*1
STATE OF MONTANA,
Appellee,
Plaintiff and
GREGORY ALAN MAINE,
Appellant.
Defendant
DANo.
10-0329.
Submitted on Briefs March
2011.
2,May
Decided
JUSTICE BAKER concurred. in part part.
JUSTICE RICE concurred and dissented in Defender, Matthew Appellant: Joslyn Hunt, Appellate For Chief Defender, Wilcox, Helena. Appellate M. Assistant General, Bullock, Attorney Appellee: For Steve Montana Wellenstein, General, Helena; Attorney Micheal Assistant Hayworth, Attorney, County Forsyth. Michael B. Rosebud Opinion JUSTICE NELSON delivered the of the Court. Gregory The State Alan Maine in charged of Montana Court, County, driving Sixteenth Judicial District Rosebud with (DUI). 61-8-401(l)(a), MCA. Because the influence of alcohol Section convictions, charged present Maine had three DUI §61-8-731, DUI, felony. as Maine’s fourth MCA. Maine offense seeking filed a motion to invalidate one of the DUI, thus reduce the offense his third a misdemeanor. The present guilty Maine then pleaded pursuant District Court denied motion. plea agreement, reserving appeal denial of his motion. appeal The sole issue on the District Court erred whether
denying Charge Maine’s Motion to Reduce to Misdemeanor. We affirm.
BACKGROUND underlying evening The events DUI occurred July Sergeant County Spencer Anderson of the Rosebud parked Sheriffs Office came a car on the left-hand side of facing wrong Greenleaf Road vehicle one direction. The had occupant, Maine, who asleep behind the wheel. Anderson woke Maine, who been explained sleeping he had he was tired. because Maine stated that he had parked wrong side the road because side, there though was more room on that noted that Anderson there gravel roadway was no more room on the left side than there was on the right way Kinsey, side. Maine insisted that he was on his City is located County, which northeast of Miles Custer when in fact *3 City he was 60 miles in County. southwest Miles Rosebud Anderson strong coming smelled a odor of an beverage alcoholic from Maine and eyes glassy. noted that his were and bloodshot Based on these tests, sobriety observations and results of several Anderson transported to the Forsyth Maine Sheriffs Office in and booked him jail. into Through check, a County Attorney records the Rosebud
¶4 ascertained that Maine had three DUI in convictions: 1991 Oregon, Hence, in County, County. 1994 Rosebud and 1997 in Rosebud DUI, prosecutor charged offense, Maine subsequent with fourth or noted, felony. As Maine a filed Motion to Reduce Charge Misdemeanor. He asserted that the 1997 conviction was and invalid therefore could not be charging used as the basis for felony. parties briefed this issue and District Court held a hearing Maine, officer, which a law enforcement and a former detention officer testified, introduced, and relating four exhibits were all to the 1997 conviction, conviction. The circumstances of as described Maine, are as follows. 28, 1996, At on July around noon Maine attended a in rodeo couple he of beers at the Upon arriving, drank a
Ingomar, Montana. Rodney employer, garden. there, he noticed former beer While hello I said testified that ‘Mr. Newman said Newman. Maine says, meaning to talk hello, looking at And he ‘I’ve been and I was him. ‘Yeah, meaning you too.’ And I said, to talk you,’ and I I’ve been that’s my with when he having asked him if he was an affair wife According Maine, five of friends held swung at me.” Newman’s point to the Maine while Newman beat Maine down consciousness, he walked over regained unconsciousness. When Maine He then noticed his assailants trough to a horse to wash his face. him. that he felt threatened and walking toward Maine testified did go Ingomar, no in which not have place believed that he had safe Thus, headed to his down police pickup station. he went Forsyth, roughly away. 40 miles Highway 12 toward Meanwhile, County deputies responding two were to the Rosebud Maine, reportedly who report Ingomar involving of an altercation in route, En challenging fight.” deputies was “drunk and one recognized traveling They direction. pickup opposite Maine’s around, driving turned him intending to follow and observe distance, immediately pulled a short Maine over on behavior for but initiative. his own At he had driven about miles from point, had Ingomar. deputies persons Maine told the that several held him Rodney down Newman beat him. Maine had visible cuts and while appeared head body, abrasions on his but none of them life- night He admitted he had drunk 12 threatening. beers before couple day Ingomar. and a Based on this Roundup of beers admission, dispatch beverage the odor an alcoholic report, sobriety tests, results emanating person, from his and the of field transported Maine arrest for DUI and him to deputies placed Forsyth. center in detention counsel, ultimately proceeded appointed and his case Maine was Court, at the County to a bench trial in Rosebud Justice conclusion fined and sentenced guilty. $300 which he was found The court Maine jail, days suspended. him to He received credit for days with 53 (1 him day), days time which court told he could leaving served appeal serve Maine did not the conviction to on consecutive weekends. novo, pursue any postconviction District for a trial nor did de *4 review. had charge to DUI that he not been Maine’s defense the 1996 was Maine, driving. According his
under the influence of alcohol while possibility with him the of a attorney never raised or discussed §45-2-212, MCA; MT compulsion Leprowse, See State v. defense. (a may assert DUI). Yet, a his compulsion charge given affirmative defense of of fleeing argued his a Ingomar pickup, reasons for Maine that compulsion “obviously” Thus, have raised. he defense should been of asserted that he had received ineffective assistance counsel and that infirm as a result. In response, conviction prosecutor that had not argued presumption Maine overcome thing, not argued, that conviction valid. For one he Maine had away Ingomar established that his decision to drive from met the six Moreover, compulsion. Leprowse, argued elements of that compulsion may trial counsel’s failure raise a defense have been trial product strategy of sound that Maine had not shown otherwise. motion, denying its order Maine’s the District Court observed
[i]t impossible adequately for the Court to sort out the claims viability compulsion and counterclaims regarding of a defense years at a trial ago testimony conducted more than without Maine, participants, except Mr. and without trial testimony of counsel as to whether he considered and, so, compulsion why defense if he did not it at trial. All the Court has is Mr. of Maine’s recollections what was or was [trial The does not counsel’s] discussed. Court have testimony recollections. Nor does the have the of Court the other in, to, participants Ingomar witnesses altercation. theAll say compulsion Court can is that the defense should have been inject considered and have sufficient been reasonable doubt in of say the mind the trier fact. The Court cannot necessarily it provided would have defense complete as claimed by the Defense. District concluded that “allegation Maine’s based raising
ineffective counsel on not affirmative defense as questions fact . which remain . . does not render ‘constitutionally purposes determining infirm’ for the enhancement punishment later offenses.” The court reasoned there is finality need for possibility” the “mere of a different outcome original in the trial is insufficient invalidate the conviction. In this regard, the court noted that the present require situation-which would ‘20-20 hindsight” inquiry viability into the defense of a that was distinguishable never raised-is from situation in which the alleged *5 proceeding” and the it taints the entire fundamental error is “so its face.” constitutionally infirm “on thus resulting conviction is Maine, plea in accordance with Court sentenced The District ¶11 months, followed of Corrections for 13 Department to the agreement, now appeals. sentence. Maine by 3-year suspended prison a OF REVIEW STANDARD enhancement may used for sentence prior 12 a conviction Whether ¶ law, review de novo. State v. for which our generally question a Weaver, 194, 195 (1995); v. 321, 323, 903 P.2d State Hansen, 273 Mont. However, 86, 10, 196, P.3d 342 Mont. 179 534. 2008 MT ¶ invalid, may court first conviction is determining prior whether fact, documentary evidence findings based on oral and need to make of that parties, regarding the circumstances presented 65, Peterson, Weaver, 9; 2002 MT e.g. ¶¶ State v. ¶ conviction. findings 199, 44 will not disturb such unless 309 Mont. P.3d 499. We Weaver, Peterson, 9; 7. they clearly are erroneous. ¶ ¶
DISCUSSION
(1997),
Okland,
10,
Misdemeanor and with evidentiary exhibits at the hearing. adduced He asserts that “conclusively evidence compulsion show[s]” that acted out of when *6 Ingomar *7 Lackawanna, Custis, Daniels, discussing Before the details Supreme it is note bear useful to two earlier Court decisions which on Texas, v. S. Ct. First, Burgett this discussion. 389 U.S. (1967), forgery conviction in Tennessee was the defendant’s during objected trial state court. He introduced his assault in Texas ground the in violation of his forgery conviction was obtained objection, right The court was to counsel. trial overruled 110-13, Ct. On appeal, convicted. Id. at 88 S. at 259-61. State, Bingman argued application rule in v. 2005 MT State also State, 18-21, Bingman Respt. v. at 329 Mont. P.3d 1235. Br. of 2004). (June 4,
No. 04-146
reversed. The Court stated that
the Constitution places
as requiring
limitations on state criminal
such
procedures,
and the
of illegally
exclusion of coerced confessions
exclusion
seized
113-14,
requirement
evidence. Id. at
[t]o conviction obtained in violation Gideon Wainwright against person support guilt be used either punishment enhance for another offense is to erode the principle yet, of that case. Worse since defect in the conviction counsel, right denial of the in effect accused suffers anew deprivation from the Sixth right. Amendment (citation omitted). Id. at Ct. at 262 The Court concluded that Burgett’s prior, constitutionally admission of infirm conviction was inherently and, thus, not prejudicial harmless. Id. Second, Tucker, in United States v. S. Ct. 589 (two
(1972), the defendant’s state-court convictions from Florida Louisiana) during one from introduced his jury were trial federal court district and were considered the trial judge at sentencing. years later, a conclusively Several California state court determined the Louisiana one of Florida convictions invalid were because Tucker’s counsel had underlying been violated in the proceedings. Tucker then filed a motion in the federal district court challenging earlier use at trial of the now-invalidated convictions. The court district held that harmless, the error was Appeals and the Court of Ninth Circuit guilt affirmed as to the phase of Tucker’s trial. the Ninth But Circuit found that the defective prior have led the district court to impose prison heavier sentence than it otherwise would Thus, appellate have. court remanded the resentencing. case for Id. at Ct. government appealed, 92 S. at 590-91. The and the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court noted that imposed the sentence by the court district had ‘founded part been at least magnitude,” misinformation rejected constitutional and the Court government’s contention that this error was harmless. Id. at 447-49, 92 S. Ct. 591-92. Custis, Daniels, and Lackawanna likewise involved
prior state-court
convictions used
enhance the defendants’ current
Custis,
challenge
sentences.
sentencing
arose in a federal
proceeding.
offenses,
Custis was
convicted
two federal
and government moved to have his sentence
enhanced
the Armed
*8
(ACCA)
prior
based on three
state-court
Act of 1984
Career Criminal
on
challenged
use of two of those convictions
convictions.3 Custis
and
ineffective assistance of counsel
he had received
grounds
Custis,
U.S. at
rights.
of his
advised
adequately
had not been
487-88,
federal
Congress had not
purposes,
used for enhancement
convictions
the ACCA. Id. at
490-93, 114 S. Ct.
such
authorized
authorization,
statutory
that,
held
absent
at
The Court
1735-37.
a federal
prior
conviction in the course of
not attack
490-97, 114
sentencing proceeding. Id.
at
Ct. at 1735-39. The Court
S.
holding:
ease of
policy
support
two
concerns
in
cited
(related
obtaining
to
in
state-court
administration
the difficulties
records)
Id.
finality of
judgments.
and
and
transcripts
promoting
496-97, 114
acknowledged
holdings
its
at
S. Ct. at 1738-39. The
Tucker,
Burgett
Gideon claims.
in
but limited those decisions
Thus,
exception to the bar on collateral
recognized only
the Court
one
alleged
if the
to have been
attacks:
conviction is
obtained
Id.
493-96, 114
counsel.
at
S. Ct. at
appointed
violation of
such violations are
and rise
“unique”
1737-38.
Court stated that
Id.
at
‘jurisdictional
to the level of
defect.”
at
S. Ct.
Id. As a
Moreover,
they
generally easy
verify
are
from
record.
matter,
Court noted that
still had other means of
final
Custis
if he
attacking
question,
convictions in
were successful
reopen any
then
federal
those
apply
could
sentence enhanced
convictions. Id. at
dissented. Burgett and Tucker. He observed that reading narrow these two had stand long thought proposition decisions been for the broader given sentencing] “‘[n]o [at consideration can to a conviction ” Custis, unconstitutionally that was obtained.’ (brackets (quoting Wright, at 1740 Charles Alan original) Ct. (1982)). Procedure vol. 3, §526, 102 Federal Practice and And he noted Burgett Tucker appeals consistently that federal courts of had read (relied as to entertain claims that convictions requiring courts provides unlawfully possesses who The ACCA an enhanced sentence for a felon by any §922(g) previous a court for a violent U.S.C. and has three firearm violation of 18 . §924(e). felony drug or a serious offense. See 18 U.S.C. enhancement) were unconstitutional Gideon other than reasons self-incrimination, confrontation, and ineffective violations-such as cases). Id. (citing assistance of counsel violations. Justice Souter Burgett and Tucker dealt acknowledged directly with claimed Gideon, argued reasoning but he that the principles violations claimed applied equally forth in those cases violations other set *9 505-06, 114 Id. at at rights. constitutional S. Ct. 1743-44. In this regard, questioned treating the soundness of right-to-appointed- differently than right-to-effective-assistance-of-counsel counsel claims pointed claims. He out that formality
[t]he guarantees Sixth Amendment no mere Strickland, supra, appointment, counsel, but the cf. “assistance”of (‘That 685, 686, 104 S.Ct., at at a who person happens be lawyer alongside a at enough trial the accused... is not “ satisfy [Sixth right Amendment]” the because ‘the to counsel ”), is the the right to effective assistance of counsel’ and whether Strickland, the violation is of Gideon or the defendant has been right. denied that constitutional (brackets
Id.
at
S.
at 1744
ellipsis
original). Finally,
Ct.
and
‘jurisdictional”
Justice
Souter
criticized
notion
and
“nonjurisdictional”
rights. He
out
pointed
the misuse of the term
‘jurisdiction,”
difficulty
devising
as well as the
a standard to tell
whether a flaw in the proceedings leading to a conviction
as a
counts
‘jurisdictional defect.”He
suggested
the denial
effective counsel
under Strickland
‘jurisdictional
no less a
than
defect”
the denial of
Id. at
Gideon.
appointed
508-10,
under
counsel
¶26
overruled,
that
review of collateral
noting
should be
prove
given
appropriate
not
burden
unusually
need
burdensome
532
at
consideration of the
circumstances”
lower
410,
in the first
Montana Law
noted,
Custis
adopt
As
the State
that we
rule in
proposes
holds
used
Montana. That rule
for enhancement
may
challenged
not be
any
theory
federal court under
constitutional
Custis,
except a Gideon
496,
Constitution
a defendant
from being
sentenced based
v. Phillips,
misinformation. 17,
248,
2007 MT
337 Mont.
constitutionally
P.3d
A
159
infirm
conviction used
enhancement
purposes constitutes “misinformation of constitutional
magnitude.” Tucker,
Thus,
“[i]n
U.S. at
‘Jurisdictional”
undermine our recent efforts
clarify
meaning
of ‘Jurisdiction.”
1,
1,
Garrymore,
MT
10 n.
334 Mont.
e.g.
State v.
¶
42-44,
946;
Eighteenth
Court, 2007 MT
¶¶
Miller v.
Jud. Dist.
City
121;
162 P.3d
Ballas v. Missoula
Bd.
MT
340 Mont.
asserted-or Gideon claims but example, particular Strickland claims. As for this provides meaningless appointed counsel is if the counsel appointed assistance; and, respect, ineffective it makes little sense to allow claims that counsel but to disallow claims that appointed But to the all appointed point, counsel was ineffective. more Walker, 74, rights rights, contained in Article II are fundamental rights sufficiently disagree premise we that some of these are with challenges, in collateral while others “unique” merit consideration choosing among deserving. Picking rights are not so constitutional arbitrary under a is another and unworkable “uniqueness” standard approach. purposes for enhancement When a conviction offered (as
challenged, evaluating the defendant’s claim the difficulties case) necessarily are the result not illustrated in *12 raised, particular theory but rather of the of adequacy constitutional Granted, adequacy generally the record. the of the record will theory. Yet, correspond underlying with the while most Gideon may record, violations be from the the will ascertainable face of that always case; not the and most not may be while Strickland violations without transcripts evidentiary be resolvable trial and a full-blown may from hearing, apparent paper may some the record. This be true, well, claims, as of other constitutional such as a violation of the privilege against plea self-incrimination or a that not guilty Hence, knowing intelligent. the of and existence administrative evaluating in challenges justify burdens collateral does not limiting particular rights may Rather, justifies which be asserted. it requiring seeking provide the defendant to avoid enhancement a sufficient record claim, on which to resolve the suffer particular or denial of claim of proof. due to failure of light foregoing, we the appropriate conclude that First,
balance is struck as follows.
we
in
principle that,
adhere to the
Montana,
may
constitutionally
“the State
not
use
infirm conviction
to support
Okland,
an enhanced punishment.”
283 Mont. at
Second,
P.2d at 434.
we see no reason to
general
abandon the
approach
Thus,
set forth in Okland.
we will continue to
this
apply
framework
(1)
evaluating
prior
collateral
convictions:
a rebuttable
presumption
regularity
conviction,
of
prior
attaches
we
presume
court
convicting
complied
all
with
law in
(2)
respects;
the defendant has the initial
burden
demonstrate that
(3)
infirm;
conviction is
once the
so,
defendant has done
the State has the burden to
rebut
.5
defendant’s evidence
However,
moving
as the
party,
the ultimate
of
burden
proof-which includes both
production
the burden of
the burden
persuasion6-shall
defendant,
be on the
must
prove by
who
preponderance of the evidence that
the conviction is
invalid.
by
burden is not
prove
State to
preponderance
the evidence
approach ‘ignoréis]”
postconviction
The State’s assertion that this
time bar
§46-21-102, MCA,
incorrect,
vacate,
aside,
is
as the defendant does not
“to
seek
set
sentence”imposed
underlying charge,
§46-21-101(1), MCA,
or correct the
on the
see
but
prevent
being
allegedly
rather seeks to
infirm
sentence from
enhanced based
anon
conviction.
Dictionary
(Bryan
ed.,
ed.,
Law
See Black’s
A. Garner
9th
Thomson Reuters
2009).
(see
valid,
facet
the framework
is
and this
the conviction
18, 941
cited above
and the cases
Okland,
that his
her
the use of the conviction
regularity
bar
presumption
note that
consistent with
approach
enhancement. We
reviewing
challenges.
federal courts when
such
followed
(8th
2008);
Cir.
Reyes-Solano,
543 F.3d
United States
(9th
1998);
Allen,
Cir.
United
153 F.3d
United States v.
*13
(10th
2003);
Cruz-Alcala,
see also
338 F.3d
Cir.
States v.
(1992).
viability
compulsion defense
a trial
conducted more than
years ago
testimony
without the
the participants, except for
*14
Maine,
Mr.
testimony
without
of trial counsel as to
he
and,
so,
whether
the compulsion
why
considered
defense
if
he
did not
it at trial.
cases,
¶39 Maine relies on our
that have found the first prong of
be
plausible
Strickland to met because there
justification”
was ‘ho
counsel’s conduct. See e.g.
Jefferson,
State v.
2003 MT
¶
641;
Mont.
243, 24,
MT
Kougl,
323 ¶
us, however,
counsel’s has performance that, errors, probability but for counsel’s demonstrated reasonable ‘(reasonable A the result of the trial would have been different. in the probability’is probability sufficient undermine confidence Ankeny, 54; Strickland, 466 Ct. at outcome. Court that the Again, agree compulsion we with the District defense “may inject doubt in mind have been sufficient reasonable necessarily provided a complete trier fact” but would have if his as defense as claimed Maine. Even version events taken true, jury “reasonably” it up was still decide whether he bodily upon him believed that death or serious harm would inflicted Highway if he miles did not drive 20 down while MCA; 12, 14-15. §45-2-212, We Leprowse, influence of alcohol. See ¶¶ cannot on the limited record before us that Maine’s belief was say as a matter of law. “reasonable” offense, punishable person guilty other “A is not of an than an offense with death, by performs compulsion under the of threat or reason conduct which he bodily reasonably or if he menace of the imminent infliction of death serious harm bodily if he harm will be inflicted him does not
believes that death serious perform such conduct.” *15 sum, prove by Maine has not met his burden to a ¶42 preponderance of evidence that his 1997 conviction is constitutionally infirm due ineffective assistance of his trial counsel.
CONCLUSION denying District did not err The Court Maine’s Motion to ¶43 Charge to Reduce Misdemeanor. Affirmed.
¶44 McGRATH, BAKER, COTTER,
CHIEF JUSTICE JUSTICES WHEAT and MORRIS concur. BAKER, concurring.
JUSTICE opinion. I concur in the Court’s This has held more than forty years that a infirm conviction not be used Lewis, 463, 457 to support punishment. enhanced 153 Mont. at P.2d at 1997, applied 766. Since we have that rule to allow a defendant collaterally attack a conviction by “presenting] direct evidence his claim support rights that his constitutional were violated in Okland, a prior proceeding.” at Mont. P.2d 436. While finality the strong judgments supports interest in placing limit on convictions, collateral of underlying attack there is no textual basis for a rule that allows such attack for the violation of one fundamental right another, equally but not the violation of right. fundamental I agree therefore with reject the Court’s decision to that artificial distinction in favor of a rule of convenience. legislature The has enacted strict limitations on convicted
person’s
to seek
postconviction relief from a
imposed
sentence
violation of the
or
constitution
laws of this State or the constitution of
46-21-101-105,
States.
United
Sections
MCA.
statutes
expressly allow an
year
additional one
within
to challenge
which
discovery
conviction
of new evidence that would establish a
46-21-102(2), MCA;
actual
defendant’s
innocence. Section
Beach v.
State,
21-22,
MT
353 Mont.
¶¶
P.3d
We have
consistently
applied these limits in the
of finality
interest
judgments, preserving
integrity
judicial process,
securing
orderly
justice.
e.g.
Rosales,
administration of
226, 999
2000 MT
313;
State,
Mont.
Davis v.
MT
JUSTICE
from
but dissent
the
affirming
I
the District Court
concur
¶48
right
the
the
to
reasoning, particularly,
expansive
creation of
Court’s
collateral
judgments. The Court’s decision authorizes
challenge prior
virtually
grounds,
limitless
upon prior
attacks
jurisprudence
permitted challenges
which
substantially expanding our
Now,
to counsel.
whenever
right
asserted violations
upon
based
enhancement,
sentencing
any
as
conviction
to serve
a
in the
based defect
challenge which asserts a
matter.
may be
in the midst of the criminal
conviction
raised
the
jurisprudence
the
of
U.S.
approach
The Court’s
conflicts with
the
of state
Supreme
jurisprudence
Court
also is inconsistent with
protections
under the enhanced
courts who have considered
issue
their
State courts have likewise
respective
of
state constitutions.
recognized
unique
by
right
the
the
to counsel and
purposes
served
For
right.
have
to
of that
the
limited collateral
violations
articulated,
have
I
likewise
they
reasons
would
hold.
”
....’ finality
A
of
key principle
“‘promoting
judgments
the
2006)
(Ark.
State,
Custis
Camp
v.
v.
221
369
(quoting
S.W.3d
States,
(1994)); see
1732, 1739
United
also
485, 497, 114
511 U.S.
S. Ct.
(1979).
Addonizio,
United States v.
As
442 U.S.
Inroads on of tend to undermine confidence in Moreover, integrity of increased volume of procedures. our judicial of processing work associated with the collateral attacks inevitably impairs delays orderly administration justice. Because is no limit on the time a collateral there when may made, hearings are evidentiary attack be often inconclusive may attack is impossible and retrials if the successful. (internal Addonizio, 442 U.S. n. Ct. at n. 11 at 184-85 99 S. omitted). Supreme citation The Court has also observed when a collaterally convictions, seeking he is to challenges previous defendant in a proceeding of “their force and effect had deprive them normal judgments.” than purpose other to overturn independent (1992). Raley, Parke 20, 30, v. S. Ct. This judgments instant old in order to requires proceedings re-litigate proceed. Although acknowledges legitimate Court interest
finality, finality by permitting decision nonetheless undermines range prior judgments. attacks Court broad new collateral dissent in quotes proposition Justice Souter’s Daniels that a “ generally paid penalty ‘has defendant whatever old conviction entailed; may forgone challenge well have direct because ” practically challenging was not worth ....’ penalty Opinion, ¶ States, 374, 391, (quoting Daniels v. United 532 U.S. 121 S. Ct. (2001)). However, finality judgment of a should not be abandoned challenge sufficiently because have been convenient or bring beneficial for the defendant at the time. As stated Michigan, Michigan judiciary singularly, ‘both the citizenry and the rights protections obligated whose collective it is have a protect, compelling championing finality interest (Mich. judgments.” People criminal Carpentier, N.W.2d 1994). A right appeal, right in Montana has the with the counsel, right challenge judgment and the in a post conviction proceeding year. Later, discovered, within if one new evidence is challenge year defendant has the within one *17 46-21-102(2), after discovering Facially the evidence. Section MCA. illegal may challenged State, sentences by corpus. be habeas v. Lott 279, 270, 150 MT 2006 334 Mont. P.3d 337. Convictions remain which final, these should despite only remedies subject deemed to a challenge for right counsel, violation of the unique to with its protections, Supreme discussed hereinafter. The Court of Idaho reasoned that a ‘has challenge several to the opportunities validity conviction,” including his or her appeal, post conviction illegal and challenge sentence, concluded, relief to an Tt]he Court rejects cloth, the create invitation ‘to from whole a fourth mechanism validity conviction, attacking prior for the of a in essence a collateral proceeding the middle of a criminal at which case the defendant challenge validity any Weber, could prior judgment....’ the ’’State v. (Idaho 2004) (citation omitted). 314, 90 P.3d 320-21 A second judicial reason of the process. administration Addressing system, the court Supreme federal the Court in Custis noted that counsel, “determination claims of ineffective assistance of guilty and failure to assure that a plea voluntary, require would sentencing rummage through frequently courts to nonexistent transcripts may difficult to obtain” or records that date “from another
203 Addressing 496, S. at 1738-39. Custis, 511 at Ct. era.” U.S. driving while previous convictions upon attacks collateral “allowing a Court of Kansas reasoned suspended, Supreme inadequate plea the basis collateral attack on every sentencing to look behind would force the court colloquies Delacruz, rely no to practically with record on.” 1995). (Kan. attempts mitigate 1042, 1049 Court P.2d While defendant, all by proof upon problems placing these burden face a ‘trial involving potentially conviction will now cases stated, trial,” or, challenge has within Supreme Court within a as purpose other than to overturn proceeding independent “a that had an Parke, 30, 113 at at S. Ct. 523. This will prior judgments.” 506 U.S. trial judicial require time and resources and courts further burden them based stale judgments hear and assess long passed4f the memories are years evidence and faded memories of 10-11, 13, 324 Snell, MT at all. In State v. ¶¶ available to a 14- challenge the district court was faced with year-old key conviction where a witness had died. While defendant, problem places it also a burden on proof cases-forc[ing them] hear such look behind courts to and decide Delacruz, every rely no record to on.” practically conviction with P.2d at 1049. context, by function uniqueness In this there served
right commonly recognized. Analyzing to counsel which courts have its history, described a jurisprudential Supreme Court Custis of the as a constitutional defect.” right “unique violation counsel Custis, 511 U.S. 114 Ct. at As the Supreme S. explained, right’s that, fact uniqueness derives from the without it, rights could be of the jeopardized other constitutional because Custis, lack of assert 511 U.S. at understanding accused’s them. 494-96, 114 S. This was the central thrust of the Ct. at 1737-38. (1963), U.S. holding Wainwright, in Gideon v. 83 Ct. 792 Alabama, precedent upon which Gideon relied. See Powell v. (1932) (other 45, rights S. Ct. be “of would counsel”). comprehend little if it heard avail did not to be Court, Relying Supreme on the United States Court of *18 ‘Is explained right North Dakota that the to counsel fundamental has it an fair trial” and that ‘the procure because enables accused to right very integrity counsel ‘the of the fact- impeaches denial of to (N.D. 1985) Orr, finding process.’” State v. 375 N.W.2d 177-78 Walker, 618, 639, (quoting Linkletter v. 381 U.S. 85 Ct.
(1965),
part,
Ky.,
v.
107 S.
overruled
Ct.
Griffith
(1987)).
reasoning
limiting
courts
offered similar
supreme
State
have
protections
attacks under the enhanced constitutional
of
collateral
Addressing
their
state constitutions.
the same issue we face
today-collateral
attacks
DUI
prior
Supreme
convictions-the
rejected
challenge
brought
Court of North Dakota
defendant had
based, in
part, upon
insufficiency
asserted
factual basis for
prior
rule,
federal
plea
adopted
stating
‘North
independent
right
Dakota’ s
strong
notion
counsel under the North
in way
holding today.”
Dakota Constitution is
no
eroded
our
(N.D. 1999).
Mund,
Supreme
v.
593 N.W.2d
The
760-62
Court
issue,
Michigan, discussing a related
that ‘Michigan
reasoned
has
recognized
unique import
of a
right
defendant’s constitutional
exceptional
counsel. The
nature of this
protection
constitutional
similarly
counsels for
atypical protection.” Carpentier, 521
at
N.W.2d
(internal
omitted).
199-200
citations
(N.H.
Weeks,
1996),
In State
Supreme
New Hampshire challenge prior considered the defendant’s to a stalking ground misdemeanor on the stalking vague was unconstitutionally Weeks, statute A.2d overbroad. 89. Recognizing at that the defendant was from doing barred so under law, federal analyzed question constitutional the court under state Weeks, constitutional law. at A.2d 89-90. The court concluded right to counsel was a unique right constitutional and held that right ‘the defendant no challenge prior collaterally has convictions the hearing revoking at her suspended except sentence when right conviction was based on a denial of the appointed counsel....” Weeks, 681 A.2d Supreme began Court of analysis Hawaii its extensive course,
issue with
proposition
“Co]f
the fact that the federal
recognizes only
constitution
collaterally
limited
attack
not mean
does
that similar limitations need be imposed
(Haw.
Veikoso,
under our state constitution.” State v.
74 P.3d
2003). Nonetheless,
authorities,
after surveying it
“that
concluded
collaterally
a defendant
attack
counseled DUI
they
convictions on the basis that
were obtained as the
result
allegedly
guilty pleas”
invalid
such
because
attacks must be
limited
alleged
Veikoso,
of the right
violations
to counsel.
enhanced sentence
alleges
of the constitutional
the
that a violation
unless
offender
Instead,
the
the
conviction.
lawyer
to a
occurred in
right
to
under
law
means available
state
may use whatever
offender
in a
grounds
other
validity of
conviction on
challenge
the
a
proceeding,
sentence
other than the enhanced
forum
Hahn,
established
during
proceeding,
relief,
subsequent
rather than
post conviction
Appeals
pre-
in the
extensively by Maryland
Court of
discussed
(Md. 1993). The
State,
of
629 A.2d
Custis case
Fairbanks
“spectrum [constitutional]
Court first observed that
Fairbanks
broad,” including, fin
“necessarily
to a
challenges”
prior conviction
denial
effective
right
to
to counsel claims ...
addition
denial of
counsel,
right
jury trial, coerced
by
denial of
representation
confession,
incrimination,
jeopardy,
self
uninformed
double
Fairbanks,
lack
the like.”
involuntary guilty
process,
of due
and
plea,
“[allowing
that
Court reasoned
629 A.2d
64.
Fairbanks
any constitutionally
challenge
predicate
to a
defendant mount
based
(or other) sentencing proceeding
at a
would
recidivist
significant
difficulties,”
requiring
procedural
but
benefits,”
significant
procedures
defendant
“utilize established
offers
case, the
opportunity
plead
investigate
such as the
properly
have
opportunity
review
record
determine whether issues
waived, and,
having
fifthe
in
a conviction
been
successful
overturned,
a new
judge may grant
by ordering
trial
full relief
(footnotes omitted).
Fairbanks,
case
trial.”