State v. LouviereState v. Louviere
This direct criminal appeal concerns the defendant‘s conviction for first-degree murder and sentence of death. On October 23, 1996, a Terrebonne Parish grand jury indicted Chad Roy Louviere for the first-degree murder of Pamela Duplantis. Pursuant to
On direct appeal to this court under
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The facts of this case are essentially undisputed, and by necessity, their narration
After D.D. overcame her fear of defendant‘s death threats, she reported this incident to the Terrebonne Parish Sheriff‘s Office, which issued a police radio alert to be on the lookout for defendant. The sheriff‘s office issued the alert after defendant had responded to radio calls, but refused to disclose his location or return to the police station.
Later that morning, defendant drove to the Argent Bank, where his estranged wife, A.L., was working. Still in his full deputy‘s uniform, defendant carried a duffle bag laden with weapons, including an AR-15 rifle, as he entered the bank. Inside, the defendant drew and cocked his sidearm and directed J.B., the bank‘s manager, to remove the bank‘s two male customers, and lock the entrance, leaving only the bank‘s six female employees inside the bank. The defendant then ordered the women to leave their work stations and assemble in the lobby.
The defendant then demanded that J.B. retrieve the surveillance tape from the bank‘s video recorder. J.B. returned to the lobby with the tape, and defendant then fired several shots from his AR-15 rifle into the tape, destroying it as it lay on the lobby‘s tile floor.
Meanwhile, Pamela Duplantis was seated in the lobby, but somewhat apart from the other women who were huddled together. She was crying. After conversing with his estranged wife, A.L., the defendant again shouldered his rifle. Standing some ten feet away, the defendant aimed at Pamela Duplantis and fired, striking her near the center of her forehead. She died instantly.
Thereafter, defendant ordered the employees to barricade the entrances and windows with furniture. The defendant handcuffed several of the women together, removing the restraints at times to have an employee with him as he walked through the bank, checking to insure that the law enforcement officers who had assembled outside had not infiltrated the building and observing the activity in their perimeter around the bank.
In exchange for lunch, the defendant uncuffed and released one employee to the police. In exchange for a radio, the defendant then released another employee.
During the approximately 30-hour standoff with police, defendant ordered J.B. and A.L. to undress and perform oral sex on each other. The defendant also directed J.B. and A.L. to insert a wooden martial arts weapon, a kubaton, into each other‘s vagina. The defendant raped J.B. on two separate occasions, vaginally and
After pulling another employee, B.T., through the bank for a perimeter check, defendant brought B.T. into a storage room where he ordered her to perform oral sex upon him. The defendant unsuccessfully attempted to penetrate B.T. vaginally. The defendant later brought A.L. into the storage room, where he likewise ordered her to perform oral sex.
On October 17, 1996, pursuant to police negotiations, the defendant released B.T. around 8 p.m. and also placed the rifle outside the bank, retaining two handguns. The next day, on October 18, 1996, around noon, after further negotiations, J.B. carried the remainder of the weapons outside the bank, then returned inside. The defendant then released both A.L. and J.B., and surrendered.
Following the Terrebonne Parish grand jury‘s indictment of first-degree murder, the defendant pleaded not guilty. Venue was transferred to Lafayette Parish pursuant to defendant‘s motion for a change of venue. While awaiting trial in the Lafayette Parish jail, defendant, armed with a sharpened toothbrush “shank,” overpowered a female deputy. Pressing the weapon to her neck and threatening to kill her, defendant held the deputy hostage until he was allowed to see a female inmate, J.R. The jail and J.R. complied with defendant‘s demand, whereupon defendant released the deputy, whose neck was gouged by the shank. J.R. remained with the defendant for several hours in the jail‘s control room. Upon her release, J.R. stated that she and defendant had consensual sex in the control room. Later, J.R. testified that the sex was not consensual, and that her earlier statement was made out of fear of retaliation.
After the hostage offenses in the Lafayette jail and the attending publicity, the state moved that venue again be transferred. The trial court granted the motion, and the case was set for trial in Terrebonne Parish with jurors selected from East Baton Rouge Parish.
Thereafter, on December 22, 1998, by joint stipulation with the state and with consent of the trial court, the defendant changed his original plea and entered a plea of guilty to the charge of first-degree murder. The trial court then conducted the capital sentencing hearing. Following four days of testimony, which included 19 defense witnesses, the jury returned a recommendation of death after finding all the aggravating circumstances advanced by the state. On February 24, 2000, the trial court formally sentenced defendant to death by lethal injection.
DISCUSSION
The defendant filed twenty-five assignments of error. Of these, four merit discussion in the published opinion and are addressed under headings designating the primary procedural stage implicated; the others are discussed in an unpublished appendix.2
Pre-Trial
Constitutionality of Guilty Plea in Capital Cases (Assignment I)
In his first assignment of error, the defendant argues that despite the specific statutory provision in
While we noted in Brogdon that the interests of justice require that no mere procedural device such as a plea should deprive the state from pursuing the full range of penalties for murder, including capital punishment, our holding rested on the defendant‘s right to a jury trial. Our statement in Brogdon that referenced the state‘s interests in capital procedure, while dicta, was not improvidently made. Indeed, as we will explain further below, we note that the current statutory framework properly balances both interests that we recognized in Brogdon—the defendant‘s right to a jury trial and the state‘s interest in seeking the death penalty when appropriate.
At the time we decided Brogdon, there was no statutory mechanism for a defendant to plead guilty while still preserving the defendant‘s right to a jury trial on the penalty issue. Without the statutory mechanism, there would have been no authority for the trial court to convene a jury and try the penalty issue. See
Aside from the distinction between Brogdon and the instant case in which the trial court accepted the plea pursuant to
Bearing in mind then that the right to a trial derives from
Therefore, we turn to
Nor can it be said that the redactors of the Constitution struck new ground in allowing for a procedure by which a capital defendant could acknowledge guilt, because the common law, on which Louisiana‘s criminal law is largely based,8 has allowed this practice for centuries. See Barry J. Fisher, Judicial Suicide or Constitutional Autonomy? A Capital Defendant‘s Right to Plead Guilty, 65 ALB. L.REV. 181, 182-83 (2001) (noting that a defendant‘s prerogative to plead guilty, even for crimes punishable by death, was described as early as the seventeenth century in England). Indeed, such procedure today is widespread among the States, with thirty-five of the thirty-eight states allowing pleas of guilt for offenses with possible capital punishment. See id.
The redactors’ choice to leave the door open for the establishment of a procedure for a capital defendant to acknowledge guilt might also be said to have been farsighted. As other procedural safeguards have evolved in the criminal justice system, today denying a defendant the choice to plead guilty arguably would impermissibly deprive the defendant, per the federal Constitution, of his strategic choice to acknowledge his crime and thereby appear remorseful before his jury. See id. (Noting that as such safeguards as effective assistance of counsel, knowing and voluntary plea waivers, and discretionary, bifurcated capital sentencing in lieu of a mandatory death penalty all become more entrenched, prohibiting a guilty plea arguably would violate an implicit Sixth Amendment guarantee to the defendant‘s choice of a defense. Citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), the author argues that if a defendant has the right to waive counsel per the Sixth Amendment, then
In sum, we note that in challenging the constitutionality of
Brady Claims (Assignment V)
The defendant argues that the state “suppressed mitigating and exculpatory evidence” in violation of Brady and its progeny. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). The defendant first urges that the state suppressed a portion of his application to the Thibodaux Police Department in which he disclosed that he had been sexually abused as a child.10 Second, the defendant also urges that the state suppressed the report of a clinical psychologist, Dr. Guidry, which report was generated as part of the Thibodaux Police employment application process from a pre-employment interview with Dr. Guidry. As a third claim, defendant urges the prosecution impaired his cross-examination of J.R., who was exchanged for the deputy in the jail hostage situation, by failing to turn over letters written by J.R. to defendant. We address each claim in turn.
Before his sentencing hearing, the defendant had issued a subpoena to the Thibodaux Police Department, seeking production of: “A complete certified copy of Chad Louviere‘s personnel file including his position(s) at Thibodaux Police Department and any and all promotions, employment training, reprimands, and reason(s) for job termination.” The district attorney also sent a letter to the department, requesting documents relating to Louviere‘s
The U.S. Supreme Court has explained that “[t]here are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999).
As to the second component, suppression, it is undisputed that the prosecution did not possess the defendant‘s background questionnaire and psychological report. The Supreme Court has stated that even though the prosecution does not possess or have knowledge of evidence, this does not necessarily absolve the state of its responsibilities under Brady because “the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government‘s behalf in the case, including the police.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). In presenting his argument, however, defendant by no means firmly establishes that the prosecution failed in this duty, thereby effectively suppressing evidence. Instead, defendant concedes that in a discovery hearing, in response to defendant‘s assertion that an investigator who interviewed the employees in the bank after the standoff had produced notes from their interviews,11 the prosecutor stated: “Judge, early on, I sent a letter to every agency, as you may recall, at Mr. Stone‘s request saying, `If I don‘t have everything that you‘ve prepared, send me the balance of it.’ I sent it out to every agency. And only Thibodaux responded by sending Mr. Louviere‘s personnel packet from his employment at the Thibodaux Police Department.” Accordingly, it appears from the record that the prosecutor took affirmative steps to obtain any evidence, and reasonably believed that he had obtained from the Thibodaux Police Department all that existed.
Furthermore, the defendant cites no authority for the proposition that the defendant‘s own response to a background questionnaire falls within the prosecutor‘s duty to learn of “evidence known to the others acting on the government‘s behalf” who are acting ”in the case ....” See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437, 115 S.Ct. 1555 (emphasis added). Instead, the weight of authority suggests that the prosecution had no such duty in this case to find
Alternatively, we observe that in the main, the Brady jurisprudence focuses on the materiality inquiry,12 and under those well-settled principles, we find defendant‘s arguments fail.
For purposes of ensuring that a defendant‘s constitutional rights are protected, suppressed evidence is material if its inclusion would establish that “`there is a reasonable probability’ that the result of the trial would have been different if the suppressed documents had been disclosed to the defense.” Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289, 119 S.Ct. 1936. (Emphasis added). The Court explained the standard of reasonable probability: “As we stressed in Kyles: `[T]he adjective is important. The question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.‘”13Id. at 289-90,
In applying the reasonable probability standard, we turn first to the defendant‘s claim that his background questionnaire was material inasmuch as “[t]his evidence would have eviscerated the state‘s suggestion that evidence about Mr. Louviere‘s prior sexual abuse was unrelated to, or was `concocted’ for the purposes of excusing, his actions at the Bank.” In our review of the trial record, we note defendant provided extensive evidence to the jury of his alleged sexual abuse as a child.
In his opening statement, defense counsel noted that in a letter written on the morning of the murder, defendant mentioned that he suffered sexual abuse as a child. In addition, defendant‘s ex-wife, A.L., testified that defendant told her he was sexually abused as a child. Later, defendant adduced the testimony of his mother, who described childhood incidents she later felt indicated abuse. Furthermore, defendant called his childhood friend, T.C., who testified that he returned from his current residence in Hungary in order to testify about allegedly being abused by the same perpetrator as was the defendant. Finally, defendant offered into evidence the police report investigating T.C.‘s claims of abuse, in which report T.C. also alleged that his abuser molested defendant as a child.
In light of these offerings, we find defendant had ample and more compelling material with which to demonstrate to the jury that his claims of sexual abuse were not concocted following his arrest. Even so, we continue to evaluate defendant‘s remaining claims so the evidence can be considered collectively. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436, fn. 10, 115 S.Ct. 1555 (“We evaluate the tendency and force of the undisclosed evidence item by item; there is no other way. We evaluate its cumulative effect for purposes of materiality separately and at the end of the discussion.“).
Next, just as the Thibodaux Police Department did not uncover defendant‘s background questionnaire until after the jury‘s verdict in his sentencing hearing, defendant was not provided with a psychological evaluation report performed by Dr. Guidry as part of his employment application for the Thibodeaux Police Department. Defendant urges that more than the background questionnaire, Dr. Guidry‘s report was germane to his case.
Describing Louviere, who was then 19, Dr. Guidry opined in his report that “of the 10 clinical scales that reflect correlates
For purposes of the elements of a Brady violation, we note the report shares with the background questionnaire the issue of suppression, which we found did not occur, and we similarly find that the report fails the materiality requirement as well. In this analysis, we first observe the larger issues focusing on the defendant himself in his penalty hearing: the circumstances of the offense, and the defendant‘s character and propensities.
Initially, we find it is worthy to note that the Bayou Oaks record was produced when defendant was 18, and like the later Dr. Guidry report, describes defendant in his late teens and several years before the commission of the instant offense. However, while covering much of the same ground as Dr. Guidry‘s report, the Bayou Oaks record does so in greater detail and in terms of intrinsically greater weight. For example, unlike the report of psychologist Dr. Guidry, the Bayou Oaks record contains a psychiatrist‘s diagnosis: “Post traumatic stress disorder, delayed onset-309.89,” which diagnosis was made by defendant‘s treating physician, Dr. Thomas Moore, not once, but twice—upon admission and discharge. Furthermore, the report indicates that defendant was referred to the hospital by his family physician, Dr. O. Naul.
The Bayou Oaks report, like Dr. Guidry‘s report, suggested a connection between defendant‘s problems and his alleged molestation as a child. However, the Bayou Oaks report also connects the alleged molestation to a specific incident of defendant‘s conduct, where the defendant “ended up at his girlfriend‘s house with a gun ....” Indeed, in the Bayou Oaks record, Dr. Moore describes the defendant‘s presenting “agitated state ... fear of rejection... [and] guilt and anger” as having their genesis in defendant‘s encounter the week before with his alleged molester. Furthermore, the record contains the evaluation of psychologist, Dr. Durbin, who more comprehensively describes the subject‘s coping skills than did Dr. Guidry: “It appears that Chad is usually able to function on a satisfactory basis but it is also clear that he may experience periods
Collectively, the opinions in the Bayou Oaks record contain a far more detailed description of conditions which might bear upon defendant‘s moral culpability. The Bayou Oaks record also contains indicia of greater weight than Dr. Guidry‘s report: two instances of a psychiatrist‘s actual diagnosis (compared to no stated diagnosis by one psychologist, Dr. Guidry); around the clock observations of the subject over a period of five days (compared to a single interview by Dr. Guidry); and a psychologist‘s report based on ten assessment measures (compared to the three measures in Dr. Guidry‘s evaluation).
The defendant‘s decision not to utilize the Bayou Oaks record illustrates the immateriality of the background questionnaire and Dr. Guidry‘s report. While Dr. Guidry‘s report potentially contains exculpatory or mitigating evidence relating to moral culpability, the Bayou Oaks record does so in fuller measure and carries indicia of greater weight. Additionally, the defense‘s decision not to utilize the Bayou Oaks record was apparently strategic, and we do not find it reasonable to assume that such a decision would have been changed by Dr. Guidry‘s report. For all that is potentially exculpatory in both the Bayou Oaks record and Dr. Guidry‘s report, we note that each report also describe a person who is intelligent and capable of reasoned decisions: “His judgment and insight were fair to good,” wrote Dr. Moore; “There is no evidence that would preclude him from working with the Thibodaux Police Department,” wrote Dr. Guidry; “[H]is overall level of intellectual functioning is within very superior range,” wrote Dr. Durbin.
In addition to Dr. Guidry‘s report and the background questionnaire, the defendant argues that the state committed another Brady violation by failing to turn over copies of letters written by the inmate, J.R., who was involved in the jail hostage situation. The defendant asserts that the letters were found in defendant‘s cell during a shakedown following the hostage situation and that some were copied and returned to him, but the prison, in forwarding evidence of the hostage situation to the district attorney, actually forwarded some of the originals. The defendant urges that these letters, written before the hostage situation and in which J.R. expressed interest in developing a sexual relationship with him, are relevant for impeachment of J.R.‘s testimony that she was raped, and that the letters therefore should have been made available to him.
The defendant, however, fails to show how the state‘s alleged omission of the letters rises to a level implicating the Agurs criteria of materiality and significance, i.e., when “evaluated in the context of the entire record.” United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). The record shows that the defense had numerous letters from J.R. in its possession, which letters the defense failed to turn over to the state, subsequently resulting in a citation for contempt of a discovery order. Despite the contempt citation, the trial court allowed the defense to fully cross-examine J.R. with the contents of one of the letters that prompted the contempt citation, allowed the others to be filed into evidence, and also allowed the defense to make reference to the fact that the additional letters contained the same type of material. The defense made no further use of J.R.‘s letters, but did cross-examine J.R. about similar letters defendant wrote to her. Accordingly, we find no prejudice, as the defense provided extensive evidence impeaching
In summation, and in order to evaluate the cumulative effect of the alleged omissions of evidence,19 we recount our findings. We found that the defendant‘s disclosure of abuse in his background questionnaire would have shed little or no new light on his case as he presented the allegation of abuse from numerous other sources, including his own writing on the morning of the murder. We also found that the potential of Dr. Guidry‘s report for exculpatory impact was debatable, but its lack of materiality is best illustrated by the defense‘s decision not to utilize the more comprehensive Bayou Oaks record. Additionally, we found the letters of J.R. were of minimal import, if any, as the defense had amply set out its theory of impeachment of J.R., who claimed to have been raped in the jail, and the defense held further impeachment evidence to spare.
We next turn to the entire record in evaluating the potential effect of the alleged omissions. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112, 96 S.Ct. 2392. In comparison to its alleged omissions, the state advanced a plethora of evidence of the defendant‘s acts surrounding the murder of Pamela Duplantis. The record contains uncontroverted evidence that defendant kidnapped the six women in the bank, including Ms. Duplantis, and fired a semiautomatic weapon in their midst. The record details the callousness of the murder of Ms. Duplantis as well as numerous instances of violence, domination, endangerment, and nefarious sexual exploitation of several of her fellow hostages. The record further contains uncontroverted evidence that defendant utilized several of the hostages as shields. As described more thoroughly in the Capital Sentence Review, infra, the evidence amply supported the jury‘s finding of three aggravating circumstances, including prior convictions for aggravated kidnapping and rape. Additionally, the record provides undisputed evidence of defendant kidnapping and wounding the deputy in the Lafayette jail while awaiting trial. Accordingly, we hold that even the sum of the state‘s alleged omissions would not have “put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290, 119 S.Ct. 1936, citing Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555. Thus, the defendant‘s Brady claims are meritless.
Voir Dire
Juror Sequestration (Assignment VIII)
The defendant argues that the trial court‘s method of conducting the voir dire examination violated his right to a sequestered jury. Specifically, the defendant argues the court violated
The record reveals, and defendant concedes, that the trial court indiscriminately selected the venire panels in open court, then the court examined the panel. Thereafter, the prospective jurors were tendered to the state and the defendant, in turn, for cause challenges. However, citing concerns over publicity, the defendant
In support of his argument, defendant points to the procedure outlined in
After the examination provided by Article 786, a prospective juror may be tendered first to the state, which shall accept or challenge him. If the state accepts the prospective juror, he shall be tendered to the defendant, who shall accept or challenge him. When a prospective juror is accepted by the state and the defendant, he shall be sworn immediately as a juror. This Article is subject to the provisions of Articles 795 and 796.
The defendant further asserts that tendering is subject to
However, reading
Accordingly, the plain language of Art. 788(A) controls: “When a prospective juror is accepted by the state and the defendant, he shall be sworn immediately as a juror.” Indeed, being “accepted” implies a discretionary act on the part of the state or the defendant. The truly discretionary challenges are peremptory challenges. See
We also note the trial court zealously sought to prevent prejudice to defendant. The record reveals that the venirepersons were repeatedly admonished by the trial court concerning their possible exposure to outside influences. Furthermore, when the venirepersons were brought back, the trial court again questioned them regarding any prejudicial influences that might impair their ability to function as a juror. Over the course of voir dire, the trial court removed three jurors for cause based on the exposure to pretrial publicity. Notably, the actions by the trial court comport with the protections observed by the highest courts of other states which have found no error in not sequestering potential jurors. See, e.g., Bellmore v. State, 602 N.E.2d 111, 117 (Ind.1993); State v. Black, 815 S.W.2d 166, 180 (Tenn.1991). Thus, we find no error in the application of the statutory requirements. This assignment lacks merit.
Penalty Phase
Cross-Examination (Assignment XI)
The defendant complains that the trial court impermissibly limited his right to cross-examine witnesses. The defendant notes that several of the victims filed civil suits against him, the Thibodaux Police Department, the Lafayette Parish Sheriff‘s Office, and the Terrebone Parish Sheriff‘s Office. The defendant urges that the trial court limited his cross-examination by refusing “to allow defense counsel to mention the existence of the civil litigation ....”
We first note that this assertion grossly mischaracterizes the ruling of the trial court, which is borne out by the full record concerning the ruling. The state sought a ruling in limine because of its concern that “the defense may ask the victims questions surrounding the filing of these suits....” (Emphasis added). In prefacing its ruling, the trial court stated: “The defendant has pled guilty to the crime. There will be no trial of guilt or innocence. The issue before the Court or before the jury will be penalty. And in light of those factors and the number of witnesses who were hostage in the bank at the time, I feel that the civil suits would be irrelevant in this proceeding.”
Thereafter, defense counsel asked for a clarification of the ruling. Counsel explained to the trial court: “It seems to me there are two categories of persons: There are persons who are plaintiffs in the civil suits; and then there are persons who are co-defendants, along with my client, Mr. Louviere, in civil suits, who may have a bias or interest in terms of their perception of things that occurred. These were not people who were victims of the alleged crime.” Defense counsel explained that the existence of the civil suits was relevant for the civil co-defendants “[b]ecause of their status as also having been sued and the effect that may have on their civil liability ....” The court concluded the clarification of its ruling: “But I agree with you that I do not intend to curtail your cross-examination, if it would be relevant to the issue of the trustworthiness of some police officer who is testifying.” Accordingly, from the beginning the state sought to exclude questioning the victims about their civil suits, and the trial court clarified that its ruling did not touch upon the defense‘s cross-examination of the police. At the most,21 therefore, the ruling
Having ascertained the scope of the trial court‘s ruling, we analyze its effect.22 In State v. Broadway, 96-2659, p. 24 (La.10/19/99) 753 So.2d 801, 817 we explained:
Confrontation errors are subject to a harmless error analysis. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). The correct inquiry is whether the reviewing court, assuming that the damaging potential of the cross-examination were fully realized, is nonetheless convinced that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674. Factors to be considered by the reviewing court include “the importance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution‘s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution‘s case.” Id. at 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674; State v. Wille, 559 So.2d at 1332. The verdict may stand if the reviewing court determines that the guilty verdict rendered in the particular trial is surely unattributable to the error. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993).
In the instant case, the defendant first maintains that the existence of civil litigation would show interest by J.R. in claiming that she was raped, in contrast to her jailhouse statement that she had consensual sex with defendant. We observe, however, that on direct examination, the state elicited the fact that J.R. had filed suit as a result of the actions in the Lafayette jail. Furthermore, on cross-examination, the defense pursued its theory of bias and interest without objection by the state and without restraint from the trial court: “And you sued Captain Brasseux [the jailhouse hostage negotiator], the sheriff‘s office, and Wendy Owens [the hostage/deputy] trying to get money through this rape story of yours, haven‘t you?” Thus, it cannot be said that defendant was prevented from cross-examining J.R. to pursue his theory of bias or interest.
The defendant next urges that he should have had the opportunity to show bias or interest by A.L. The defendant points to A.L.‘s cross-examination testimony that after the defendant had earlier directed another bank employee place his AR-15 rifle outside the bank in an effort to demonstrate willingness to negotiate with police, defendant handed a loaded .38 pistol to A.L. late in the evening. Defense
Setting aside for the sake of argument the more reasonable conclusion that A.L. returned the weapon out of fear that the defendant—who was well trained with firearms—held another weapon, under the Van Arsdall factors we find that the impeaching effect of inquiry into A.L.‘s civil litigation would have been de minimis. First, A.L. was not pivotal, in the sense that she was one of three victims of sexual abuse and one of five testifying victims of detention in the bank. See Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 685, 106 S.Ct. 1431 (first factor described as: “the importance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution‘s case...“). On all issues relating to the actions in the bank, including defendant‘s confinement of the employees, her testimony was merely cumulative, and well-corroborated. See id. Finally, the strength of the state‘s case is readily apparent: several witnesses saw defendant committing the murder and evidence of aggravating circumstances abounds. See id. Accordingly, even assuming any error occurred in the trial court‘s limitation of the proposed cross-examination, the sentence rendered was surely unattributable to the error, and the error would not be reversible. Thus, this assignment is meritless.
CAPITAL SENTENCE REVIEW
The UCSR and CSI indicate the defendant, Chad Roy Louviere, is a white male, who was twenty-four years of age at the time of the commission of the offense. He is one of two children born to his parents. At the time of the offense, Louviere was married to A.L., a hostage in the instant case, for approximately two years. The couple was in the process of divorcing.
The defendant completed the twelfth grade and thereafter earned some college credit. He was employed as a pipefitter helper while in high school and then joined the Air National Guard. Defendant worked for the Thibodaux Police Department for approximately three and one-half years and was also employed by the Robichaux Tile Company. At the time of the offense, he had been employed as a deputy with the Terrebonne Parish Sheriff‘s Department for approximately five months.
There was one murder victim, Pamela Duplantis, a white female who was twenty-seven years of age at the time of her death. The victim was a mother of one child and her murder was committed in her place of employment.
In mitigation, the defense emphasized Louviere‘s lack of prior history of criminal activity, his marital problems, difficulties on the job causing emotional disturbance, and his alleged sexual abuse as a child.
There is no suggestion in the record that the jury‘s decision was based on passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor. Indeed, we note the trial took place in May of 1999, approximately two and one-half years after the offense. Furthermore, at defendant‘s request, the trial was moved to Lafayette Parish. Nevertheless, defendant‘s own actions while awaiting trial regenerated interest in the instant offense after he held a female deputy hostage in Lafayette and allegedly raped a female inmate to whom he was given access, ostensibly to speak about his case, in exchange for the deputy‘s release. The trial court subsequently granted the state‘s motion for a change of venue based on pretrial publicity concerns. As a result, a jury was picked from East Baton Rouge Parish and transferred to Terrebonne Parish for trial. The trial court removed three jurors for cause based on their exposure to pretrial publicity. Under these circumstances, defendant fails to show, and nor do we find, that publicity injected an arbitrary factor into the sentencing decision mandating reversal of his death sentence.
Aggravating Circumstances
Jurors found the following statutory aggravating circumstances: the offender was engaged in the perpetration of an aggravated kidnapping, second-degree kidnapping, and aggravated rape; the offender was previously convicted of an unrelated aggravated kidnapping and aggravated rape; and the offender knowingly created a risk of death or great bodily harm on more than one person.
Aggravated Kidnapping, Second-Degree Kidnapping, and Aggravated Rape
As to defendant being engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of an aggravated kidnapping, the state admitted into evidence weapons and handcuffs used as well as the statements of the bank employees who were held captive in the bank. These statements were all essentially consistent and undisputed. One of the hostages was released in exchange for food; another hostage was released in exchange for a police radio. This aggravating circumstance, then, is satisfied by ample evidence.
In addition to the above evidence, the state introduced testimony of several hostages who relayed how the defendant forcibly took a hostage through the bank as he checked for police infiltration and peered out of the windows at the police perimeter. These statements were all essentially consistent and undisputed and thus the aggravating circumstance of second-degree kidnapping is met.
The state further introduced testimony of three hostages who described how the defendant committed various acts of vaginal, oral, and anal penetration.
These statements were essentially undisputed. The state introduced evidence of defendant carrying out these acts during the hostage situation, while armed with dangerous weapons, and demonstrating his ability to discharge firearms, and thus the aggravating circumstance of aggravated rape is met.
In sum, the evidence overwhelmingly established defendant‘s takeover of the bank followed by the shooting death of the victim, who was one of six women held hostage, and the subsequent instances of forced sexual intercourse and oral sex suffered by three of the women, formed a single continuous 30-hour transaction supporting the jury‘s determination that the victim died during the course of multiple aggravated kidnappings, second-degree kidnappings, and aggravated rapes. See State v. Anthony, 427 So.2d 1155, 1158 (La.1983)(deciding whether a killing occurred
Previous Conviction for Unrelated Aggravated Kidnapping and Aggravated Rape
The state introduced the indictment for the aggravated rape and aggravated kidnapping begun on Bull Run Road. The state also introduced the minutes of the conviction, as well as the essentially uncontroverted testimony of the victim, detailing how she was maced, dragged into defendant‘s patrol car, driven to a cane field, and acts of oral, anal, and vaginal penetration were committed upon her. Thus, the aggravating circumstances of prior conviction for aggravated rape and aggravated kidnapping are met.23
Risk of Death or Great Bodily Harm on More Than One Person
The undisputed and overwhelming evidence shows when defendant entered the bank, he assembled the employees in the lobby. Before he fired the shot that killed Pamela Duplantis, defendant discharged a semi-automatic assault rifle several times into a videotape placed on the tile floor in their midst. Perceiving a risk to himself, he ordered the employees to barricade the windows and used several of the hostages as shields while checking on the activity of police outside. These actions all evidence the defendant created a risk of death or great bodily harm to more than one person.
Proportionality
The federal Constitution no longer requires a proportionality review. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 104 S.Ct. 871, 79 L.Ed.2d 29 (1984). Nevertheless, comparative proportionality review remains a relevant consideration in determining the issue of excessiveness in Louisiana. State v. Miller, 99-0192, p. 30 (La.9/6/00), 776 So.2d 396, 414. This court reviews death sentences to determine whether the sentence is disproportionate to the penalty imposed in other cases, considering both the offense and the offender. Pursuant to
The state‘s Sentence Review Memorandum reveals that since 1976 jurors in the 32nd Judicial District have returned a guilty verdict in 14 capital cases and recommended the death penalty only one time before the instant case in State v. Sanders, 93-0001 (La.11/30/94), 648 So.2d 1272. However, this court reversed the defendant‘s sentence and, after remand, the defendant was resentenced to life imprisonment.
Given the scarcity of comparable cases in Terrebonne Parish, it is appropriate for this court to look beyond the judicial district in which the sentence was imposed and conduct the proportionality review on a state-wide basis. State v. Davis, 92-1623, pp. 34-35 (La.5/23/94), 637 So.2d 1012, 1030-1031. The defendant
In conclusion, the state has proven not only risk of death or serious bodily harm to more than one person, but two other aggravating factors: the offender was engaged in the perpetration of an aggravated kidnapping, second-degree kidnapping, and aggravated rape; and also the offender was convicted for an unrelated aggravated kidnapping and aggravated rape. Hence, based on the above, we do not find defendant‘s death penalty to be disproportionate.
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, defendant‘s conviction for first-degree murder and his sentence of death are affirmed. In the event this judgment becomes final on direct review when either: (1) the defendant fails to petition timely the United States Supreme Court for certiorari; or (2) that Court denies his petition for certiorari; and either (a) the defendant, having filed for and been denied certiorari, fails to petition the United States Supreme Court
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.