STATE OF OHIO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. RIAN LYNN, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
CASE NO. 17-17-06
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT SHELBY COUNTY
October 30, 2017
2017-Ohio-8355
WILLAMOWKSI, J.
Appeal from Shelby County Common Pleas Court Criminal Division Trial Court No. 10CR000138 Judgment Affirmed
Rian Lynn Appellant
Anne Bauer for Appellee
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Rian Lynn (“Lynn”) appeals the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Shelby County, alleging that the trial court erred by (1) engaging in impermissible judicial fact finding; (2) sentencing him under an unauthorized statute; (3) construing his motion to correct an illegal sentence as a petition for post-conviction relief; (4) failing to notify him of the mandatory requirements of
Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} On June 24, 2010, Lynn was indicted on two counts of rape in violation of
{¶3} Lynn was sentenced on February 7, 2011, and was ordered to serve a prison term of fifteen years to life. Doc. 152. During the sentencing, the trial court failed to inform Lynn that this sentence included a mandatory term of post-release control. Doc. 152. He appealed the decision of the trial court on March 7, 2011. Doc. 165. State v. Lynn, 3d Dist. Shelby No. 17-11-08, 2011-Ohio-6014, ¶ 10. In his direct appeal, he challenged the decision of the trial court to deny his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Id. On November 21, 2011, this Court affirmed the decision of the trial court. Id. at ¶ 21.
{¶4} Lynn filed a second motion to withdraw his guilty plea on October 21, 2013. Doc. 177. In this motion, he argued that the trial court did not impose the sentence he agreed to in his plea agreement and instead sentenced him to a fifteen-year sentence. Doc. 177. The trial court denied this motion on October 25, 2013. Doc. 178. Lynn did not file an appeal of the trial court‘s decision on this motion. On March 12, 2014, Lynn filed a third motion to withdraw his guilty plea in which he argued that the trial court failed to inform him of the mandatory term of post-release control that was included in his sentence. Doc. 184. In response, on March 21, 2014, the trial court set a date for a resentencing hearing but denied Lynn‘s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Doc. 186. At the resentencing hearing, on April 17, 2014, the trial court informed Lynn of the mandatory term of post-release control that was part of his sentence. Doc. 217. Lynn subsequently filed an appeal over the trial court‘s decision to dismiss his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Doc. 223.
{¶5} On April 14, 2016, Lynn filed a motion to vacate the judgment and withdraw his guilty plea. Doc. 232. In this motion, he argued that he had not agreed to the five years of post-release control in his plea agreement. Doc. 232. The trial court denied this motion on April 22, 2016. Doc. 234. In response to the trial court‘s decision, Lynn filed a notice of appeal on May 23, 2016. Doc. 240. Lynn argued that the trial court engaged in an improper reformation of his plea agreement by including the term of post-release control as part of his sentenced and, therefore, erred in denying his motion. This Court affirmed the decision of the trial court.
{¶6} On March 21, 2017, Lynn filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence with the trial court. Doc. 256. The trial court treated this motion as though it was a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to
Trial court errored [sic] at sentencing by making unconstitutional judicial fact findings to enhance appellant‘s sentence to more than the minimum sentence.
Second Assignment of Error
The trial court errored [sic] by sentencing appellant under an unauthorized statue rendering his sentence contrary to law.
Third Assignment of Error
The trial court errored [sic] recasting appellant‘s motion into a post conviction petition in pursuant to
Fourth Assignment of Error
The trial court failed to notify appellant of the mandatory requirement set forth in
Fifth Assignment of Error
Trial court failed to notify appellant of right to appeal.
We will consider Lynn‘s third assignment of error first. We will then consider his remaining assignments of error.
Third Assignment of Error
{¶7} In his third assignment of error, Lynn contends that the trial court should not have construed his motion to correct an illegal sentence as a petition for post-conviction relief. He argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his motion as an untimely petition for post-conviction relief because his motion challenges his sentence on the grounds that it is void. Claiming that the trial court erred in its
Legal Standard
{¶8} A motion may be a petition for post-conviction relief even if the heading says otherwise. State v. Reynolds, 79 Ohio St.3d 158, 161, 679 N.E.2d 1131, 1133 (1997). If a motion is “filed after the time for a direct appeal had passed, claims a denial of rights, and seeks to void the judgment of sentence, the motion and the appeal are based upon a petition for post-conviction relief.” State v. Turrentine, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-10-40, 2010-Ohio-4826, ¶ 5, citing Reynolds. See State v. Coleman, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-15-08, 2015-Ohio-1883, ¶ 12, citing Reynolds at 161 (holding “the Ohio Supreme Court held that a motion that seeks to vacate or correct a sentence should be construed as a petition for post-conviction relief under
{¶9} “
be filed no later than one hundred eighty days after the date on which the trial transcript is filed in the court of appeals in the direct appeal of the judgment of conviction * * *. If no appeal is taken, except as otherwise provided in section 2953.23 of the Revised Code, the petition shall be filed no later than one hundred eighty days after the expiration of the time for filing the appeal.
Unless the defendant alleges a new federal or state right has been recognized, the defendant must prove (1) that he was unavoidably prevented from discovery of facts upon which his successive petition for postconviction relief rests and (2) that he would not have been convicted at trial by a reasonable factfinder but for the constitutional error.
State v. Workman, 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-17-12, 2017-Ohio-7364, ¶ 17, citing
{¶10} In this case, the record shows that Lynn‘s motion to correct an illegal sentence was filed on March 21, 2017, which was after his direct appeal. Doc. 256. In this motion, he claims that his rights were denied and that his sentence should, as a consequence, be voided. Doc. 256. See Lynn, supra. Thus, the trial court properly construed Lynn‘s motion to correct an illegal sentence as a petition for post-conviction relief. See Lester, supra, at ¶ 12, citing State v. Holdcroft, 3d Dist. Wyandot No. 16-06-07, 2007-Ohio-586, ¶ 11; State v. Turrentine, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-10-40, 2010-Ohio-4826, ¶ 5; State v. Wyerick, 3d Dist. Mercer No. 10-07-23, 2008-Ohio-2257.
{¶11} The record also shows that the transcript of Lynn‘s appeal was filed at the court of appeals for his direct appeal on April 18, 2011. Doc. 173. Thus, Lynn filed this petition more than one year after the transcript was filed in the court of appeals for his direct appeal, making his petition fall outside of the statutory timeframe allowed for petitions for post-conviction relief.3 Doc. 256. Lynn also filed his petition more than one year after the time had expired for filing a direct appeal of any issues arising from his resentencing hearing, which was held on April 17, 2014. Doc. 217. Lynn also does not allege that he has found new evidence or that he would not have been convicted but for a constitutional error at trial. For
{¶12} We also note that the issues raised in Lynn‘s motion were based upon facts in the record and were, therefore, available for review during his direct appeal. These issues were not raised during his direct appeal. Thus, even if his petition for post-conviction relief was timely filed, these issues would be barred from review by the doctrine of res judicata. State v. Saxon, 109 Ohio St.3d 176, 2006-Ohio-1245, 826 N.E.2d 824, ¶ 16-17. Further, Lynn raised many of these same issues in previous motions that were submitted to the trial court. He appealed the denial of one of these motions, but these issues were not considered on appeal pursuant to the filing restrictions of
Remaining Assignments of Error
{¶13} Since the trial court did not err in dismissing Lynn‘s petition without considering the merits of his arguments, the resolution of Lynn‘s third assignment of error makes the issues raised in his remaining assignments of error moot. For this reason, this Court declines to address the questions raised in his first, second, fourth, and fifth assignments of error pursuant to
Conclusion
{¶14} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars assigned and argued, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Shelby County is affirmed.
Judgment Affirmed
PRESTON, P.J. and SHAW, J., concur.
/hls