State v. LynchState v. Lynch
The state appeals an order granting Stephеn Joseph Lynch‘s motion to discharge an information charging him with the offense of possession of cocaine due to the state‘s purported failure to comply with
On March 31, 1983, the state filed an information acсusing Lynch of committing the felony of possession of cocaine on July 24, 1982. Lynch was eventually arrested on the cocaine possession charge on May 10, 1983. On June 9, 1983, Lynch filed a motion to discharge under
Section (a)(1) of
Lynch averred in his
At a hearing on Lynch‘s motion to discharge, Detective Paul Smith of the Pinellas County Sheriff‘s Office testified that at about 1:30 a.m. on July 24, 1982, he and Detective Poorbaugh were sitting inside an unmarked squad car outside a local tavern known as the 49th Street Mining Company. They observed Lynсh in the parking lot take a small bottle out of his pocket, remove the top, and sniff the contents. They then saw Lynch offer the bottle to a male and female, both of whom also sniffed the substance. Suspecting that thе substance “might” be cocaine because of the actions of the three, the officers, who were dressed in plain clothes, approached Lynch. Immediately after the officers identified themselves, Lynсh threw the bottle, despite Detective Smith‘s attempt to prevent the throw, and then Lynch shoved Detective Smith backwards. Detective Poorbaugh promptly arrested Lynch for battery of a police officer.
Detective Smith testified further that the bottle thrown by Lynch was never located, having landed in a heavily wooded area. However, the bottle‘s plastic cap and some cotton were recovered shortly after Lynch‘s arrest on the battery charge. No presumptive tests for cocaine were performed at the scene due to an insufficient amount of substance for testing. The bottle cap and cotton were submitted to a forensic laboratory for analysis. The analysis, which was completed on November 2, 1982, revealed traces of cocaine on the bottle cap. Lynch was not arrested for the offense of рossession of cocaine on July 24, 1982, because Detective Smith was of the belief that he lacked probable cause at that time to arrest Lynch for that offense.
After the hearing, the trial court rendered an order granting Lynch‘s motion to discharge under
On appeal, the state voices its disapproval with the trial court‘s conclusion that the 180-day speedy trial time рeriod for the cocaine possession charge began to run on July 24, 1982, the date of Lynch‘s arrest for the charge of battery of a law enforcement
We concur with the state that the trial court erroneously discharged Lynch on the cocaine possession charge. Kelly, which Lynch points to for support, actually hurts his position. In Kelly, we endorsed the
The definition of “criminal episode” which we employed in reaching our decision in Kelly actually originated from the Fourth District Court of Appeal‘s pronouncement in Walker that the conduct resulting in the separate crimes must be “not merely related,” but “the same conduct.” 390 So.2d at 412. In Walker, our sister court used this definition to affirm a trial court‘s order which denied the defendant‘s motion to discharge under
Taking its cue from Walker, the Third District Court of Appeal in State v. Stanley, 399 So.2d 371 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), also held that “[i]t is not enough that the conduct resulting in separate offenses be related; the conduct or episode must be the same even though it may give rise tо different consequences.” Id. at 373.
This succinct, accurate, and easy-to-apply definition of “criminal episode” is entirely consistent with the majority of holdings in cases dealing with the issue at bar. See, e.g., Carter v. State, 432 So.2d 797 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (defendant entitled to discharge under
Applying this definition of “criminal episode” tо the facts in this case, it is plain that Lynch engaged in two criminal episodes. The separate alleged offenses of possession of cocaine and battery of a law enforcement officer were related, to be sure, but they were not the result of the same conduct or episode. Thus, Lynch is not entitled to a discharge under
We recognize that two cases relied upon by Lynch cannot be reconciled with the definition of “criminal episode” which requires that the separate offenses arise from the same conduct or episode: Crain v. State, 302 So.2d 433 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974), and Deiches v. Kaney, 375 So.2d 584 (Fla. 5th DCA 1979). In Crain, the defendant was arrested for the offense of driving an automobile while under the influеnce of a prohibited drug. During the investigation of the incident, the police discovered marijuana in the trunk of his car. He was not arrested for possession of a felony amount of marijuana until more than 180 days after his аrrest for the crime of driving an automobile while under the influence of a prohibited drug. This court held that the two offenses stemmed from the same criminal episode, thus entitling the defendant to be discharged under
In Deiches, the defendant attempted to pass a forged prescription at a drugstore. Immediately upon his exit from the store, the police follоwed his car and cornered him in a dead-end alley, where he was promptly arrested for the offense of loitering and prowling. However, he was not arrested for the crime of unlawfully attempting to acquire pоssession of a controlled substance by attempting to pass the forged prescription until more than 180 days had elapsed since the date of his arrest for the loitering and prowling offense. The Fifth District Court of Appеal held that the two offenses occurred during a single criminal episode and thus quashed an order denying Deiches’ motion to discharge him on the charge for attempted forgery. We disagree with the holding in Deiches because it suggests that a charge may be dismissed under
Given that there were two criminal episodes in the case at bar, it is unnecessary to address the “probable cause” issue which was also raised by the parties.
Accordingly, we reverse the order discharging the information accusing Lynch of the offense of possession of cocaine and remand for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
RYDER and CAMPBELL, JJ., concur.