State v. MacE

Ap- argues that the Court of Trail Mountain applied Utah, Appellee, instead the six-

peals should have Plaintiff of STATE by Ann. provided Utah Code year limitation 78-12-23(2) upon any con- § action “[a]n

tract, liability upon obligation, founded an or MACE, Aaron G. Defendant Trail writing.” Specifically, instrument Appellant. language “by rea- Mountain asserts right title of the state to the son of the or No. 930509. applicability §in limits the same” 78-12-2 Supreme Court of Utah. statute to cases where the state sues property right or title to the real itself— July 1996. i.e., possession suits. adverse disagree. plain reading A of the stat- brought applies that it to actions ute reveals

by consequence of the state’s the state as right property

claim of to real or issues or If, property.

profits derived from real claims, the statute were limit-

Trail Mountain claims, possession language

ed to adverse profits would

“or the issues or thereof’ superfluous. “This court will not

rendered way a statute in such a as to render

construe meaningless parts viable and void.”

certain County, Lake

Nelson Salt case, In is this the Division

alleging that Trail Mountain withheld issues profits derived from leased school trust

lands, Division, agency, and the as a state

brought right suit virtue of its to receive profits. fits

those This lawsuit therefore 78-12-2, § express

within the terms of

consequently, uphold ruling Appeals applicability.

Court as to ruling Appeals af- Court part part,

firmed and reversed proceedings for further consistent

remand opinion.

with this

ZIMMERMAN, C.J., HOWE, RUSSON, JJ.,

DURHAM and concur. degree Mace contends

both first felonies. defense, as codified Utah’s section 76-2-305 and other related sec- Code, violates state and tions of the Utah prohibitions against constitutional federal reject cruel and unusual affirm his conviction Mace’s contentions and and sentence. 2, 1992, December Mace knocked on

On apartment the door of a woman’s to tell her tampering her car. that someone was with entering apartment, began After Mace tell the woman about car alarms and then asked to use her bathroom. After about ten minutes, Mace came out of the bathroom gloves holding wearing rubber and a knife tape. a roll of duet He threatened the and woman with the knife and tied her hands tape. behind her back with the He then took raped the woman into her bedroom and her. rape, After the Mace forced the woman into point her ear at knife and then drove her to her bank to have her withdraw for him. $100 sped The victim off her car after Mace left phone call. confess- the car to make police following day. ed to on the He was subsequently charged degree with four first assault, rape, aggravated ag- felonies: sexual robbery. gravated kidnaping, aggravated 27,1993, January Mace filed a notice of On rely his intent to on a defense of diminished capacity insanity, pursuant or to section 77- 7,1993, 14-3 of the Utah Code. On June he plea guilty of not entered each of later, four counts. One week he moved to plea guilty amend his to “not the alter- insanity” guilty native not reason of lengthy challenging, on due filed motion and cruel and unusual grounds, constitutionality Graham, Gen., Voros, Att’y Jan Frederic J.

Jr., Gen., codifying Att’y Cope, Utah’s defense. Asst. James M. Salt City, plaintiff. Lake July hearing At a on the motions on Gillett, clinical Dr. director Utah Fratto, Jr., Joseph City, C. Salt Lake unit, Hospital’s forensic testified defendant. ego dystonic Mace suffered from the form of compulsive paraphilia. doctor obsessive ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice: explained that the disorder includes a com- pulsive, uncontrollable need to have excessive appeals Aaron G. Mace his conviction and intercourse, though rape aggravated robbery, patient even sentence for sexual ill, “try mentally making subject not want to do so. Patients all him does thus stop doing usually it kinds of means to but it statutes. up up until it

builds and builds becomes what subsequently The trial court sentenced impulse.” called an irresistible On cross- [is] Mace to two concurrent five-to-life terms and examination, Dr. testified that Mace Gillett qualified later that Mace found for the status “obviously “obviously had intent” knew guilty Accordingly, ill. [his forced sexual intercourse with the vic- court ordered Mace committed to the De- wrong,” but that Mace was unable tim] partment of Human Services for care and to conform his conduct to the law. until treatment his transfer to the De- Utah partment Corrections, pursuant to sections testimony, On the basis of Dr. Gillett’s 77-16a-203 and -204 of the Code. change plea trial court allowed Mace to his guilty by insanity. to not reason of court, duly appealed Mace to this day, unsigned

next the trial court issued an (i) claiming plea properly the conditional entry in it minute which denied Mace’s con- right appeal reserved his to the constitution challenges specifying stitutional without the issues, though they al nondisposi- even were denial, reasons for the and directed the (ii) case, statutory tive of his Utah’s prosecution prepare to a formal order on the scheme violated federal pro and state due denial. requirements. parties’ cess Pursuant to the 19th, hearing July At a second on the trial stipulation, stayed briefing this court granted subsequent court motion to pending our resolution of two other cases ill,” plea “guilty mentally amend his to appeal. anticipated, holding then on As our right appeal conditioned on Mace’s (Utah Montoya, State v. 887 P.2d ruling court’s adverse on his constitutional 1994) an issue on a reserved condition — that ll(i) challenges, pursuant to rule of the Utah plea dispositive prose al need not be of the prosecu- Rules of Criminal Procedure.1 The fully disposes of Mace’s first issue cution — agreed drop tion the sexual assault and plea dictates that Mace’s conditional was kidnaping charges purposes for the proper. Similarly, opinion our in State v. Mace, plea agreement. attorney, his the Herrera, (Utah 1995), 363-68 prosecutor, judge signed and the trial each rejected process the identical due claims that plea agreement day. that same in his raised initial brief and thus de process challenge. feats Mace’s due 2nd, August On two weeks after Mace guilty plea, the conditional entered the trial decision, Following the Herrera the State signed findings court fact and conclusions summary moved for affirmance of the trial regarding of law the court’s earlier denial of However, granted court. leave for Mace challenges. Mace’s constitutional The court supplement his brief with a claim that denied Mace’s due claims on the punishing prohibi- him violated constitutional merits but ruled that Mace had no against tions cruel and unusual challenge sentencing Utah’s scheme for only That is the claim we address this mentally ill because he had not estab- opinion. implicates the claim Because subject lished that he was constitutionality co- ruling Although may defense, statutes. this insanity have difying grant no Utah’s July been correct at the time of the 1st deference to the trial court in our review of issues, James, hearing on the constitutional it legal its conclusions. State (Utah obviously 1991); signed incorrect at the time it was P.2d see also State v. 1994). (Utah Pena, pleaded guilty because Mace had then 938-39 (i) provides: appeal judgment, 1. Rule 11 from the to a review of any specified pre- the adverse determination of approval With of the court and the consent of prevails on prosecution, trial motion. A defendant who a defendant enter a con- ill, plea. plea guilty, guilty appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the ditional contest, ll(i). reserving right, or no Utah R.Crim. P. record (1) matter, prosecution un- It is a defense to a preliminary the State

As right any his to chal claims that Mace waived der statute or ordinance that de- sentencing illness, men lenge fendant, scheme for the Utah’s of mental as a result tally the trial court ruled ill because after required lacked the mental state as an standing to assert the chal that Mace lacked charged. of the offense Mental element lenge, to renew the at he failed not otherwise a defense. illness is reject argu sentencing. We this after his 76-2-305(1). § As we have Utah Code Ann. right properly preserved the ment. Mace explained, previously this statute limits the ruling on his appeal trial court’s adverse negating mens defense to rea punishment claim at the cruel and unusual necessary for conviction. See plea. time he entered his conditional 361-62; Young, at P.2d plea his conditional note that Mace entered 1993) J.). (Utah Durham, (opinion 383-84 unsigned court’s on the basis of the trial result, As a the statute allows for the convic- is entry minute before the trial court had requisite of those have the mens tion findings of fact and conclusions sued rea, though they may appreciate even entry Ordinarily, unsigned minute law. an wrongfulness of their conduct or are unable finality appealable constitute an lacks the to control their conduct. Mace claims that Ins., Shields, Shepherd Inc. v. order. Ron 1994). (Utah punishing such offenders is cruel and unusu- 650, Logically, it 882 P.2d 652 al, Eighth in Amendment2 to entry violation unsigned that an minute would seem I, constitute a “ad the United States Constitution and article likewise could not sufficient 3 purposes verse determination” for the of a section 9 of the Utah Constitution. ll(i) However, plea. light conditional in rule decline to a state con We undertake plea agree that the the fact conditional analysis of claim stitutional signed by judge, pros trial ment was the the argue analysis not of this he “does ecutor, Mace, attorney, agree and his issue under the Utah Constitution would be a ment itself reflected consensus analysis different from its under the federal unsigned entry a sufficient “ad minute engage not constitution.... This Court will ll(i) plea for a rule verse determination” constructing arguments in out of whole preserve of Mace’s consensus merits 1239, Lafferty, cloth....” v. 749 P.2d State appeal. Applying constitutional issues for (Utah 1988), corpus 1247 & n. 5 habeas concept in of waiver these circumstances Cook, granted grounds, Lafferty on other v. utterly purpose would defeat the of condi (10th denied, Cir.1991), 949 F.2d 1546 cert. pleas, pointless tional which is to avoid the “ 911, 112 1942, 504 S.Ct. 118 L.Ed.2d 548 U.S. ‘forcing parties and wasteful exercise of (1992); Barnes, accord Parsons v. 871 P.2d merely go through pre an entire trial ” — (Utah), denied, 516, 519 n. 2 U.S. Montoya, the ... issue.’ 887 P.2d at serve (1994). -, 431, 115 S.Ct. (quoting Sery, 859 939 separately not his state Mace has briefed (Utah Ct.App.1988)). We therefore conclude claim, constitutional and we do not reach it. not unusu that Mace did waive his cruel and punishment al claim. claim,

Turning to Mace’s federal we specify that Mace does not whether he note now address the merits of Mace’s We challenging challenges section 76-32-305 on its face claim. He section 76-2-305 of the Code, provides pertinent part: applies in or as it to him. We will first address Utah which required; provides: bail shall not be excessive 2. That amendment Excessive imposed; required, cruel and Excessive bail shall not be nor exces- fines shall not be nor shall imposed, pun- sive fines nor cruél and unusual punishments unusual be inflicted. Persons ar- inflicted. ishments imprisoned with rested or shall not be treated Const, U.S. amend. VIII. unnecessary rigor. Const, I, § Utah art. 9. provides: 3. That section legislature constitutionality ap as it did can of the statute con- stitutionally consistent with the hold such defendants accounta- plies to Mace. This is approach have taken in other contexts ble their criminal conduct but cannot constitutionally impose any punishment on a statute was constitu on which City grounds. such defendants. As we said the analo- tional See Greenwood (Utah Lake, gous Eighth context of a broad North Salt 1991) (“‘A grounds Amendment penal- Utah’s death court should therefore examine ty: analyzing complainant’s conduct before ” hypothetical applications of other the law.’ assessing punishment “[I]n selected Village Flip Estates v. (quoting of Hoffman democratically legislature against elected side, Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. Hoffman measure, presume the constitutional 1186, 1191, 71 102 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 362 validity. may require legisla- (1982))). approach This is also consistent penalty pos- ture to select the least severe preference with our stated to examine the long penalty sible so as the selected is not cruel and contours limitations Utah’s cruelly disproportionate inhumane or “case-by- punishment unusual clause on a heavy the crime And a involved. burden Bishop, case basis.” State v. judg- rests on those would attack representatives ment of people. part This is true because the constitu- A criminal be cruel tional test is intertwined with an assess- barbaric, excessive, and unusual when it is contemporary ment of standards and the disproportional4 to the offense committed. legislative judgment weighs heavily in as- Helm, 277, 284, Solem v. 463 U.S. 103 S.Ct. certaining such standards. a demo- ‘[I]n 3001, 3006-07; (1983); An L.Ed.2d courts, society legislatures, cratic not are Morris, 816, (Utah), drews v. 824 respond to to will constituted and con- denied, 891, 254, 101 cert. 449 U.S. S.Ct. 66 ” sequently of people.’ the moral values Carter, (1980); L.Ed.2d 120 v. see also State — denied, 629, (Utah), 656-57 cert. (second Andrews, 607 P.2d at 824 alteration -, 163, 116 133 105 U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d original) Gregg Georgia, (quoting v. 428 (1995). particu Mace does not claim that his 2909, 153, 175, 2926, U.S. 96 S.Ct. 49 L.Ed.2d barbaric, excessive, lar was (1976) (quoting Georgia, Furman v. 859 408 rather, disproportional; argues im he that 238, 383, 2726, 2801, U.S. 92 S.Ct. 33 L.Ed.2d posing any punishment ill but (1972) C.J., (Burger, dissenting))); see 346 legally not insane offenders like himself is 957, Michigan, also Harmelin v. 501 U.S. cruel and unusual. 998, 2680, 2703, 111 115 L.Ed.2d 836 S.Ct. (1991) J., (Kennedy, concurring part already This court has held that a judgment) (noting fix- concurring qualify legally ing defendant who does not as of criminal sentences involves “substan- under penological judgment” province insane the Utah tive that is of courts). tried, Thus, charged, legislature, and convicted without of not absent a fending showing particular punishment state or federal due that a is “cru- Herrera, Andrews, elly equal protection guarantees. disproportionate,” inhumane or 895 anomalous, 824, apt if not P.2d at 363-69. It would be 607 P.2d at we are substitute irrational, hold, judgment legislature re- for this court to as we our that of the sitting justices “grossly disproportionate” 4. We that two of the United sentences that are note 1001, Supreme at States Court have articulated the view the crime committed. Id. at 111 S.Ct. J., Eighth embody (Kennedy, concurring part 2705 and con- Amendment does not proportionality requirement curring judgment). for sentences in in the Our use of the term cases, noncapital Michigan, "disproportional" v. in the text is not meant see Harmelin 501 957, 961-94, 2680, 2683-2701, evolving express any view on the status of this U.S. 111 S.Ct. Scalia, J.), (1991) meaning (opinion jurisprudence, term at 115 L.Ed.2d 836 nor is justices only present that three would forbid issue in the case. other 1378 Second, particular punish- independently, Mace

garding of a the wisdom rule, M’Naghten sentencing was not insane under the scheme. See ment or of an entire Herrera, by majority 269; which is followed of states. 895 Bishop, 717 P.2d at cf. M’Naght See 895 P.2d at 365. The (discussing legislative respon- at P.2d 362-68 requires prove that he en test “ defendant determining accountability for sibility for reason, laboring acts). Vas under such a defect of criminal mind, not to from disease know to demonstrate Mace has failed quality doing, or nature and of the act he was cruelly particular punishment is in how his if he did know it that he did not know what disproportionate to the crime ” humane or doing wrong.’ 1 he was was Id. at 363 n. undisputed evidence as re involved. LaFave, Wayne (quoting R. Substantive testimony demon flected in Dr. Gillett’s (1987)). Law 311 was not Criminal Mace strates, best, unable to at that Mace was because, in insane under this test the words subject he was control his conduct because Gillett, obviously of Dr. [his “He knew forced impulse. to an irresistible The evidence victim] sexual intercourse with the illness, despite his also demonstrates that asserts, wrong.” The State and our own appreciate wrongful was able confirms, that no court has ever research In of his conduct. that factual con ness punishing ruled someone fails text, reject punishing claim that M’Naghten cruel meet test constitutes him for conduct that he was unable to con See, e.g., and unusual Jackson punish and unusual trol constitutes cruel Cir.1963), Dickson, (9th 573, 325 F.2d 575-76 Eighth in violation of the Amendment ment denied, 957, rt. 377 U.S. 84 S.Ct. ce to the United States Constitution. 1637, (1964); Helms, 508, 850, (N.C.), 853-54 N.C. S.E.2d First, specif Supreme Court has denied, 419 U.S. 95 S.Ct. ically “adoption of held that the irresistible (1974); Myers, L.Ed.2d 190 State v. 6 Wash. ‘implicit concept impulse test is not (Wash.Ct.App.), App. 1020-21 liberty.’” Oregon, ordered Leland v. denied, rt. 409 U.S. 93 S.Ct. ce 790, 801, 1002, 1009, U.S. 72 S.Ct. 96 L.Ed. (1972). 562, 34 L.Ed.2d 513 (1952) Connecticut, (quoting Palko v. Finally, “guilty Mace received a verdict of 319, 325, 149, 152, 302 U.S. 58 S.Ct. 82 L.Ed. (“GAMI”) pursuant ill” to sec- (1937)). above, As see no 288 noted tions 77-16a-103 and -104 of the Utah Code. general impediment punish constitutional The GAMI verdict “buffers some of the constitutionally ing a defendant who can be consequences eliminating harsher an inde- tried, charged, and convicted for conduct re pendent insanity by allowing defense” for sulting impulse, an from irresistible place prelude medical treatment in of or as a showing specific punish of a that a absence to traditional incarceration. cruelly imposed on a is inhu ment defendant utterly P.2d at 367. Mace has failed to brief disproportionate. mane or This conclusion is punishment or demonstrate how this form of supreme in accord with the views of the excessive, barbaric, disproportionate is Idaho, courts of Montana and the two other view, the offenses he committed. In our the ap adopted states which have the mens fea improved compas- verdict an GAMI is insanity proach to the defense. See State v. punishment form of for offenders like sionate Cowan, 884, (Mont.1993), 861 P.2d 888-89 M’Naghten cannot Mace who meet the test — denied, U.S. -, S.Ct. legal insanity. This is because such of- 1371-72, (1994); State v. subject to traditional incar- fenders would be Korell, 316, 992, 213 Mont. 690 P.2d 1001-02 M’Naghten regime ceration under a that Winn, (1984); also v. 121 Idaho see State availability lacks the of a verdict. GAMI (1992) (noting 828 P.2d 882-83 that reasons, foregoing of an ... does For the we hold that “the absence defense subjected to unconstitutional any protections”). not violate constitutional Mace was not precíate wrongfulness cruel and unusual violation the of their conduct. Eighth indicate, the Amendment the United States appreciate As the facts Mace did the Constitution. wrongfulness Therefore, of his conduct. Mace, relationship

there is no causal between scheme, decline to reach Mace’s statutory We the request- and the relief argument statutory broader hold, ed. if Even we were to which we do constitutionally punishes infirm it is not, precluded that is punish- the State from appreciate wrongful those who cannot ing people appreciate who are unable to of their Those ness conduct. facts are conduct, wrongfulness of their that form of ease, present in this and we hold that Mace utterly unhelpful relief would be to Mace. standing lacks to assert such a broad facial Moving step standing- to the second of the challenge. standing first note rules inquiry, it is also evident that there are more procedural are matter of state law. Provo appropriate litigants claim, Willden, pursue Corp. City 456-58 (Utah 1989). namely, previously rights This court those individuals whose has out three-step inquiry reviewing lined a seeks to assert: those whose mental illness question complainant’s standing of a to sue. impossible appreciate made it for them to Swan, (Utah Jenkins wrongfulness of their conduct. 1983); accord National Parks & Conserva Finally, if even we were to reach the last Lands, tion Ass’n v. Board step standing inquiry, of the we do not find step The first that Mace’s claim raises an issue that is so

inquiry ascertaining is directed to the com important that we must decide it in the ab- plainant’s personal controversy: stake appropriate litigant. sence of a more adversely “One who is not no affected has Cf. City, Provo 768 P.2d at 457. if Even standing. allegation A mere of an adverse susceptible scheme is impact is not sufficient. unconstitu- There must also be relationship alleged some causal application, appropriate between the tional it is more injury [complainant], governmental litigant may actually us to await a Jenkins, requested.” actions and the relief application. Deciding harmed such complainant 675 P.2d at 1150. If the satis issue now would have no conceivable concrete requirement, fies this first he or she will be anyone. benefit to granted standing inquiry and no further ruling Our that Mace lacks is not required. Id. say any constitutional claim must be complainant satisfy If cannot the first premised solely application on the requirement, then we will move to the second complainant. statute to the To step determining anyone whether else contrary, that some have held individ- have a “more would direct interest uals have to mount a facial chal- adequately litigate issues who can more lenge step to a statute under the third in our complainant Id. If issues.” cannot meet standing inquiry constitutionally “the —when step the first and if there are no better protected infringed by interests such statutes litigants step, under the second then we will important protection are so that their need step, move to the third which is “to decide if (invali- perfect plaintiff.” not await the Id. by [complainant] the issues raised are of dating city ordinance which violated free public in importance sufficient and of them- Constitution). speech clause of U.S. Howev- Id.; grant standing.” ... selves see also er, statutory undisputed it is scheme Parks, National P.2d at 913. only applies at issue here to individual defen- gener- dants does not threaten to chill or and step standing inqui- Under the first ally infringe rights on the of others. To the ry, personal it is evident that no Mace has statutory in extent that the scheme could be claimed to stake his claim that the defendants, might punish people ap- specially who are unable harm certain those de- from Judeo-Christian moral and opportunity to chal- evolved have the fendants will through appeals process.5 lenge it expanding concepts and from an ethical knowledge of the causes of human behav- to address Mace’s therefore decline scheme, facial precepts ior. Basic of state and federal affirm and sentence. conviction law, equal protection of due law, and the cruel and unusual RUSSON, JJ., concur HOWE provisions in the state and federal constitu- ZIMMERMAN, C.J. opinion of prohibit legislative imposing action tions Justice, STEWART, Chief Associate persons such inhuman treatment on whose separate opinion: deranged that ra- mental faculties are so majority opinion relies tional, morally responsible conduct is (Utah 1995), Herrera, dispose 895 P.2d 359 impossible. process challenges of Mace’s due .Utah’s insanity defense. See Utah abolition of the 895 P.2d at 371-72. 76-2-305(1). my § In dissent in Ann. Code dissent, pointed As I out that the aboli- 371-87, pointed I at out defense, culpabili- moral which is even by eliminating individual tion of the liability, criminal ty precondition as a in its flout- more draconian and unreasonable the most fundamental shattered one of Court ethical, historical, ing legal, of fundamental precept Anglo-American law—a precepts of moral, principles and common sense of fair- deep- on moral and ethical foundations based justice approaches than taken ness and ly law of western civilization embedded by only that have under- two other states moral and ethical and in Christian-Judeo approach, taken such an extreme Montana Utah, places, all the basic principles. In of Idaho, simply disconnects the criminal dependent personal culpability notion moorings concepts its of individu- law from severely concept of human free will is on the al free will and moral blameworthiness.1 my dissenting opinion in In undermined. Herrera, I stated: simply I cannot to such an extreme accede Today’s majority opinion and the statute departure precepts from such basic of consti- represent depar- a monumental it sustains tutional law. of, from, rejection one of the most

ture principles Anglo-American fundamental is, however, majority, It odd that the which criminal that has existed for centuries. law legal compunction against convicting has no history in this state’s For the first time morally persons blameless of malum se and, first exceptions, two for the time with crimes, history, apparently open in this Court now holds this case the in the nation’s person that an insane who commits holds person possibility refusing punish a by criminal law is as prohibited an act of a crime even who has been convicted impris- guilty person as sane though cannot know that the act for which he oned, executed, if he were a and even wrong. In other he was convicted was person. I fully responsible sane submit words, morally person who is blameless perceive that the Court fails extent ability loss of his to discern princi- to which fundamental constitutional as, right wrong, example, from such by ples violated and values have been disease or person afflicted with Alzheimer’s § Code Ann. 76-2- affirmance Utah paranoid delusions caused chemical or 305(1). The flouts centuries-old decision might in the brain that responsibility hormonal imbalances principles personal Cowan, why P.2d 1. See State v. 260 Mont. 5. We are unable to understand Justice Stew- denied, - U.S. -, (1993), our decision that Mace art in his dissent refers to 114 S.Ct. validity Korell, lacks the facial (1994); State v. "holding” that would scheme as a Winn, (1984); State v. Mont. 690 P.2d 992 opin- allow but not Our conviction (1992). 121 Idaho 828 P.2d 879 holding. ion contains no such means, by pharmacological can be corrected punished. cannot

be convicted but

majority’s holding in such a case would allow person be convicted of a “crime” but bar

a per-

punishment for that “crime” morally culpable

son was not for that act. corrupts very

That foundation of the body

criminal law as normative stan- supposed

dards that are to reflect those fun- precepts concerning

damental the moral na-

ture of humankind on which this nation was

founded.

DURHAM, Justice, dissenting: join majority

I cannot opinion for the my dissenting opinion

reasons set forth in dissenting opinion

and the of Associate Chief

Justice Stewart in State v.

I respectfully therefore dissent. TIMM, Neiuwland,

Louis L. John

Floyd Childs, M. trustees of United Pre Engineering Compa

cision Machine and

ny Sharing Trust; Profit Insur ABCO Agency, Inc., corporation;

ance a Utah Joseph Henriod, L. trustee for the Trust, Ap

Annette Jacob Plaintiffs

pellees,

T. LaMar DEWSNUP and Aletha

Dewsnup; Co., Arrow Investment partnership;

limited The Federal Land Berkeley; Imperial

Bank of Land Ti Inc., trustee, Eugene

tle L.

Carson and Elaine Carson as benefi

ciaries; Stringham, Mazuran, Larsen Sabin, professional corporation;

& Co., Inc.;

Mineral Fertilizer and Har

ry Kaps, Appel V. Defendants

lants.

No. 950073.

Supreme Court of Utah.

Aug. 1996.

Case Details

Case Name: State v. MacE

Court Name: Utah Supreme Court

Date Published: Jul 26, 1996

Citation: 921 P.2d 1372

Docket Number: 930509

Court Abbreviation: Utah