STATE OF OHIO v. M.D.
No. 97300
Court of Appeals of Ohio, EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
April 5, 2012
2012-Ohio-1545
JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-360551
BEFORE: S. Gallagher, J., Jones, P.J., and Cooney, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 5, 2012
Larry W. Zukerman
S. Michael Lear
Brian A. Murray
Zukerman, Daiker & Lear Co., LPA
3912 Prospect Avenue, East
Cleveland, OH 44115
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
William D. Mason
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
By: Diane Smilanik
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
The Justice Center, 8th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, OH 44113
{1} Defendant-appellant M.D. appeals the trial court‘s decision that denied his application to seal the records of his 1998 conviction for receiving stolen property, forgery, uttering, and obstructing justice. For the following reasons, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.
{2} In 1998, a jury convicted M.D. of receiving stolen computer equipment, forgery, uttering, obstructing justice, and tampering with evidence. State v. [M.D.], 8th Dist. Nos. 75339, 75340, and 75341, 2000 WL 235778 (Mar. 2, 2000) (“M.D. I“). According to the facts gleaned from M.D. I, M.D. owned a pawnshop. One of his employees took in and created a bill of sale for a laptop stolen from Cleveland Clinic. The charge of receiving stolen property was for the laptop. The forgery, uttering, and obstructing justice charges were based on the bill of sale that was created and given to the prosecutor during discovery. The bill of sale included information that was only available from the search warrant. See id. M.D. was sentenced to one year in prison and fined $3,500. This court subsequently vacated the tampering with evidence conviction on M.D.‘s direct appeal. Id. at *9.
{3} In 2009, M.D. filed an application to seal his record of conviction pursuant to
{4} Upon remand, the trial court issued a journal entry finding that M.D. did not qualify as a first offender pursuant to
{5} The trial court, once again, denied the application. It is from this decision that M.D. timely appeals, raising three assignments of error, which provide as follows:
- I. The trial court erred in denying appellant [M.D.‘s] application to seal his records of conviction as it did not liberally apply the factors set forth in
R.C. 2953.32(C) in appellant‘s favor. - II. The trial court erred in finding that appellant had not been satisfactorily rehabilitated as the law of the case doctrine prohibited the trial court from re-considering this issue as the court of appeals had already determined that there was overwhelming evidence that appellant was rehabilitated.
- III. The trial court erred in finding that the public‘s need to maintain the records of appellant‘s conviction outweighed appellant‘s interest in sealing them and that said basis could not serve as ground[s] upon which to deny appellant‘s application to seal the records of his conviction.
{6} As we previously recognized: “[a] trial court shall only grant expungement to an applicant who meets all the requirements presented in
{7}
{8} In the current case, there is no dispute at the time of his hearing that M.D. is a first offender and had no criminal proceedings pending against him. Further, this court has determined that the state‘s generic argument in its objection to the application was contrary to this district‘s precedent. M.D. II, 8th Dist. No. 92534, 2009-Ohio-5694. The state simply argued that the nature of the offense outweighs M.D.‘s interest in sealing the record of conviction; however, the nature of the offense, in and of itself, is not grounds to deny the application. Id., citing State v. Haas, 6th Dist. No. L-04-1315, 2005-Ohio-4350. The state has not otherwise objected to M.D.‘s application. Therefore, the only issue before this court is whether the trial court abused its discretion in determining that M.D. was not rehabilitated and the government‘s interest in maintaining the record of conviction outweighed M.D.‘s interest.
{9} The trial court found that the government‘s interest in maintaining the record of conviction outweighed M.D.‘s interest based on the “the public‘s need to know,” citing State v. Greene, 61 Ohio St.3d 137, 573 N.E.2d 110 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting in part) (1991). The trial court held that because the offense was committed while in the course of his business, the public had a right to review the record of conviction in order to determine whether to conduct future business with M.D. The trial court also noted that M.D. did not have any interest in sealing the records because he has been able to rebuild his reputation, maintain a management position at work, and otherwise move on with his
{10} M.D. must prove that he was rehabilitated in order to have his record of conviction sealed.
{11} We are sensitive to the trial court‘s concerns about the public‘s possible “need to know” about a person‘s prior conduct in business, but that concern is not unlimited. We must note that M.D. is now 50 years of age and has led a law abiding life since these convictions in 1998. Further, it is undisputed that he is no longer involved in the “pawn” business that was the subject of these original convictions. By all accounts, he has moved on and deserves the benefit that the expungement statute affords. The fact that he is now successful should not deny him the benefits of the expungement statute. Because rehabilitation is a factor that must be demonstrated pursuant to
{12} The trial court also found that M.D. had not been rehabilitated to the court‘s satisfaction because M.D. had not demonstrated remorse for his crimes. The trial court relied on M.D.‘s statement in the January 6, 2008 letter attached to his application, that a
{13} In State v. Auge, 10th Dist. No. 01AP-1272, 2002-Ohio-3061, ¶ 71, the court held that, as a matter of law, a defendant who exercises his right to a trial and is found guilty, can be deemed “rehabilitated” even if that person did not expressly state that he was guilty of the offense. The defendant in that case exercised his right to trial and testified as to his innocence at trial. In that context, expecting the defendant to express remorse for a crime for which he denied guilt amounted to perjury, and the court erred as a matter of law in imposing a contrary requirement. Id.
{14} The Auge court‘s rationale is persuasive. At M.D.‘s trial, the testimony reflected that his employee purchased the computer and drafted the bill of sale that was
{15} There being no other stated reason to deny M.D.‘s application to seal his record of conviction, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand for the limited purpose of ordering M.D.‘s record of conviction to be sealed.
It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
LARRY A. JONES, SR., P.J., and
COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, J., CONCUR