4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 594 | Conn. App. Ct. | 1967
Identical issues are involved in these appeals. They were argued together and may be disposed of in a single opinion. In each case, there was a conviction under both § 53-226 and § 53-230 of the General Statutes.
The defendants have withdrawn their claim that scienter is an essential element of the offense charged in respect to § 53-230. See State v. Gaetano, 96 Conn. 306, 318. They have also withdrawn the assignments of error directed toward the admission of conversations between the members of the Hartford vice squad and female frequenters at the defendants’ place of business. Their withdrawal of these assignments of error, however, relates only to the court’s rulings in respect to § 53-230. In withdrawing the assignments of error, the defendants probably have in mind rulings on the subject appearing in cases such as Cadwell v. State, 17 Conn. 467, 472; State v. Anderson, 82 Conn. 111, 114; Morse v. Brown, 83 Conn. 550, 553, and State v. Gaetano, supra. See Wharton, Criminal Evidence (12th Ed.) §§222, 275; 24 Am. Jur. 2d, Disorderly Houses, § 18. For competency of evidence relating to the character of female frequenters of a disorderly house and of their conversations, see State v. McGregor, 41 N.H. 407; of arrests and convictions for prostitution of female frequenters of disorderly houses, see Harwood v. People, 26 N.Y. 190; and of acts of unchastity of women who resort to such places, committed elsewhere than on the premises in question, see Beard v. State, 71 Md. 275.
The only substantial questions on the appeal relate to rulings on evidence and certain of the court’s conclusions. There is no serious dispute about the facts. The facts as found may be briefly summarized as follows: The defendant Oronzo was a permittee of a restaurant known as Al’s Music Bar. Both he and his brother Albert, the codefendant, were majority shareholders in Malena, Inc., the
After the state had rested, the defendants moved to strike “any evidence pertaining to any one of the women who were testified to by Sergeants Rucci, Frank, Dee, ■ Detectives Stelmach and-Lieutenant Roach didn’t testify to any.” The defendants claim that evidence of arrests for prostitution of' the women referred to was inadmissible because there was no evidence of conviction. The court denied the motion except as it applied to five of the women. But no objection was made to the court’s treatment of the motion, and no exceptions were taken by the defendants. This being so, we have no occasion to review the court’s ruling on the motion. Practice Book § 226; Maltbie, Conn. App. Proc. § 147.
The defendants unsuccessfully moved to strike the testimony of Officer Daley on the ground that the act of solicitation involving him took place off the premises. In support of their contention, they cite State v. Curtis, 146 Conn. 365, 370, to the effect that an act of lewdness under § 53-226 must take place indoors. In the instant case, the officer was leaving the premises when a girl (named) in the last booth followed him out “and at the entrance way to
The defendants also assign error in the admission of certain evidence relating to the general reputation of the defendants’ place of business. An officer testified that he had known the establishment for two years, or since its purchase by the defendants, and during this period had checked it at least two or three times a week and had arrested women who resorted to the place on the ground of prostitution. He was then asked if he knew the general reputation of the place, and he answered, “The reputation of the place is that of a hangout of prostitutes and assignators.” Since the defendants neither objected nor took an exception to this testimony, we have no reason to review it. Practice Book § 226; Maltbie, Conn. App. Proc. § 147. See cases cited above relating to competency of evidence offered for the purpose of proving reputation.
The defendants assign error in the court’s rulings on certain evidence as those rulings related to § 53-226. The evidence consisted of conversations between the police and the solicitors (named) on the defendants’ premises. The state claimed a violation of the statute in that the defendants permitted
The defendants further assign error in the court’s conclusions relating to § 53-226 “without evidence.” Strictly, such assignments do not present a reviewable question of law. City Bank & Trust Co. v. Ruthinian Greek Catholic Church, 102 Conn. 609, 610. We assume that the attack is made on the ground that the conclusions are not supported by the subordinate facts. In their argument and brief, the defendants contend that scienter is an essential element and that the subordinate facts “negative scienter.” The word “permits” must be construed according to its approved usage. General Statutes §1-1. Used in this sense, it means “1. to allow; consent to; tolerate.” Webster, New World Dictionary (College Ed.). To “permit” means suffering or allowing without interference or prohibition. Territory v. Stone, 2 Dak. 155. It implies knowledge. State v. Cooke, 130 Ore. 552. In that posture of the case, the court found that during the period in which the activities in question were occurring and arrests were being made, an officer on the premises pointed out four women (named) to Albert and told him they had all been arrested for prostitution; that both Albert and Oronzo were warned by
The defendants further assign error in the court’s conclusion as it relates to § 53-230. It should be pointed out initially that the defendants were charged with “keeping a house of ill-fame . . . 53-230.” The judgment file indicates that the defendants were found guilty of “keeping house of ill-fame.” The court concluded, however, that the defendants were guilty of “keeping a house of ill-fame ... in that they kept a house which is or reputed to be, a house or place of assignation.” Section 53-230 contains two independent clauses, one relating to a house of ill fame and one relating to a house of assignation. Each is a separate and distinct interdict. The syntactical arrangement lends itself to the principle of statutory construction “that, if possible, no clause, sentence or word shall be superfluous, void or insignificant.” Fenwick v. Old Saybrook, 133 Conn. 22, 28. Courts must presume that the legislature had a purpose for every sentence, clause, or phrase in a legislative enactment. McAdams v. Barbieri, 143 Conn. 405, 419. It is unnecessary, however, to determine any
There is no error as to the first count; there is error as to the second count, the judgment is set aside as to the second count only and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment that the defendants are not guilty on that count.
In this opinion Kinmonth and Kosicki, Js., concurred.
“See. 53-226. prostitution; lewdness; assignation. As used in this section, 'prostitution’ includes the offering or receiving of the body for sexual intercourse for hire and the offering or receiving of the body for promiscuous sexual intercourse without hire, 'lewdness’ ineludes any indecent or obscene act and 'assignation’ includes the making of any appointment or engagement for prostitution or lewdness or any act in furtherance of such appointment or engagement. Any person who receives, or offers or agrees to receive, any person into any place, structure, building or conveyance for the purpose of prostitution, lewdness or assignation or permits any person to remain there for such purpose . . . [shall be punished]. . . .”
“Sec. 53-230. keeping a house of ill-fame or a disorderly house. Any person who keeps a house which is, or is reputed to be, a house of ill-fame, or which is resorted to, or is reputed to be resorted to, for the purposes of prostitution or lewdnéss, or a house which is, or is reputed to be, a house or place of assignation ... or keeps or maintains a disorderly house . . . [shall be punished].”