinion, based upon a series of psychological examinations that she had administered, that the defendant was probably not suffering from a severe psychological dysfunction, thought disorder, impulse disorder, psychotic
Following his conviction, the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, arguing, inter alia, that the trial court had erred in compelling him to submit to the prenotice psychiatric examinations.
I
We turn first to the question of whether the trial court exceeded its authority under § 760 when it ordered the defendant to submit to a series of psychiatric examinations over one year before the defendant declared his intent to rely on the defenses of insanity and extreme emotional disturbance. The defendant argues that, read together, Practice Book §§ 756 through 761 require that a trial court find one of the following three conditions before it can order a psychiatric examination over the defendant’s objection: (1) the defendant has filed notice of intent to rely on the defense of mental disease or defect, in accordance with § 758; (2) the defendant has filed notice of intent to present expert testimony concerning a mental disease or defect inconsistent with the mental element required for the offense charged, in accordance with § 759; or (3) the defendant has in some other manner placed in issue his mental status at the time of the offense. Based upon this interpretation of the Practice Book, the defendant contends that the trial court’s prenotice examination orders were invalid since none of the required conditions was present. We disagree.
Section 760 imposes no further condition on the ability of a trial court to order a compulsory psychiatric examination than a determination that the situation before the court presents “an appropriate case” for
At the time that the trial court ordered the preno-tice examinations, the defendant had already presented expert testimony indicating that he had been experiencing serious emotional and mental difficulties. In addition, the trial court was aware that the defendant had been hospitalized, pursuant to his doctor’s recommendations, for treatment of these problems. While the defendant had presented this evidence in connection with his motions to modify his bond conditions, and not in an effort to establish insanity or extreme emotional disturbance, it was reasonable for the court to conclude that these problems might be relevant to the question of whether the defendant was suffering from a mental disease or defect at the time of the offense. By permitting the state a psychiatric examination of the ■ defendant at this time, the trial court was simply advancing the objective of § 760 to assure the state an opportunity to procure reliable and timely expert testimony that would enable it to meet a defendant’s men
We also find support for the trial court’s order in several federal cases holding that a trial court has the power to order an examination of the defendant’s mental condition at the time of the offense along with an examination concerning the defendant’s competency to stand trial. See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 627 F.2d 1300, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 1980); United States v. Reifsteck, 535 F.2d 1030, 1033 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Wade, 489 F.2d 258, 258-59 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Moudy, 462 F.2d 694, 697 (5th Cir. 1972). While noting that “the discretion to enlarge the examination does . . . expose [the accused] to the possibility of bolstering the government’s case,” these courts have reasoned that consolidating the examinations is appropriate because it “allows economy of judicial and medical efforts, of prosecution and defense efforts, and of the accused’s time” and because, “in the end, all concerned — court, counsel, and parties — have an interest in determining if the accused was incompetent at the time of the offense, if that is to be an issue, and we see no prejudice in the court’s ordering that such determination be made sooner rather than later . . . . ” United States v. Moudy, supra, 697. In the present case, the trial court’s orders compelling the defendant to undergo psychiatric examination to determine his mental condition at the time of the offense along with the examinations inquiring into the propriety of the defendant’s bond conditions served a simi
Central to our conclusion that a court may order a psychiatric examination under § 760 before a defendant has asserted a mental status defense is the availability of a protective order sealing the contents of any psychiatric reports, with the exception of the diagnosis, until the defendant has actually filed notice of his defenses. Such an order, authorized by Practice Book § 785, would eliminate any risk that the state might inappropriately acquire substantive information concerning the defendant’s involvement with the alleged offense.
II
The defendant also challenges the prenotice psychiatric examinations on the ground that the trial court’s order compelling him to submit to these examinations violated his privilege against self-incrimination as guaranteed by the fifth amendment to the United States constitution.*
Our analysis begins with the well established proposition that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination ordinarily protects a criminal defendant from compulsory psychiatric examinations. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 468, 101 S. Ct. 1866, 68 L. Ed. 2d 359 (1981); State v. Fair, supra, 109; State v. Lovelace, supra, 550. It is equally clear, however, that “[a] criminal defendant waives this privilege . . . when he places his mental status in issue.” State v. Fair, supra. Once a defendant has waived the privilege, the state may require him to submit to a psychiatric examination, and the results of such an examination may be introduced at trial for the purpose of rebutting the defendant’s mental status defenses. State v. Fair, supra, 110-12; State v. Lovelace, supra, 551-52; see also Estelle v. Smith, supra, 465. A defendant effectively places his mental status in issue for fifth amendment purposes by filing notice of intent to rely on a defense of insanity or extreme emotional disturbance; State v. Lovelace, supra, 550-51; or by presenting testimony in support of these defenses at trial. State v. Fair, supra, 111-12; see Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483
In light of these precedents, the question presented in this case, one that neither this court nor the Supreme Court of the United States has previously addressed, is whether a defendant may ever be said to have placed his mental status in issue, thereby waiving his privilege against self-incrimination, even though he has not yet formally filed notice of his intent to rely on a mental status defense. Our review of the record persuades us, contrary to the conclusion of the Appellate Court, that this defendant had placed his mental status in issue before the trial court ordered him to undergo psychiatric examination.
The defendant nevertheless maintains that he had not waived his privilege against self-incrimination because he had not formally placed his mental status
Moreover, the case law indicates that a court may, under certain circumstances, impose a mental status defense on an unwilling defendant. In State v. Asherman, 193 Conn. 695, 731-32, 478 A.2d 227 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1050, 105 S. Ct. 1749, 84 L. Ed. 2d 814 (1985), for example, we held that a trial court can charge the jury on extreme emotional disturbance even if the defendant does not wish to present that defense. Similarly, courts have held that a trial court has a responsibility to introduce the insanity defense, even if the defendant has refused to do so, if the evidence raises a significant question concerning the defendant’s sanity. United States v. Wright, supra, 1307,1310-11; Whalem v. United States, 346 F.2d 812, 818-19 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 862, 86 S. Ct. 124, 15 L. Ed. 2d 100, reh. denied, 382 U.S. 912, 86 S. Ct. 245, 15 L. Ed. 2d 164 (1965). A necessary concomitant of the judicial duty to consider mental status defenses sua sponte is the power to seek expert assistance in evaluating the defendant’s psychological problems. United States v. Wright, supra, 1312; United States v. Jines, supra, 1256. The court’s independent authority to order an inquiry into mental status is analogous to its power to order an examination concerning mental competency at the time of trial whether or not the defendant has raised the issue. See Estelle v. Smith, supra, 465.
Finally, we emphasize that a compulsory prenotice psychiatric examination is available only under very limited circumstances, and an order compelling submission to such an examination must be carefully structured to ensure compliance with the provisions of § 760
Applying this standard to this case, the evidence to which we have already alluded clearly satisfies the first prerequisite, and the trial court detailed these findings on the record, in accordance with the second prerequisite. With respect to the court’s obligation to craft an appropriate protective order, it is unclear from the record whether the defendant waived this protection at the time of the prenotice examinations.
The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
In this opinion Callahan, Glass and Covello, Js., concurred.
General Statutes § 53a-55 provides in pertinent part: “(a) A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when ... (2) with intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person under circumstances which do not constitute murder because he committed the proscribed act or acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance . ”
We granted certification to appeal the following question: “Did the Appellate Court err in sustaining the admission of expert psychiatric testimony elicited by the state in advance of the filing of notice of intent to rely on a defense of mental disease or defect?” Pursuant to Practice Book § 4140, the state also filed the following question as an alternative ground for affirming the judgment of the Appellate Court: “Whether this was an appropriate case under Practice Book § 760 for the trial court to order a psychiatric examination prior to the defendant’s assertion of mental disease or defect under Practice Book § 759?”
“|Practice Book] Sec. 760.--psychiatric examination
“In an appropriate case the judicial authority may, upon motion of the prosecuting authority, order the defendant to submit to a psychiatric examination by a psychiatrist designated for this purpose in the order of the court. No statement made by the defendant in the course of any examination pro
The state’s sole objection to the proposed protective order was that the state should have access to more information than the diagnosis to the extent that the information concerned such collateral matters as would be relevant to the defendant’s release conditions and contact with his children.
“[Practice Book] Sec. 758.--notice by defendant
“If a defendant intends to rely upon the defense of mental disease or defect at the time of the alleged crime, he shall, within the time provided for the filing of pretrial motions pursuant to Sec. 811 or at such later time as the judicial authority may direct, notify the prosecuting authority in writing of such intention and file a copy of such notice with the clerk. If there is a failure to comply with the requirements of this section, mental disease or defect may not be raised as a defense. The judicial authority may for cause shown allow late filing of the notice or grant additional time to the parties to prepare for trial or make such other order as may be appropriate.”
“[Practice Book] Sec. 759.--mental disease or defect inconsistent WITH THE MENTAL ELEMENT REQUIRED FOR THE OFFENSE CHARGED
“If a defendant intends to introduce expert testimony relating to a mental disease or defect, or another condition bearing upon the issue of whether he had the mental state required for the offense charged, he shall, within the time provided for the filing of pretrial motions or at such later time as the judicial authority may direct, notify the prosecuting authority in writing of such intention and file a copy of such notice with the clerk. He shall also furnish the prosecuting authority with copies of reports of physical or mental examinations of the defendant made in connection with the offense charged, within five days after receipt thereof. The judicial authority may for cause shown allow late filing of the notice or grant additional time to the parties to prepare for trial or make such other order as may be appropriate.”
The defendant testified that, on the evening of March 7,1985, he fatally struck his wife with a baseball bat after a night long series of arguments that had escalated to the point of the victim slapping and punching him
Borden explained that a catathymic crisis centers on a relationship in which there has been significant difficulty and feelings of sexual inadequacy, and is tied to past emotional problems.
Indeed, Phillips was apparently unable to obtain any information from the defendant concerning his actions on March 7 and 8, as she testified that the defendant had refused to discuss that subject with her.
The defendant also claimed that the trial court erred in: (1) instructing the jury that it could consider psychiatric testimony presented by the defense and by the prosecution in determining whether the state had proved the requisite intent to commit murder; and (2) refusing to permit defense counsel to be present at the prenotice examinations or to allow the defendant to record these examinations. The Appellate Court refused to review the first claim after determining that the defendant had not objected to the charge, and found no error on the second claim based on its conclusion that the right to counsel does not extend to compulsory psychiatric examinations. These conclusions are not at issue in the present appeal.
Practice Book § 760 also prohibits the state from using information obtained in a compulsory examination to meet its affirmative burden of proving the defendant’s guilt of the offense. State v. Fair, 197 Conn. 106, 110-11, 496 A.2d 461 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1096, 106 S. Ct. 1494, 89 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1986); State v. Boscarino, 204 Conn. 714, 734-37, 529 A.2d 1260 (1987).
The fifth amendment to the constitution of the United States provides in pertinent part: “No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .”
At oral argument, the state asserted that this case presents no fifth amendment problem whatsoever in light of dictum in the recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Powell v. Texas, U.S. , 109 S. Ct. 3146,106 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1989). According to the state, Powell
We note that in analogous circumstances, when it is the defendant who needs access to the psychiatric history of a witness, we have held that the patient-psychiatrist privilege must yield when the defendant has demonstrated that there is “ ‘any reasonable basis in the evidence for believing that psychiatric personnel may have information relating to the mental condition of a witness that might affect his testimony (Emphasis added.) State v. Hufford, 205 Conn. 386, 403-404, 533 A.2d 866 (1987); State v. Pierson, 201 Conn. 211, 227, 514 A.2d 724 (1986).
As we previously indicated, the trial court invited the defendant to submit a proposed protective order, and the state did not object to such an order as long as the state would be permitted access to information relevant to the defendant’s bond conditions. Although the defendant did file a motion and suggested order, the record does not indicate the trial court’s disposition of the motion.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting in part and concurring in part. I respectfully disagree with Part I of the majority opinion. I, however, join in affirming the judgment of the Appellate Court.
I
Prior to discussing the majority’s analysis in Part I, it is important to set out some additional circumstances, none of which are in dispute. On March 26,1985, after the state filed its motion asking for a psychiatric examination of the defendant, pursuant to Practice Book § 760, and sought a continuation of the prior court order prohibiting him from seeing or communicating with his children, the defendant moved for permission to see his children. The trial court granted the state’s motion for a psychiatric examination and in early April, 1985, Peter Zeman, a psychiatrist, began a lengthy series of psychiatric examinations of the defendant that, when concluded in July, 1986, included ten separate sessions totaling about seventeen hours. Eight of these examinations were conducted in April and May of 1985, with at least four of them occurring even before the start of the defendant’s hearing in probable cause. Certain psychological testing also ordered by the court was performed by Anne Marie Phillips, a clinical psychologist, on April 29, 1985, and May 7, 1985.
It is important to note that all of these events occurred before the probable cause hearing even started on May 17, 1985.
Although the majority does not expressly say so, the only fair reading of that opinion upholding the trial court is that the “situation before the court” presented “an appropriate case” for ordering such an examination. The ineluctable consequence of this determination under the circumstances is that the defendant had in some manner placed in issue his mental status at the time of the offense. This, of course, is entirely based on circumstances that took place long before the defendant had been accorded the constitutionally guaranteed right under the Connecticut constitution of a probable cause hearing to decide whether he should “be held to answer for [the] crime [of murder].” Specifically, our constitution provides: “No person shall be held to answer for any crime, punishable by death or life imprisonment, unless upon probable cause shown at a hearing in accordance with procedures prescribed bylaw . . . .” Conn. Const., amend. XVII. It is difficult to understand how this defendant can be said to have indicated that he “intended] to introduce expert testimony relating to a mental disease or defect, or another condition bearing upon the issue of whether he had the mental state required for the offense charged ...” (emphasis added); Practice Book § 759;
Putting aside for the moment the state’s ability to have a meaningful evaluation of his mental state, unless ordered at the time it was in this case, was it “appropriate” for the trial court to conclude, as it did long before the probable cause hearing, that “fairness,
Against this background, I do not agree with the majority that this presents “an appropriate case” under § 760 for the trial court to enter the orders which it did.
I have absolutely no problem with the state having a psychiatric examination of a defendant early on; it should not have to wait to do so for an unreasonable time. Fairness, equity and justice require it in certain cases; fairness, equity and justice did not, however, require it in this case. Singly or collectively, none of these concepts can even justify, let alone require, the order for the examinations by the trial court. To do as the trial court did, in effect, impermissibly imposed upon the defendant the obligation of undergoing an examination targeting a defense to a crime for which
Justice Felix Frankfurter once said in dissent: “It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people.” United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69, 70 S. Ct. 430, 94 L. Ed. 653 (1950). If we assume, arguendo, that the philosophy of this observation is surely applicable here, as I believe it is, this was not “an appropriate case” for the examination order entered. Fewer constitutional principles have a higher call upon the discretion of a judge than the protection of the privilege against self-incrimination as well as the right to present a defense after proper accusation of a crime, especially homicide.
Because I cannot agree that that discretion was correctly exercised here, I respectfully dissent from Part I of the majority opinion.
On the other hand, I cannot agree with the defendant that since all of the testing administered by Phillips and the majority of the examinations conducted by Zeman preceded his filing the notice of his mental status defenses under § 760 was reversible error. In doing so, I agree with the conclusion of the majority on that issue for reasons other than those given.
Under the circumstances of this case, once the defendant filed his notice of intent under § 760 and agreed, thereafter, upon query by Zeman, that he then had nothing to change vis-a-vis his prenotice statements prior to additional examination by that psychiatrist and he offered evidence at trial, both personally and through experts, concerning his mental status at the time of the offense, in my view, cured any valid preexisting bar to Zeman’s rebuttal testimony.
In coming to this view, I note that even though “[t]he self-incrimination privilege serves a variety of interests beyond the protection of the innocent, yet the [United States Supreme] Court in Chapman [v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, reh. denied, 386 U.S. 987, 87 S. Ct. 1283, 18 L. Ed. 2d 241 (1967),] held the harmless error standard applicable to an infringement of that right.” 3 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 26.6, p. 274. In any event, a defendant who makes an involuntary statement is not perpetually disabled from giving a subsequent voluntary statement. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 311, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 84 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1985); United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540-41, 67 S. Ct. 1394, 91 L.
I, therefore, concur in affirming the judgment of the Appellate Court.
There does not appear, especially from anything the trial court said, that the examinations ordered concerned the competency of the defendant to stand trial. See General Statutes § 54-56d.
There appears to be no question that from the outset defense counsel properly objected and excepted to all of the rulings involving the court-ordered examinations and endeavored completely to protect the defendant’s rights throughout the pretrial and trial proceedings in this regard.
The fact that prior to the constitutional probable cause hearing that started on May 17, 1985, the defendant was being held on an arrest warrant charging murder demonstrates no more than that a disinterested magistrate had found probable cause to believe that he had committed that crime.
Actually, there is no claim that the defendant should have filed his notice of intent under Practice Book §§ 757 through 761 at that time or anywhere near that time. He did not actually file that notice until almost one year later, i.e., on May 6, 1986.1 do not dispute that over that period he was receiving psychiatric treatment nor can it be overlooked that the state had had those series of psychiatric and/or psychological sessions with the defendant, which are chronicled'above, since March, 1985, and the final two sessions in 1986 after the notice of intent was filed by the defendant. I do not understand that the defendant “made” the state wait until May 6, 1986, before he filed this notice.
I can, however, envisage a scenario under a demandingly different fact pattern which might present “an appropriate case” under Practice Book § 760 to have a mental status examination of a defendant even before the constitutional probable cause hearing.