State v. Lynch, 883 P.2d 1080

State v. Lynch

883 P.2d 1080

Idaho

1994

Check Treatment

*1 pared first-degree with other murder cases. analysis part of proportionality

A is not Plaintiff-Respondent, Idaho, of STATE review of a life sentence. The test is wheth- light of the er the sentence is reasonable Enno, goals sentencing. of 119 Ida- State v. (1991). LYNCH, Defendant- ho 807 P.2d Elizabeth Anne properly Appellant. record reflects the district court goals sentencing: of considered all of the No. 20187. deterrence, society, rehabilita- punishment. tion and Id. We find no error Idaho, Supreme Court of imposed. in the sentence Boise, February 1994 Term. Next, Grube contends that the dis by referring trict court erred to Grube’s 1994. Oct. continuing assertion of his innocence Rehearing Denied Oct. treating aggravating factor'when that as sen imposing sentence. The district court’s

tencing reveals that the dis memorandum

trict court considered Grube’s assertion only possibil

innocence when it evaluated the

ity of Grube’s rehabilitation. Grube’s asser

tion of his innocence was not the sole factor sentence, ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍appropriate determining only part it the determination

rather was

of whether Grube could be rehabilitated.

Thus, did not err. See the district court Lawrence,

State v.

Finally, Grube asserts that the district by denying

court erred his Rule 35 motion have held

for a reduction of sentence. We grant

that a court’s or denial of a Rule 35 discretionary subject to stan-

motion is Lavy, 121 State v. dard of review. After say

reviewing the record we are able to court did not abuse its discretion denying Rule 35 motion for reduc- Grube’s

tion of sentence.

CONCLUSION committed no

We find the district court sentencing the trial or in

errors either possibili- a life without the

Grube to sentence conviction, Thus,

ty parole. we affirm district court’s denial

sentence and the 35 motion.

Rule SILAK,

McDEVITT, C.J., JOHNSON Tern., REINHARDT,

JJ., J. Pro concur. *2 Gen., EchoHawk, A. Atty. Michael

Larry Gen., Boise, Henderson, Deputy ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍Atty. respondеnt. PETITION DENIAL OF

ON FOR REHEARING McDEVITT, Justice. Chief (“Lynch”) Lynch Appellant Elizabeth Anne Airway Road when driving on 900 was erratically patrol officer noticed her swerve Lynch stopped lane. The officer her sobriety test which a field administered Lynch Lynch was arrested for driv- failed. (“DUI”) cited for ing the influence under designated Lynch to in a lane. failure drive the lane infraction and paid the fine for immediately magistrate to dismiss moved charge. magistrate denied motion, ruling was affirmеd Lynch by appeals court. contending charge and the ruling, omission for the same act or citation were therefore, and, any pro- § 18-301 bars ceedings in case. We reverse. the DUI

BACKGROUND 30, 1991, Lynch pulled November On west on оver Officer Nelson while Lewiston, Airway Idaho. Officer Road observing her stopped Lynch after Nelson erratically of him. in the lane ahead swerve Lynch proceeded give Officer Nelson test, Officer sobriety field which she failed. charged ultimately arrested Nelson influence, Lynch with misdemeanor, 18-8004. violation Lynch had An intoximeter test revealed Lynch was alcohol content of .17. a blood designated for failure to drive also citеd infraction, lane, 49- in violation of I.C. alleged the offense Each Airway a.m. at 900 had occurred at 2:00 Road. 20,1991, Lynch paid the fine December

On Lynch Longeteig, then moved Longeteig, & for the infraction. Strom Wilfrid W. charge under magistrate to dismiss the DUI Craigmont, appellant. separate be established magistrate 18-301. The denied the and distinct act can regardless prosecution, Lynch ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍as basis for each plea motion. entered a conditional proof of differ reserving require whether the offenses guilty, right appeal pre- her ing presented ruling. Recognizing elements.” trial the issue *3 (citing law, (Ct.App.1991) State v. 822 P.2d 539 given parties stipu- one as of that the Werneth, 241, Idaho facts, 101 lated to the the district court relevant (1980), denied, 1129, 101 S.Ct. 449 cert. U.S. free the trial exercised review over court’s (1981)). 951, employ 67 L.Ed.2d 118 Courts denying Lynch’s ruling motion to dismiss temporal con a test to determine whether § based on I.C. The court 18-301. district separate, is distinct events. duct divisible into ruling magistratе. Lynch the affirmed 1099, Sterley, P.2d at 112 Idaho at 739 appeals ruling denying the her now motion test, two crimes the fact that Under this dismiss. sequence events is not arise from the same of appeal The issue sole on is whether I.C. of protection to invoke the I.C. sufficient § prosecution charge of a DUI 18-301 bars 112 Chapman, § v. Idaho 18-301. State Lynch, Lynch paid has against where the 310, Idaho 739 P.2d 312 companion moving fine for a violation. requires same § that the act Code 18-301 or for both constitute the basis foundation II words, charges. In the issue is Id. other which led to one conviction whether the acts ANALYSIS as the which lead the are the same acts § IDAHO CODE 18-301 BARS PROSECU- other conviction. A TION OF DUI CHARGE AGAINST test, applying In this THE LYNCH BASED ON OF FACTS that, Lynch’s driving although court ruled THIS CASE anything but continuous and cannot be “one argues § Lynch that I.C. 18-301 bars act,” § does not bar indivisible I.C. 18-301 prosecution charge against of a DUI her moving the proceedings the because DUI of because the arises out the same conviction and violation does not constitute a moving or omission a violation for action as § contemplated by I.C. 18-301. sentence as Lynch fined. was cited and Idaho legislature court held that thе district prosecution § for Code 18-301 bars the same infractions as civil intended to denominate provision omission code act or the public statutory purposes, and to offenses for prosecut or has beеn where the act omission statutory from double exclude infractions provision under a different the code. ed § jeopardy 18-301. We I.C. § has that I.C. ex This Court held 18-301 correctly hold that the district court conclud scope of the constitutional con ceeds driving one ed that continuous jeopardy, providing thus straint on double act, ruling but erred that and indivisible ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍expanded protection. defendant § apply not to traffic infrac 18-301 does Sterley, 112 Idаho 739 P.2d tions. (1987); Chapman, State v. 112 Idaho 398 121 In State v. 1011, 1012, 739 311 Article P.2d Appeals held (Ct.App.1991), Court of I, § 13 of the retrial Idaho Constitution bars charges against Smith for inattentive charge, for criminal or reconviction the same upon onе con- DUI were based and § punishment 18-301 or while I.C. constrains driving errati- tinuous and indivisible act of prosecution for different crimes based on cally under the influence of alcohol. while Chapman, same conduct. Idaho аt case, against charges Similarly, in this P.2d, at 312. Lynch stay designated lane for failure to prohibits § are based the continuous 18-301 suc DUI Code driving erratically while un- as act of prosecutions, as well successive indivisible cessive undеrlying punishments, stemming influence of alcohol. The from the der the offenses sufficiently be divisible act of cannot act or One test the “same same omission. “separate in and clear “a into character requirement is whether events act or omission” refer to the 18-301 in I.C. distinguishable.” “this code” sequence to be enough Castaneda, code, just there- some subdivision not State v. entire Because the (Ct.App.1994). of. charged against Lynch of DUI and offenses matter, rehearing on petition for In its stay designated in the lane arise failure to time, State, argues that first for the continuous, represents from conduct proposition Bennion decision stands driving erratically while un- indivisible act of subject to criminal not infractions are alcohol, and because der the influence of implicate therefore do punishment, Lynch “punished” for the infrac- has been Bennion held in This Court 18-301. tion, prosecution for the 18-301 bars actions that, are criminal although infractions charge. *4 analysis, the constitutional purposes of for any § applies to Idaho Code 18-301 imposed be punishment that could maximum punished whiсh is ame act which can be and as to not so severe infraction was for a traffic and acquittal or a conviction nable to an jury the Idaho Constitu- require a trial under sentence, is not limited to felonies and and “[ajlthough the tion. This Court held pen An misdemeanors. infraction carries crimi- public offenses are prosecutions of all -alty, an act for which one and therefore is 1, actions, 5, § all criminal and nal Article Traffic Infrаc punished. can be The Idaho at the time of required jury trials actions (“ITIA”) by examined tion Act has been 1, statehood, § 7 has suffi- we believe Article embody criminal rather Court and found to summary pro- flexibility to cient allow.for purposes than violations for of constitu civil if the sanction is decriminalized.” ceedings Bennion, 112 v. See State analysis. tional Bennion, 45, P.2d at 965 112 at 730 Idaho (1986).1 35, 952, 32, P.2d 955 We Idaho 730 original). (emphasis in distinguishing no the nature of find basis for acknowledges context, argument statutory in The State’s traffic infractions an an offense is potential penalty for cloak them a criminal and refuse to with determining when only. element to be considered purposes charаcter for constitutional is civil or criminal. prohibition § hold that art. 13 of the Idaho Consti whether We However, prohibition against successive legislature’s effectively tution nullifies the § in is not 18-301 public prosecutions of contained designation of infractions as civil punish- criminal statutory strictly limited to successive for both constitutional and fenses recog- previously has that ments. This Court purposes. The district court reasoned clause, jeoрardy the double applies only § defined nized that 18-301 to offenses 18-301, “protects § by expanded as a to the was the criminal code successor for the same prosecution apply public against a second penal and thus does not code against a sec- acquittal, protects offense after such as traffic infractions. This civil offenses after for the same offense faulty premise prosecution ond is conclusion based conviction, against multiple pun- protects part enacted in 1932 as that the statute was v. the same offense.” ishments for parcel penal code and referenced Pizzuto, § 18-301 119 only penаl code. Idaho Code opinion Nothing in this Court’s referenced 694 adopted in the late 1800’sand Bennion code, supports the conclusion penal in the only offenses defined not conviction, guilty to code, plеa of upon her political defined in the but also offenses constitute charge, did not the infraction legislatively subdivision early mandated Gutke, act the State for the same v. criminal conviction the Idaho Code. See State 25 action. prosecute the DUI now seeks to P. The words 346 revocation, only by punishable fine or license are the ITIA under The Bennion court examined Bennion, I, at imprisonment. to determine 112 Idaho the Idahо Constitution art. 7 of I, barring incorporated clause art. whether the ITIA’s The Court held that P.2d at 965. governed by jury the ITIA was on issues trial provides for trial the Idaho Constitution the ITIA The Court held that constitutional. potentially jury public which arе all offenses jury provides for no easily passes muster where it by imprisonment. Id. punishable ITIA punishable under the offenses trial because prosecution Idaho Code 18-301 bars charge against Lynch under the Applicatiоn In the Matter of the of Carin Accordingly,.

facts of this case. we reverse County Aid, Medical JOHNSON the trial court. COUNTY, JEFFERSON Petitioner- J., Tem., JOHNSON, HART, J., Pro Appellant, concur. BISTLINE, J., sat, participate in did not IDAHO REGIONAL EASTERN opinion. substitute CENTER, MEDICAL Respondent.

SILAK, Justice, specially concurring. No. 21132. Although I continue to adhere the views my expressed Ap ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍dissent as a Court Appeals of Idaho. Court of peals judge in State v. (Ct.App.1991), rec 26, 1994. Oct. *5 in permit ord this case does not the facts оf separate, conduct to be divided into ¶. purposes distinct events for of the State

Sterley temporal analysis. Sterley, 112 Ida

Here, conduct which was swerving

basis of the infraction citation was Airway specif

in the 900 block of The Road. charge “operat

ic 18-8004 was

ing a motor vehicle while under influence intoxicating beverages drugs.” or of

police report contained the record indicat operation

ed that of the motor vehicle charge basis DUI was Airway swerving the 900 block of

Road. the facts in Unlike

charges specifically sepa did reference

rate acts of at different locations.

Thus, opinion I concur the Court’s case, the infraction and

are based one continuous and indivisi act,

ble and therefore the of I.C. Lynch.

§ 18-301 should be afforded to