13 Or. 235 | Or. | 1886
We are of the opinion in .this- .ease that the circuit court should have permitted the appel
It was claimed by the respondent’s counsel, upon the argument, that the substance of the question was asked the witness under another form, that was unobjectionable; but that cannot be conceded, nor would it be likely to have obviated the effect of the error if such had been the case. The appellant’s counsel should have been allowed • to pursue his own course in attempting .to draw out •proof, as long as he kept within reasonable bounds, ft must clearly appear that an error is harmless in such a case to prevent a reversal of the judgment.
The appellant’s counsel claimed that it was error in the court’s making the remark it did upon overruling the motion to postpone the cause until the following morning; but as that is not likely to occur again, we
We deem it our duty to send the. case back for a new trial upon the points referred to. The other errors assigned were not well taken.
The granting of a new trial in a criminal case creates an additional expense upon the county where it is had, and the occasion for it should be obviated as much as possible. We have heretofore suggested one means of avoiding the necessity of having to grant new trials in such cases. It is by pursuing a liberal course in the admission of testimony in the trial court. Testimony that has any possible bearing upon the defendant’s case should not be excluded. Such a course would save time in the trial of a cause, and prevent the apprehension upon the part of the defendant that he had not had a fair and impartial hearing. Nor would it, in our opinion, be any more liable to allow guilty parties to escape punishment.
The judgment appealed from is reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial.