STATE OF OHIO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE vs. JEREMY LOGAN, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
No. 99471
Court of Appeals of Ohio, EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
March 6, 2014
2014-Ohio-816
BEFORE: Kilbane, J., Rocco, P.J., and E.A. Gallagher, J.
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION; Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. CR-560218-A; RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 6, 2014
John F. Corrigan
19885 Detroit Road, #335
Rocky River, Ohio 44116
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. McGinty
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
Brent C. Kirvel
Assistant County Prosecutor
The Justice Center - 8th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Jeremy Logan (“Logan“), appeals from his guilty plea to involuntary manslaughter with a firearm specification. He assigns the following errors for our review:
- The trial court erred in accepting two speedy trial waivers.
- Trial counsel was ineffective in executing speedy trial waivers and continuing trial dates when the record demonstrated an unmedicated client with a psychiatric history and a pending pro se motion for their removal.
- The trial court erred in failing to investigate appellant‘s complaint about the adequacy of court-appointed counsel.
{¶2} Having reviewed the record and pertinent law, we affirm the trial court‘s decision. The apposite facts follow.
{¶3} On February 22, 2012, Dena‘Jua Delaney (“Delaney“) was fatally shot in East Cleveland after two competing groups engaged in an altercation. On February 24, 2012, Logan was arrested. On March 21, 2012, Logan and codefendant, Robert Robinson (“Robinson“), were charged in a ten-count indictment. In Count 1, they were charged with the aggravated murder of Delaney, in violation of
{¶4} Logan pled not guilty, and two defense attorneys were assigned to represent him. On March 26, 2012, or after 87 days elapsed for purposes of speedy trial, defense counsel filed a demand for discovery, motion for evidence, and motion for a bill of particulars. A pretrial was held on April 12, 2012, and the matter was then continued until April 19, 2012 “at the request of the defense,” because of “ongoing discovery.”
{¶5} On April 16, 2012, Logan appeared in open court with counsel and executed a waiver of his speedy trial rights until September 30, 2012. On April 19, 2012, the court issued a journal entry continuing a scheduled pretrial because of ongoing discovery. Logan was referred to the court psychiatric clinic in order to determine his competency to stand trial and sanity at the time of the offense. At a hearing on May 17, 2012, Logan stipulated to the report of Dr. Stephen Noffsinger. The court determined Logan to be sane at the time of the offense and competent to stand trial. On June 15, 2012 and July 3, 2012, the court journalized continuances at Logan‘s request because of ongoing discovery.
{¶6} On July 25, 2012, Logan filed pro se motions to disqualify counsel, a motion for a second psychiatric examination, and a motion for permit him to be present at all proceedings. Logan complained that he had met with his counsel seven times for ten-minute conferences, he “was cut off by defense counsel” during the conferences,
{¶7} At a pretrial on September 17, 2012, Logan executed a second waiver of speedy trial and consented to the case being continued until December 31, 2012.
{¶8} The case against Robinson proceeded to a jury trial on October 22, 2012, and Logan testified against him. According to the supplemental record, during Robinson‘s trial, Logan conceded that his “excellent lawyers cut a deal” for him. (Robinson tr. 842, 845.) Robinson was subsequently convicted of felony murder (Count 2), five counts of felonious assault (Counts 4-8), and discharging a firearm near premises (Count 10), and the one- and three-year firearm specifications. See State v. Robinson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99290, 2013-Ohio-4375. Robinson was sentenced to life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving 15 years, plus three years for a firearm specification.
{¶9} On October 26, 2012, Logan appeared with his appointed counsel, withdrew his not guilty plea, and then pled guilty to Count 2, which was amended to charge him with involuntary manslaughter, a first-degree felony, with a five-year gun
Speedy Trial
{¶10} In his first assignment of error, Logan complains that the trial court erred in accepting the waivers of speedy trial. He maintains that the waivers were not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made because he had not received his medication and because his pro se motion to disqualify counsel should have been deemed a revocation of his waiver of speedy trial.
{¶11}
{¶12} We note, however, that a defendant who pleads guilty waives his statutory right to a speedy trial by pleading guilty. See State v. Kelley, 57 Ohio St.3d 127, 566 N.E.2d 658 (1991), paragraph one of the syllabus (reaffirming and applying its prior holding in Montpelier v. Greeno, 25 Ohio St.3d 170, 495 N.E.2d 581 (1986)); State v. Bohanon, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98217, 2013-Ohio-261.
{¶13} In addition, the time constraints of
{¶14} In any event, the record clearly demonstrates that the motions filed by defense counsel, the pro se motions filed by Logan, and Logan‘s written waivers of speedy trial also tolled the speedy trial time requirements. That is, on March 26, 2012, or after 87 days elapsed for purposes of speedy trial, defense counsel filed a demand for discovery, motion for evidence, and motion for a bill of particulars. Speedy trial was tolled until the state responded on April 11, 2012. State v. Winn, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98172, 2012-Ohio-5888, ¶ 28. A pretrial was held on April 12, 2012, and the matter
{¶15} On April 16, 2012, Logan appeared in court with counsel and executed a written waiver of his speedy trial rights until September 30, 2012.
{¶16} At a pretrial on September 17, 2012, Logan executed a second written waiver of speedy trial and consented to the case being continued until December 31, 2012, but the transcript fails to demonstrate that it was made in open court and that the trial court determined in open court that it was knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made. Nonetheless, even concluding that speedy trial time resumed from September 30, 2012, until the date of the plea, 26 days, or 78 additional speedy trial days (using the triple count provisions) then accrued. Therefore, by the time of the October 26, 2012 guilty plea, a total of 165 speedy trial days had elapsed, or well under the 270-day limitation. Therefore, there is no violation of his right to a speedy trial.
{¶17} Although Logan now asserts that the first speedy trial waiver is invalid in light of his pro se motion to disqualify his trial counsel, at the time of the plea he stated on the record that he was satisfied with his present counsel. He made a similar statement during Robinson‘s trial. The record, therefore, supports the conclusion that the motion to disqualify counsel was abandoned by Logan.
{¶18} Logan also maintains that the waivers were not knowingly and intelligently made because he suffers from bipolar disorder and his counsel informed the trial court on April 16, 2012, that the “jail has refused to give him his medications.” We note that this
Ineffective Assistance
{¶19} Logan next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to require that the state bring him to trial within the statutory speedy trial limits.
{¶20} As this court observed in Bohanon:
The fact that Bohanon raises her speedy-trial issue by claiming her counsel was ineffective does not change our analysis. This court has held that when a defendant pleads guilty, he or she also waives the right to claim that his or her counsel was ineffective based upon statutory speedy-trial issues. State v. Johnson, 8th Dist. [Cuyahoga] No. 61904, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 1263, 9 (Mar. 4, 1993); State v. Goodwin, 8th Dist. [Cuyahoga] No. 93249, 2010-Ohio-1210, ¶ 10; State v. Miller, 8th Dist. [Cuyahoga] No. 94790, 2011-Ohio-928, ¶ 16.
{¶21} In any event, we note that in general, “waiver of the right to a speedy trial, including a motion for continuance, can be considered trial strategy.” McBreen, 54 Ohio St.2d 315, 376 N.E.2d 593 (1978), syllabus. See also State v. Brime, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 09AP-491, 2009-Ohio-6572, ¶ 17; State v. Shepherd, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2003-A-0031, 2004-Ohio-5306, ¶ 31. In addition, there is a presumption that waiver is a sound trial strategy, “especially when the purposes of the waiver are for trial preparation.” Id. This rule applies even when the continuance is filed without the defendant‘s consent. State v. Taylor, 98 Ohio St.3d 27, 2002-Ohio-7017, 781 N.E.2d 72, ¶ 33.
{¶22} In accordance with all of the foregoing, the second assignment of error is without merit.
Motion to Disqualify
{¶23} Logan next complains that the trial court erred in failing to investigate his motion to disqualify his appointed counsel.
{¶24} In State v. Corbin, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96484, 2011-Ohio-6628, ¶ 19, this court held:
Ordinarily, when an indigent accused moves to disqualify his or her counsel, it is the duty of the trial court to inquire into the complaint and make it a part of the record. State v. Lozada, Cuyahoga App. No. 94902, 2011-Ohio-823, citing State v. Ketterer, 111 Ohio St.3d 70, 2006-Ohio-5283, ¶ 139, 855 N.E.2d 48. The inquiry need only be brief and minimal. Id.
{¶26} The third assignment of error is without merit.
{¶27} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant‘s conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, JUDGE
KENNETH A. ROCCO, P.J., and
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR