State v. LuceroState v. Lucero
- Reporters:
- , , ,
- Before:
- Hardesty
By the Court,
Hardesty, J.:
A conviction for level-three trafficking in a controlled substance results in a mandatory minimum prison term of 10 years pursuant to
FACTS
In 2007, the State charged respondent Arthur Lucero with one count of level-three trafficking in a controlled substance, in violation of
Several months later, Lucero violated the terms of his probation. After a hearing pursuant to Anaya v. State, 96 Nev. 119, 606 P.2d 156 (1980), 1 the district court revoked his probation. Lucero’s counsel requested a lesser sentence than the sentence originally imposed by the district court because of the prior finding of substantial assistance. After revoking his probation, the district court reduced Lucero’s original sentence to 180 months with eligibility for parole after 24 months.
The State then filed a motion to correct the new sentence, which it asserted was an illegal sentence. The State argued that allowing parole eligibility in less than 10 years violated the statutorily prescribed minimum sentence found in
The district court ultimately found that it had authority to reduce Lucero’s sentence at the time of probation revocation pursuant to
DISCUSSION
When a defendant’s probation is revoked,
Standard of review and statutory interpretation
Challenges to a district court’s discretionary modification of a sentence after a probation revocation hearing are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Kirkpatrick
v.
State,
122 Nev. 846, 848, 137 P.3d 1193, 1194 (2006). However, we review questions of statutory interpretation de novo.
State
v.
Catanio,
120 Nev. 1030, 1033, 102 P.3d 588, 590 (2004). Whether the substantial-assistance provision of
When interpreting a statute, legislative intent “is the controlling factor.”
Robert E. v. Justice Court,
99 Nev. 443, 445, 664 P.2d 957, 959 (1983). The starting point for determining legislative intent is the statute’s plain meaning; when a statute “is clear on its face, a court can not go beyond the statute in determining legislative intent.” Id.;
see also Catanio,
120 Nev. at 1033, 102 P.3d at 590 (“We must attribute the plain meaning to a statute that is not ambiguous.”). But when “the statutory language lends itself to two or more reasonable interpretations,” the statute is ambiguous, and we may then look beyond the statute in determining legislative intent.
Catanio,
120 Nev. at 1033, 102 P.3d at 590. To interpret an ambiguous statute, we look to the legislative history and construe the statute in a manner that is consistent with reason and public policy.
Great Basin Water Network v. State Eng’r,
126 Nev. 187, 196, 234 P.3d 912, 918 (2010);
see also Moore v. State,
122 Nev. 27, 32, 126 P.3d 508, 511 (2006) (looking to legislative history to determine legislative intent behind ambiguous statute);
Robert E.,
99 Nev. at 445-48, 664 P.2d at 959-61 (looking to legislative history, reason, and public policy to determine legislative intent behind ambiguous statute). With these rules of statutory construction in mind, we turn first to the statutory language to determine whether
The “minimum term of imprisonment” referred to in NRS 176A. 630(5) is ambiguous
Pursuant to
The State and Lucero agree on appeal, as they stipulated in the district court, that Lucero provided substantial assistance and was eligible for a reduced or suspended sentence pursuant to
The State contends that after probation is revoked pursuant to
Lucero, on the other hand, argues that the statutorily prescribed minimum sentence after revocation of probation includes all of the statutory provisions that determine the original sentence.
We conclude that both interpretations of the phrase “minimum term of imprisonment” in
Because we determine that both the State’s and Lucero’s interpretations of
Statutory interpretation
The legislative history of
The legislative history regarding
In Robert E., 99 Nev. at 447-48, 664 P.2d at 960-61, we determined that, in the absence of applicable legislative history, specific public policy grounds supported one interpretation of an ambiguous statute over another. However, the parties have not argued, and there does not appear to be any reason or public policy independent of that expressed in the legislative history, regarding the role of the substantial-assistance provision in sentencing drug traffickers after probation revocation.
Thus, the legislative history and the reason and public policy behind these statutes shed no light on whether the Legislature intended for the district court to have the discretion to consider
Rule of lenity
The “rule of lenity [is a rule of construction that] demands that ambiguities in criminal statutes be liberally interpreted in the accused’s favor,” Moore, 122 Nev. at 32, 126 P.3d at 511, and it “applies not only to interpretations of the substantive ambit of criminal prohibitions, but also to the penalties they impose.” Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387 (1980). Because ambiguity is the cornerstone of the rule of lenity, the rule only applies when other statutory interpretation methods, including the plain language, legislative history, reason, and public policy, have failed to resolve a penal statute’s ambiguity. Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474, 488 (2010); Bifulco, 447 U.S. at 387; see also Moore, 122 Nev. at 32, 126 P.3d at 511. That is the case here.
Applying the rule of lenity, we conclude that the phrase “minimum term of imprisonment
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order.
Pickering, L, concurs.
I concur in the result only.
Douglas, C.J.
Notes
An Anaya hearing ensures that the probationer’s due process rights are protected during probation revocation proceedings by giving the probationer an opportunity to “confront and question witnesses giving information against him.” Anaya v. State, 96 Nev. 119, 123, 606 P.2d 156, 158 (1980).
We reject the State’s suggestion that the applicable penal statute refers only to subsection 3 of
This language was part of
When the Legislature first enacted