{¶ 2} After pleading guilty to one count of attempted safe-cracking and three counts of breaking and entering, all fifth-degree felonies, appellant was sentenced on August 15, 2001 to five years of community control with conditions. Appellant was told at that initial sentencing hearing that if he violated community control, he could be sentenced "to prison for close to four years on those four felonies[.]" Appellant never appealed that sentence. Appellant subsequently violated the conditions of his community control. As a result, on December 9, 2003, appellant was sentenced to nine months in prison on each of the four counts, to be served consecutively. Appellant did not timely appeal his prison sentence. However, on September 22, 2004, this court granted appellant leave to file a delayed appeal. On appeal, appellant raises three assignments of error.
{¶ 3} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues that it was error for the trial court to revoke his community control and impose a prison term where the trial court failed to notify him at the initial sentencing hearing of the specific prison term it would impose if appellant violated his community control, in contravention of State v.Brooks,
{¶ 4} In Brooks, the Ohio Supreme Court held "that pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 5} Brooks was decided in September 2004. Appellant was sentenced to community control in 2001 at the initial sentencing hearing. The issue, then, is whether appellant is entitled to the retroactive application ofBrooks to his community control sentence.
{¶ 6} It is well-established that "a new judicial ruling may be applied only to cases that are pending on the announcement date. * * * The new judicial ruling may not be applied retroactively to a conviction that has become final[.]" Ali v. State,
{¶ 7} As noted earlier, after pleading guilty to four felonies, appellant was sentenced to community control in 2001. He never appealed that sentence. Appellant subsequently violated the conditions of his community control. As a result, in December 2003, appellant was sentenced to nine months in prison on each of the four counts. Appellant did not timely appeal his prison sentence. Instead, in August 2004, appellant filed a notice of appeal and motion to file a delayed appeal. On September 22, 2004, this court granted appellant leave to file a delayed appeal. That same day, Brooks was decided.
{¶ 8} We find that appellant has no legal right to the application ofBrooks to this case. See State v. Novel, II, Richland App. No. 05CA8,
{¶ 9} However, according to the Ohio Supreme Court in State v.Fraley,
{¶ 10} We therefore find that when a trial court sentences an offender to community control and the offender does not appeal his community control sentence, the offender's conviction becomes final with regard to the community control sentence. In the case at bar, appellant has no legal right to the application of Brooks to his case as he had exhausted his appellate remedies from his community control sentence before Brooks
was decided. See State v. Greene, Sandusky App. No. S-03-045,
{¶ 11} Since Brooks does not apply retroactively to this case, we find that the trial court did not err by failing to notify appellant at the initial sentencing hearing of the specific prison term it would impose if appellant violated his community control. Appellant was told at that initial sentencing hearing that if he violated community control, he could be sentenced to prison for close to four years. The trial court therefore did not err by revoking his community control and imposing a prison term. Appellant's first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 12} In his second assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive prison sentences. In his third assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred by imposing nonminimum prison sentence on each count. At the heart of both arguments is appellant's contention that the trial court failed to make the required statutory findings to impose nonminimum and consecutive sentences at the initial sentencing hearing in violation of State v.Comer,
{¶ 13} In Comer, the Ohio Supreme Court held that "[p]ursuant to R.C.
{¶ 14} As we have before, we "reject [the] argument that the trial court was required to make the requisite statutory findings to impose consecutive sentences at the initial sentencing hearing." Sneed, Butler App. No. CA2004-06-153,
{¶ 15} For the same reasons, we reject appellant's argument that the trial court was required to make the requisite statutory findings to impose nonminimum sentences at the initial sentencing hearing. See Statev. Brown (Mar. 22, 2001), Cuyahoga App. No. 77875. Again, pursuant to the sentencing statutes under R.C. Chapter 2929, a trial court is required to make the statutory findings under R.C.
{¶ 16} Appellant was sentenced to prison terms at the second sentencing hearing in 2003, and not at the initial sentencing hearing in 2001. Upon thoroughly reviewing the record, we find that the trial court made the required findings under R.C.
{¶ 17} Judgment affirmed.
Powell, P.J., and Bressler, J., concur.