The defendant was charged, in separate counts of the Information, with the crimes of incest, adultery, and rape of his nine-year-old daughter. The jury found him guilty of an attempt to commit each of the crimes charged. He’appeals on two grounds, viz.: (1) The trial court erred in instructing the jury they could find him guilty of an attempt to commit the particular crimes charged in the Information, and (2) The evidence is insufficient to support the convictions.
The instructions complained of were given by the court on its own motion. No objections were made or exceptions taken thereto by the defendant as required by SDC 33.1318. In any event the instructions were proper. “It is a general rule that every completed crime necessarily includes an attempt to commit it, so that, under a charge of a completed offense, accused may be convicted of the lesser offense of attempting to commit .the crime charged, as under statutes in terms providing for conviction of an attempt, * 42 C.J.S., Indictments and Informations, § 285, p. 1305. Our statute expressly so provides. Under the provisions of SDC 34.3669 “The jury may find the defendant guilty of any offense, the commission of which is necessarily included in that with which he is charged in the indictment or information, or of an attempt to commit the offense charged.” SDC 13.0401 further provides: “Every person who attempts to commit any crime and in such attempt does any act toward the commission of such crime, but fails or is prevented or intercepted in the perpetration thereof”, is punish
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able as therein provided. Such statutes do not infringe upon the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. 42 C.J.S., Indictments and Informations, § 273, p. 1296. State v. Morse, 35 S. D. 18,
It has been held in a similar case that a person charged with incest may properly be convicted of an attempt to commit that crime. State v. Winslow,
The defendant relies on State v. Albers,
The convicting evidence in this case came largely from the testimony of the nine-year-old victim, and her brother, age twelve. The girl did not know the literal meaning of the word “oath” and defendant, therefore, contends she was incompetent to testify. Such is not the test of testimonial competency. As pointed out in McCormick on Evidence, p. 140, “This, manifestly, is inappropriate. It confounds a religious with a mental standard, and if literally applied, the most intelligent witness could hardly meet the test, much less a child or an insane person.” Under the
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liberalized standards of this court the girl fully indicated her competency and capacity to testify. In raising her hand to take the oath she promised “always to tell the truth”. She was taught in Sunday School “always to tell the truth”, that “God don’t like you if you lie”, and “if you lie, God won’t help you or anything.” There is no arbitrary age which prohibits a child from testifying. In the case of State v. Southmayd,
The credibility of the witnesses, and the weight and value of their testimony, are matters within the exclusive province of the jury. We have reviewed the entire record and find ample evidence to sustain .the convictions.
Affirmed.
