41 Minn. 60 | Minn. | 1889
The defendant, Eugene Lucy, jointly indicted with his brothers, Daniel and Timothy, but separately tried, stands convicted of the crime of murder in the second degree, as charged in the indictment. From a judgment that he be imprisoned for life as. punishment for the offence, he has appealed to this court, alleging error in a single ruling on the admission of testimony upon the trial; and that the court erred in its charge to the jury; and, generally* that it was error to refuse a new trial.
From tha evidence it appears that James Gates, now deceased* met the defendants and several other persons at a dance given at the house of one of their neighbors. During the festivities Gates and the convicted defendant, Eugene Lucy, got into a discussion, in which the latter used abusive language towards Gates, and was finally ejected from the house by another man. Upon his return to the house within a few minutes, he renewed his abuse of Gates, and was again compelled to go out of the house. The deceased shortly afterwards went outside, where he'met Lucy in the presence of several of the party, including the codefendants. It seems evident from the testimony that Lucy attempted — inside as well as outside
In detailing the affair one of the witnesses stated that when Lucy stepped outside the first time, he struck the house, causing a dull, hard sound. As this entire occurrence was after dark, and none of the witnesses saw a weapon or instrument of any kind in the hands of the accused, the state, after laying the foundation for an opinion,— evidently for the purpose of showing by circumstances that Lucy was armed, — asked the witness if he could tell, by comparing the sound in question with that produced by the naked fist, what kind of a sound the blow made on the boards of the house; and he was permitted to an swer, the defendant objecting. The necessities of a case may frequently require the opinion of a witness to be given concerning matters with which he is specially acquainted, but which cannot be specifically described, and an opinion is always admissible whenever an effect produced upon the mind cannot be reproduced and made palpable to the jury. For illustrations of this doctrine see Wharf. Grim.
In response to a request made by defendant’s counsel, suggested ■undoubtedly by the testimony that Daniel and Timothy Lucy had to .some extent participated in the quarrel, the court charged, in effect, that if death was caused by the blow of a third person, who of his ■own volition interfered in the fight after it commenced, the defendant upon trial could not be convicted. The court thereafter, and as ■qualifying this language, charged that if the jury should find that some other person struck the fatal blow, but that the defendant upon trial aided, abetted,, or assisted in the killing by word, act, or deed, he might be found guil.ty as charged in the indictment. Of this the defendant complains, averring that there was no testimony whatever in the case tending to show him guilty of aiding, abetting, or assisting another person in the crime set forth in the indictment. We do not fully agree with counsel in all they claim in relation to the testimony on this point, but this exception to the charge is well disposed of by saying that the qualification was equally as pertinent and proper, in view of the testimony, as was the request to which it applied, and which induced it.
The defendant availed himself of a statutory privilege, and gave to the jury his version of the unfortunate encounter. In referring to this fact the court charged that such weight should be given his testimony as the jury believed it entitled to in view of all the facts and circumstances proved on the trial, and that the defendant’s interest in the result of the prosecution might also be considered. This is
Finally, it is claimed in behalf of the appellant that the testimony was insufficient to sustain a conviction. The physicians who made the post mortem examination — one being the coroner of the county— found a scalp wound about one inch long upon each side and upon the upper and back portion of the head of the deceased, which for their entire length penetrated to the skull. These physicians were very decidedly of the opinion that neither could have been produced with the naked fist. They were contused wounds, and, in the judgment of the medical men, inflicted by means of a blunt instrument, which must have been quite heavy, or used with great force. The skull was not found to be fractured, and there were no other injuries of the surface. The internal structure of the body was examined, and all of its parts and organs found to be in an apparently normal condition. Bruises were found upon the brain upon each side of the head and directly underneath the scalp wounds, — one being one and one-half inches in diameter. From these bruises or contusions the blood had effused and clotted in several places in the brain substance. In the opinion of these physicians death was caused by concussion and extravasation of the blood in the brain and its membranes, — the result of the blows upon the head. The defence attempted to destroy the effect of this opinion by introducing as witnesses four medical experts, who with great unanimity asserted the post mortem unsatisfactory and incomplete, because such organs as the heart and kidneys were not minutely dissected, without which, they asserted, it would be impossible to positively state the cause of the death. They also testified, as was admitted by the state, that concussion of the brain, followed by extravasation of blood in its substance and membranes', rarely resulted in instantaneous death. The object of this testimony seems to have been to lodge in the minds of the jurors a suspicion that, because instant death under circumstances like these is of rare occurrence, it might be attributed in this case to heart disease, which, it was claimed, cannot be detected with
Judgment affirmed,