STATE OF OHIO v. CHASE ALEXANDER LOVELACE
CASE NO. CA2022-05-032
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO WARREN COUNTY
2/6/2023
[Cite as State v. Lovelace, 2023-Ohio-339.]
David P. Fornshell, Warren County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kirsten A. Brandt, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Johnna M. Shia, for appellant.
M. POWELL, J.
{1} Appellant, Chase Alexander Lovelace, appeals his felony conviction for failure to comply with the signal of a police officer.
{2} On December 16, 2021, a complaint was filed in the Franklin Municipal Court charging appellant with third-degree felony failure to comply with the order or signal of a
{3} During a pretrial hearing on March 4, 2022, the trial court determined that appellant‘s speedy trial time expired on April 7, 2022.2 However, the trial court sua sponte extended the trial time due to an “unusually heavy trial schedule.” On April 12, 2022, appellant filed a pro se motion to dismiss for violation of his right to a speedy trial, and his counsel orally moved for dismissal on those same grounds at a pretrial hearing on April 14, 2022. The trial court denied the mоtions on April 19, 2022, and the matter proceeded to a jury trial on April 21, 2022.
{4} At trial, the state presented testimony from Erica Robinson, who stated that on the morning of December 14, 2021, appellant came to her home to install a doorbell camera. She left for work at 9:15 a.m. in a Dodge Charger that had been rented from Enterprise for her use by her parents. Robinson‘s roommate, Karlin Wilson, arranged for Robinson to drop her off in Franklin on Robinson‘s way to work and then pick her up later that day. When Robinson returned home from work around 4:30 p.m., appellant was still at her home. Robinson received a text message from Wilson between 4:30 p.m. and 5:00
{5} Wilson testified that the Charger, driven by appellant, arrived to pick her up. Aware that appеllant was as an acquaintance of Robinson, Wilson assumed that Robinson sent him to come pick her up and she got in the passenger seat of the Charger.
{6} Appellant, on the other hand, testified that though he came to Robinson‘s home to install the doorbell, he never drove the Charger. Appellant contended that a man named Jeff Karl came to pick him up in the afternoon and the two went to Robinson‘s work before going out that evening.
{7} The state also presented testimony from Officer Wallace and Chief Colon. The officers testified that on the evening of December 14, 2021, they witnessed a Dodge Charger run a red light, for which they initiated a traffic stop. During the stop, Officer Wallace approached the driver‘s side of the Charger and spoke to both the passenger and the driver. The driver did not have a driver‘s license or any form of identification but gavе the name “Chase Lovelace” and a social security number that matched that for a “Chase Lovelace,” except for the last digit.
{8} A few moments later, Chief Colon approached the driver‘s side window. He testified that he spoke to the driver and asked the driver to remove the keys from the vehicle. The driver then revved the engine of the car and sped away. With Wallace at the wheel, the officers pursued the Charger at speeds of over 95 miles per hour, during which the driver drove over curbs, ignored traffic signals, and drove in and out of traffic. There were times during the pursuit that the driver turned off his headlights. After determining that it was no longer safe to continue to chase the Charger because of the volume of other vehicular and pedestrian traffic, the officers decided to terminate the chase.
{10} After hearing the evidence, the jury found appellant guilty, and the court sentenced him to a 36-month prison term. Appellant now appeals his conviction, raising two assignments of error for our review.
{11} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{12} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED LOVELACE‘S MOTION TO DISMISS ON SPEEDY TRIAL GROUNDS.
{13} Appellаnt argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. Specifically, appellant argues that the trial court‘s “broad reason of a crowded trial docket, without further explanation” does not constitute a “reasonable continuance” pursuant to
{14} Appellate review of speedy-trial issues involves a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Wilson, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2017-08-125, 2018-Ohio-702, ¶ 33. In reviewing these issues, we defer to the trial court‘s faсtual findings if they are supported by competent, credible evidence, but we review the application of the law to those facts independently. Id.
{15} The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and by
{16}
{17} The Ohio Supreme Cоurt has held that these statutes set forth “mandates to which strict adherence is required.” State v. Wentworth, 54 Ohio St.2d 171, 173 (1978). However, the supreme court has further held that “the prescribed times for trial set forth in
{18}
{19} Here, appellant was arrested on January 10, 2022, and was held in jail in lieu of bail. Thus, pursuant to
{20} While it is clear that appellant was not afforded a trial within the time provided by
{21} The Ohio Supreme Court has previously held that a trial court must “affirmatively demonstrate that a sua sponte continuance by the court was reasonable in light of its necessity or purpose,” and that “mere entries by the trial court will ordinarily not suffice, except when the reasonableness of the continuance cannot be seriously questioned.” State v. Lee, 48 Ohio St.2d 208, 209 (1976). Further, the supreme court has also held that “court congestion may be a valid ground under subsection (H) for extending an accused‘s trial date beyond the time periods provided for by
{22} In Lee, the court upheld a continuance pursuant to
{23} Based on these principles, this court has held that “scheduling conflicts, crowded dockets, or the lack of an available courtroom, are reasonable bases necessitating a continuance under
{24} Under the circumstances herein, we find that the trial court did not err in denying appellant‘s motion to dismiss. As with the above cases, the trial court‘s docket was congested, and the court granted a continuance that was only nine days beyond the speedy trial expiration date due to two other jury trials and a murder trial. The court stated the reasons for the continuance both on the record and in its journal entry and did so before the expiration of the speedy trial period. While appellant argues that the reason provided by the court in its journal entry was too “broad,” and that “a general assertion of a crowded docket with numerous trial [sic] set alone should not suffice as a reasonable basis,” the reasonableness of this nine-day continuance cannot be seriously questioned. This is not а case where the court used a “mere entry” to extend the statutory period to a degree that undercuts the implementation of the speedy trial provisions.
{25} Accordingly, because appellant‘s speedy trial rights were not violated, appellant‘s first assignment of error is overruled.
{26} Assignment of Error No. 2:
{27} LOVELACE‘S FAILURE TO COMPLY CONVICTION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE NOR THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
{28} Appellant argues that his conviction for failure to comply with the signal or order or a police officer was not supportеd by sufficient evidence and was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, appellant asserts that the state failed to show that he was the driver of the Dodge Charger. Appellant discredits the testimony of Chief
{29} “It is well settled that in order to warrant a conviction, the evidence must establish beyond a reasonаble doubt the identity of the accused as the person who committed the crime at issue.” State v. Jividen, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2020-10-067, 2021-Ohio-2720, ¶ 11. The reasonable doubt standard is “proof that an ordinary person would be willing to rely and act upon in the most important of his own affairs.”
{30} The legal concepts of sufficiency of the evidence and weight of the evidence are both quantitatively and qualitatively different. State v. Barnett, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2011-09-177, 2012-Ohio-2372, ¶ 13. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court “examines the evidence in order to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would support a conviction.” Id. In contrast, a manifest weight challenge, “concerns the inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other; weight is not a question of mathematics, but depends on its effect in inducing belief.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Babyak, 12th Dist. Madison Nos. CA2009-10-023 and CA2010-03-006, 2010-Ohio-3820, ¶ 17.
{31} As this court has previously stated, “a finding that a conviction is supported by the weight of the evidence must necessarily include a finding of sufficiency.” State v. Stodgel, 12th Dist. Fayette No. CA2012-04-010, 2013-Ohio-1109, ¶ 34. Though a review of the sufficiency of the evidence and a review of the manifest weight of the evidence are separate and legally distinct concepts, “[a] detеrmination that a conviction is supported by
{32} In determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, a reviewing court must look at the entire record to weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, as well as consider the credibility of the witnesses. Barnett at ¶ 14. In reviewing the record, we must ask if the trier of fact “clearly lоst its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed, and a new trial ordered.” State v. Cephas, 12th Dist. Buter No. CA2021-05-051, 2021-Ohio-4356, ¶ 9. While our review requires us to consider the credibility of witnesses and weight given to the evidence, “these issues are primarily matters for the trier of fact to decide.” State v. Barnes, 12th Dist. Brown No. CA2010-06-009, 2011-Ohio-5226, ¶ 81. Accordingly, an appellate court will overturn a conviction due to the manifest weight of the evidence “only in extraordinary circumstanсes when the evidence presented at trial weighs heavily in favor of acquittal.” State v. Roberson, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2021-01-003, 2021-Ohio-3705, ¶ 29.
{33} Appellant was convicted of
{34} Officer Wallace testified that upon initiating the traffic stop of the Dodge Charger, she approached the passenger side of the vehicle with her flashlight. The footage shows Officer Wallace shining her flashlight into the vеhicle. Officer Wallace spoke with
{35} Chief Colon‘s testimony was similar to that of Officer Wallace. Chief Colon testified that during the traffic stop, he saw Officer Wallace approach the passenger side and engage the passenger and the driver. He thereafter approached the driver side of the vehicle. Chief Colon testified that he spoke to the driver, who he described as a slender white male with tattoos and facial hair. Chief Colon identified appellant in court as the driver of the vehicle. Chief Colon testified that he saw the driver “with my eyes, as I made the approach to speak to him as he was in the driver‘s seat * * * He also gave his social security number, which was incorrect by one number.”
{36} Chief Colon stated that shortly after terminating the chase of the Charger, he and Officer Wallace received a call that a car had been stolen by an individual named Chase Lovelace. Chief Colon pullеd up an individual by that name on JusticeWeb and found “a prior mugshot of the same guy.” Though Chief Colon cannot remember what the driver was wearing that night, Colon stated that the driver “looked at me” and he remembers that the driver was tattooed. Upon arriving at Robinson‘s address, Colon stated that both Robinson and Wilson told the officers that Chase Lovelace had stolen the Charger.
{38} Appellant himself testified that he had seen Wilson around Robinson‘s home and that he “got more familiar with her, once I started coming over to Ms. Robinson‘s a little bit more.” Appellant testified that he never drove the Dodge Charger; he said that an individual named Jeff Karl came to pick him up and that the two went to Robinson‘s work before going out that night. The appellant asserts that all of the other witnesses are not telling the truth. Notably, no witnesses testified to corroborate appellant‘s testimony, including Jeff Karl.
{39} The jury in this case, as the trier of fact, was in the best position to determine “the credibility of witnesses and weight to be given to the evidence as it relates to the perpetrator‘s identity.” State v. Burns, 12th Dist. Clinton No. CA2013-10-019, 2014-Ohio-4625, ¶ 41. The jury clearly believed the testimony of Chief Colon, Officer Wallace, and Karlin Wilson that appellant was the driver of the vehicle. “The jury was in the best position to judge the credibility of the [witnesses], and we will not disturb its credibility determination.” State v. Bostick, 12th Dist. Warren Nos. CA2022-03-013 and CA2022-04-015, 2022-Ohio-4228, ¶ 17. Moreover, “[i]t is well-established that when conflicting evidence is presented at trial, a conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence simply because the trier of fact believed the prosecution testimony.” State v. Lunsford, 12th Dist. Brown No. CA2010-10-021, 2011-Ohio-6529, ¶ 17.
{40} In light of the consistent testimony of Officer Wallace, Chief Colon, and Wilson that identified appellant as the driver of the Dodge Charger, as well as the dashcam footage
{41} Accordingly, as appellant‘s conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence and is thus supported by sufficient evidence, his second assignment of error is overruled.
{42} Judgment affirmed.
S. POWELL, P.J., and HENDRICKSON J., concur.