STATE of Minnesota, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Brian Keith LUCAS, Respondent.
No. C0-97-2145
Supreme Court of Minnesota
Jan. 21, 1999
589 N.W.2d 91
GILBERT, Justice.
III.
Having determined that the trial court erred, both in excluding appellant from the pretrial hearing and in admitting Glaze and Peltier‘s out-of-court statements, we must now decide if these errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.23 To determine if the errors were harmless, we must look to the basis on which the jury rested its verdict and determine what effect the errors had on that verdict.24 If the verdict actually rendered was surely unattributable to the errors, the errors are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.25 Appellant is entitled to a new trial if the errors, when taken cumulatively, had the effect of denying appellant a fair trial.26
The trial court first erred in excluding appellant from the pretrial hearing that was held to determine if appellant threatened Glaze. The court then erred in admitting Glaze and Peltier‘s out-of-court statements pursuant to
These errors, taken cumulatively, deprived the appellant of his right to a fair trial. While the impact of any one of these errors, standing alone, may not have affected the verdict, we cannot conclude on this record that the cumulative effect of these errors was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, in the interests of justice we must reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
Clayton M. Robinson, Jr., Saint Paul City Attorney, Joel A. Franklin, Assistant City Attorney, Saint Paul, for petitioner-appellant.
John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Mark D. Nyvold, Assistant State Public Defender, Saint Paul, for respondent.
Michael A. Hatch, Attorney General of Minnesota, Jeffrey F. Lebowski, Assistant Attorney General, Saint Paul, for amici curiae Minnesota Commissioner of Public Safety.
Moore, Costello & Hart, P.L.L.P., J. Patrick Plunkett, James E. Blaney, Saint Paul, for amici curiae Minnesota Safety Council, Inc.
GILBERT, Justice.
The issue in this case is whether a police officer may stop a vehicle based solely on a violation of
At 11:40 a.m. on October 6, 1997, a police officer noticed three small children standing up and jumping around in the back seat of a moving vehicle. The officer estimated that the children were all 4-years-old or younger. Based on this observation, the officer stopped the vehicle and its driver, Brian Keith Lucas, for a violation of
No motor vehicle operator who is operating a motor vehicle on the streets and
highways of this state may transport a child under the age of four in a seat of a motor vehicle equipped with a factory-installed seat belt, unless the child is properly fastened in the child passenger restraint system. Any motor vehicle operator who violates this subdivision is guilty of a petty misdemeanor and may be sentenced to pay a fine of not more than $50. The fine may be waived or the amount reduced if the motor vehicle operator produces evidence that within 14 days after the date of the violation a child passenger restraint system meeting federal motor vehicle safety standards was purchased or obtained for the exclusive use of the operator.
The officer asked Lucas for his driver‘s license, which Lucas said he did not have with him. Lucas then told the officer that he was the father of the three children, ages 3, 4 and 5 years old. The officer confirmed that the vehicle contained no child passenger restraint systems for the 3-year-old child and that none of the occupants of the vehicle were wearing seat belts. The officer further noticed a “strong odor of alcohol” on Lucas’ breath, and Lucas admitted to drinking four or five beers between 7:00 or 8:00 a.m. and 11:00 a.m. Lucas failed several field sobriety tests and was placed under arrest. Lucas was transported to St. Paul police headquarters, where the arresting officer read Lucas the implied consent advisory and Lucas agreed to take a breath test. The breath test revealed Lucas had a blood alcohol content of .17%.
Pursuant to
At his Rasmussen hearing, Lucas sought to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the stop by challenging the stop, asserting that police may not stop an individual solely for a violation of
A peace officer may not issue a citation for a violation of this section unless the officer lawfully stopped or detained the driver of the motor vehicle for a moving violation other than a violation involving motor vehicle equipment.
Id. (emphasis added). Lucas argued that the prohibition against issuing citations based solely on a violation of
The trial court, relying in part on State v. Fiebke, 554 N.W.2d 755 (Minn.App.1996), concluded that
On appeal from a pre-trial suppression order, the state must show “clearly and unequivocally that the trial court has erred * * * and that, unless reversed, the error will have a critical impact on the outcome of the trial.” State v. Edrozo, 578 N.W.2d 719, 722 (Minn.1998) (internal citation omitted). In this case, suppression of all of the evidence obtained from the stop would have a critical impact on the outcome of the case.
Therefore, the only issue this court must decide is whether the lower courts erred in suppressing the evidence obtained as a result of the stop of Lucas’ vehicle based on their interpretation of
On appeal to this court, Lucas does not claim that the language of
Furthermore, it has long been the rule that “[w]here failure of expression rather than ambiguity of expression * * * is the vice of the enactment, courts are not free to substitute amendment for construction and thereby supply the omissions of the legislature.” State v. Moseng, 254 Minn. 263, 269, 95 N.W.2d 6, 11-12 (1959); see also Phelps v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 537 N.W.2d 271, 274 (Minn.1995). In this case, adding a limitation on citations to 169.685, subd. 5(b) where there is no ambiguity would wrongfully substitute amendment for construction. Therefore, we agree with Lucas’ concession that the doctrine of in pari materia may not be used to construe the limitation on citations in
Lucas instead asserts that the citation limitation of
Reversed and remanded.
PAGE, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur in the result and the court‘s analysis in reaching that result. I write separately only for the purpose of noting that, from a plain reading of
PAUL H. ANDERSON, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur in the result reached by the majority, but I write separately to add a point, to emphasize a point, and to point out statutory language that I conclude is confusing.
I would add to the majority‘s argument the fact that the origins of
As the majority points out,
The point I wish to emphasize is that our holding today applies only to the suppression of evidence obtained as a result of a stop under
Finally, as I examine the language used in
(3) a passenger riding in any seat of a passenger vehicle who is older than three but younger than 11 years of age.
(Emphasis added.).
Minnesota statute section 169.685, subdivision 5(b) provides that:
(b) No motor vehicle operator who is operating a motor vehicle on the streets and highways of this state may transport a child under the age of four in a seat of a motor vehicle equipped with a factory-installed seat belt, unless the child is properly fastened in the child passenger restraint system * * *.
(Emphasis added.)
I believe that older than three can be construed to mean a person who is three years and one day of age while under the age of four clearly means a person who has yet to reach four years of age. Wearing a properly adjusted and fastened seat belt including both the shoulder and lap belt is different from having a child properly fastened in a child passenger restraint system, yet it seems that both are statutorily required for a person older than three but under the age of four. This leads me to question whether it would be a proper defense to a citation for violation of
My concern about this ambiguity is further heightened if, under some circumstances, violation of either of these two statutes could be construed to be a criminal violation. It is clear from our prior holdings that the criminal consequences which attend criminal violations of a statute obligate us to construe the statute‘s provisions strictly in favor of the accused. See State v. Larson Transfer and Storage, Inc., 310 Minn. 295, 304, 246 N.W.2d 176, 182 (1976) (stating that penal provisions in statutes and municipal ordinances are strictly construed because [b]efore a person may be subject to criminal liability, it must be reasonably certain that the statute or ordinance renders his conduct a criminal offense.).
While resolution of the dilemma caused by the different and possibly irreconcilable language used in these two statutes is not necessary to decide the case before us today, it may well be relevant in a future case. It is for this reason that I believe it is important to make this potential ambiguity known.
PAGE, Justice (concurring specially).
I join in the special concurrence of Justice Paul H. Anderson except as to his argument that this court should leave the interpretation of