State v. MageeState v. Magee
The defendant, Dwayne Magee, was сharged by grand jury indictment with first degree murder, a violation of
ERRORS PATENT
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to suppress his cоnfession.
In a prior writ application, Magee sought review of the trial court‘s denial of his motion to suppress. State v. Magee, an unpublished writ bearing docket number K91-511 (La. App. 3rd Cir., June 7, 1991). This court rejected Magee‘s assertion that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, finding that thе evidence presented supported the trial court‘s conclusion that the defendant‘s statement was voluntary.
The prior deniаl of supervisory writs does not bar reconsideration of an issue on appeal, nor does it prevent the appellate panel from reaching a different conclusion. State v. Fontenot, 550 So.2d 179 (La.1989); State v. Decuir, 599 So.2d 358 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1992), writ denied, 605 So.2d 1095 (La. 1992). When a defendant does not present any additional evidence on this issue аfter the pre-trial ruling, the issue can be rejected on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Regan, 601 So.2d 5 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1992), writ denied, 610 So.2d 815 (La.1993); State v. Wright, 564 So.2d 1269 (La.App. 4th Cir.1989). Judicial efficiency demands that this court accord great deference to its pre-trial decision unless it is apparent that the determination was patently erroneоus and produced unjust results. State v. Decuir, supra, at 360.
Magee argues on appeal that the prosecuting attorney induced him to make a confessiоn by misleading him into believing that the State‘s case was very strong and that a confession would be insignificant. The defendant asserts that, as it turned out, his confession was a vital part of the State‘s case and that he would not have given the confession had he not been given the impression that the confession was insignificant.
The trial court‘s conclusions on the credibility and weight of testimony relating to the voluntarinеss of a confession for the purpose of admissibility will not be overturned on appeal unless they are not supported by the еvidence. State v. Hutto, 349 So.2d 318 (La.1977). A confession is not rendered inadmissible by the fact that law enforcement officials exhort or adjure an accusеd to tell the truth provided that the exhortation is not accompanied by an inducement in the nature of a threat or one which implies a promise of reward. State v. Mullins, 353 So.2d 243 (La.1977).
At the hearing on the defendant‘s motion to suppress, Detective Conrad Kirsch testified that he arrestеd defendant on a warrant for first degree murder. After being booked in jail and advised of his rights, Magee stated that he wanted to give a statement in the presence of an assistant district attorney. Detective Kirsch and Assistant District Attorney, Michael Harson, were present while the defendant gave a video-taped statement.
Harson testified at the suppression hearing as follows with respect to the comments he made to Magee just prior to Magee confessing:
And I said, well, I wasn‘t going to make any deals because I said the case, you know, the evidence I saw in the case is probably enough that we could go on, but I said if you wanted to give a statement that he‘s welcomed to give a statement and that I wasn‘t going to make any promises, I wasn‘t going to promise any leniency, I wasn‘t going to promise any deals or anything.
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My basic position at the time was, and something that I more or less conveyed to him, was that I felt that the evidence that we had now was probably enough to win the case, so it wasn‘t a—I didn‘t have a great incentive for wanting to do anything on it, because I mean I felt I had enough to—I probably could convict him at that time anyway.
Later in his testimony, Harson conceded that the defendant‘s confession was “a very important bit of evidence insofar as linking him to the crime ... a very large piece of evidence“.
Our careful review of Harson‘s testimony convinces us that he made nо express or implied promise to Magee which could have served as an inducement for Magee to confess.
Additionally, thе record reveals that Magee was advised of his Miranda rights on at least three occasions while in the custody of authorities. Magee testified that after Detective Kirsch brought him to the Sheriff‘s office, he asked about having an attorney. According to the defendant, Detective Kirsch answered his request by noting that an attorney would just tell him not to give a statement. Detective Kirsch disputed the defеndant‘s claim that he had requested an attorney. Detective Kirsch testified that Magee never asked for an attorney but only to speak to a prosecutor. The defendant acknowledged in his testimony that he did not request an attorney while in the presencе of Harson.
We find that the record strongly supports the trial court‘s determination that the defendant was not coerced into cоnfessing nor was he induced to confess by any promises of reward. Hence, we find no error in the trial court‘s ruling.
For the above and foregoing reasons, the defendant‘s conviction and the sentence imposed are affirmed. The district court is directed to inform Magеe of the
AFFIRMED.