OPINION
11 Defendant Allen Smith Lloyd appeals his conviction for possession of a controlled substance, a third-degree felony, see Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8@)(a@)G) (Supp.2011), claiming that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. The suppression motion challenged the reliability of a citizen informant's report and the viability of odor evidence in the context of evaluating reasonable suspicion and probable cause. We affirm.
T2 At 9:19 pm. on March 8, 2008, the Ogden City Police Department received a report from a woman that there were three people in a small, green car parked behind the building in which she resided. She indicated that she could see and smell the individuals inside the vehicle "smoking drugs." The informant identified herself as Stacy. It is unclear whether officers knew her last name or exact address. Nevertheless, Stacy was possibly familiar to the police because she had previously been in contact with the Weber-Morgan Narcotics Strike Force.
T3 Two police officers, Officers Powers and Harris, arrived on the scene. Just as Stacy described, the officers saw a small, green car parked behind Stacy's building. As the officers approached the car, they confirmed that there were three individuals in the vehicle. Approximately ten feet from the vehicle, the officers detected a "cat urine" odor emanating from the vehicle that they both associated with a burning narcotic. Officer Powers testified that he specifically distinguished the odor to be "crack cocaine." The officers did not see any illegal items or activity as they neared the vehicle.
T4 Onee at the car, Officer Powers. approached the driver's side of the vehicle and spoke with Defendant, who was sitting in the driver's seat. At the same time, Officer Harris approached the passenger side of the vehicle to speak with the two female passengers. Immediately upon reaching the vehicle, Officer Powers asked Defendant whether he had any weapons or drugs in the car. Defendant responded that he had a gun under his seat and began to retrieve it. Officer Powers told Defendant not to get the gun and asked him to step out of the car. After Defendant exited the car, Officer Powers placed him in handcuffs. Officer Powers then pulled a black bag from underneath the driver's seat. Officer Powers opened the bag and found that it contained a 45 caliber handgun. Officer Powers also opened a small brown eyeglass case that was in the black bag and discovered used syringes. Officer Powers asked Defendant if he had a medical condition requiring him to have syringes. Defendant indicated that he did not. Officer Powers then placed Defendant under arrest. In searching Defendant incident to arrest, Officer Powers found a small bag of methamphetamine and clean syringes.
15 Meanwhile, while speaking with the two female passengers, Officer Harris discovered that one of the women had several outstanding warrants. Accordingly, Officer Harris placed the woman under arrest and searched her, finding a crack cocaine rock and a pipe containing crack cocaine. The pipe appeared to have been recently used as it had "fresh burn markings." The officers also thwarted an attempt by the other female passenger to swallow drugs.
T6 Defendant was subsequently charged with possession of a controlled substance, possession of a firearm by a restricted person, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the investigating police officer did not have reasonable suspicion to detain Defendant and search his vehicle for weapons. Specifically, Defendant argued that the informant was unreliable as she was anonymous and lacked the ability to distinguish between individuals "smoking drugs" and individuals smoking legal tobacco. Defendant also presented testimony from a drug expert, who testified that cocaine, even when heated or vaporized, has no odor. The district court denied Defendant's motion, finding that Officer Powers's actions were reasonable. Defendant subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea to a charge of possession of a controlled substance, contingent on his right to appeal the district court's decision denying his motion to suppress.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
17 Defendant argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We review a trial court's decision to deny a defendant's motion to suppress for correctness. See State v. Richards,
48 In appealing the district court's decision to deny his motion to suppress, Defendant argues that the Utah Constitution provides greater protection against police invasion of an individual's privacy than the Fourth Amendment to the federal constitution, suggesting that we' should apply a higher degree of scrutiny under our own constitution when reviewing the investigating officers' actions in this case. While we acknowledge that "choosing to give the Utah Constitution a somewhat different construction may prove to be an appropriate method for insulating this state's citizens from the vagaries of inconsistent interpretations given to the fourth amendment by the federal courts," State v. Walts,
19 While Defendant cites to cases in which our courts have held that the Utah Constitution provides greater protection against police intrusion, he merely refers to these cases for the general propositions of law they contain. Defendant does not directly apply the general propositions to the facts of this case and, thus, fails to explain "how the court's analysis under the state constitution would differ from its consideration under the federal constitution," State v. Van Dyke,
" 10 Defendant contends that the information available to the investigating officer was insufficient to give rise to reasonable suspi-clon-much less probable cause-that a crime had occurred. Accordingly, Defendant argues, the district court erroneously admitted all evidence flowing from the investigating officer's detention of Defendant and the accompanying search of Defendant's vehicle. We disagree. We conclude that the information available was sufficient to give the investigating officer reasonable suspicion to briefly detain Defendant and probable cause to search Defendant's vehicle. 1
1. The Fourth Amendment
¶11 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects citizens against "unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer has probable cause justifying an arrest when there are "facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the cireumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense." Michigan v. DeFillippo,
¶12 Although an officer may not arrest an individual absent probable cause, an officer may stop and briefly detain an individual if the officer has "reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity may be afoot." United States v. Arvizu,
$13 We also note that while a warrant is generally required before an officer may conduct a search, an officer may search a vehicle without a warrant if the vehicle is "readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe [the vehicle] contains contraband." Maryland v. Dyson,
probable cause is a flexible, common-sense standard.... A "practical, nontechnical" probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required.... "[The evidence thus collected must be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement."
Texas v. Brown,
II. Reasonable Suspicion and Probable Cause
114 Whether reasonable suspicion or probable cause exists depends on the quality and quantity of the information available to the investigating officer. This information may come from external sources, such as an informant's tip, see Salt Lake City v. Street,
A. Informant's Tip
15 Our Supreme Court has declined to adopt a "rigidly exact[ing]" standard in assessing an informant's tip and instead undertakes a "flexible, common sense test" with a view toward the "totality of the facts and cireumstances." State v. Saddler,
116 Defendant argues that the informant in this case was an anonymous tipster and, therefore, that the informant's tip was not sufficiently reliable. We recognize that where an informant is anonymous, reliability is low; however, where an informant is an identified, disinterested "citizen-informant," reliability is high. See Street,
117 While we conclude that the informant here was not anonymous, we also consider whether she had a sufficient basis of knowledge for reporting that the individuals parked in the green car behind her building were "smoking drugs." See Saddler,
B. Detection of "Cat Urine" Odor
¶18 Our courts have recognized that probable cause and, by extension, reasonable suspicion "may arise from an officer's sense
¶19 Whether an officer's detection of an odor that the officer identifies as cocaine is sufficient to constitute probable cause (or reasonable suspicion) requires careful analysis because cocaine in its pure form, as the expert in this case testified, is odorless. See United States v. Cruz-Roman,
¶20 Key to determining whether detection of an odor can support a reasonable suspicion or probable cause determination is whether the individual detecting the odor can reliably identify the odor in question. Indeed, the United State Supreme Court has held that
[ilf the presence of odors is testified to before a magistrate and he finds the affi-ant qualified to know the odor, and it is one sufficiently distinctive to identify a forbidden substance, this Court has never held such a basis insufficient [to support a probable cause determination].... Indeed it might very well be found to be evidence of the most persuasive character.
Johnson,
121 Our courts have likewise held that an officer's experience is key to determining whether a smell can support a probable cause determination. Indeed, in State v. Wright,
¶22 Therefore, the question here is whether Officer Powers's experience was sufficient that he was qualified to recognize the "cat urine" odor as an odor distinetly associated with burning crack cocaine. We conclude that it was. 3
123 Defendant argues that the officer's assertion that he smelled the odor of burning cocaine as he approached the car is insufficient to support a determination that reasonable suspicion-much less probable cause-existed. Specifically, Defendant contends that Officer Powers has never been trained as a drug recognition expert and that because cocaine is odorless, as Defendant's expert testified at the suppression hearing, the "cat urine" odor referred to by the officer could have been just that-actual cat urine. We reject these arguments.
¶24 First, Defendant overstates the importance of his expert's testimony. Specifically, while Defendant's expert indicated that cocaine has no "particular kind of smell that you can identify," his experience came primarily from handling cocaine powder in its pure form in laboratory testing. Moreover, the expert acknowledged that he had only heated crack cocaine to the point of vaporization "a number of times," and whenever he did heat cocaine, the fumes did "[njot [rise] significantly into [his] face." Additionally, the expert acknowledged that cocaine is often mixed with other substances that may give off an odor when heated. This appears to be particularly true of crack cocaine, which is "produced by dissolving powdered cocaine in a mixture of water and ammonia or sodium bicarbonate (baking soda)," National Drug Intelligence Center, Crack Cocaine Fast Facts: Questions and Answers (2008), available at http://www 3978/83978p.pdf. Finally, the expert noted that while he had never likened the smell of cocaine to cat urine, he had read that other individuals had associated the odor of a drug mixed with ammonia with the odor of cat urine.
¶25 Second, Defendant minimizes Officer Powers's experience as a police officer. In his duties as a patrolman, Officer Powers regularly encounters drug use. Although Officer Powers had not been formally trained to recognize the smell of crack cocaine, 4 he testified that during the more than a year and a half that he had been a patrolman, he encountered drug activity "almost on a daily basis." Officer Powers further testified that he was familiar with the odor of burning crack cocaine and that to him it smelled like cat urine. Indeed, Officer Powers indicated that the cat urine odor has such a distinctive smell that each time he had detected this odor while on patrol, he found crack cocaine to be present. 5
¶27 While Officer Powers had authority to briefly detain Defendant, we conclude that he did not initially have probable cause to arrest him. See State v. Prows,
¶28 Nevertheless, although Officer Powers did not initially have probable cause to arrest Defendant, he did have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained contraband. See State v. Spurgeon,
III. Authority To Detain Defendant and To Search Defendant's Vehicle
¶29 Prior to Officer Powers's search of the vehicle, Defendant was unquestionably detained. See State v. Van Dyke,
¶30 Because there was probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained contraband, i.e., crack cocaine, Officer Powers had authority to "search [the] automobile and the containers within it," California v. Acevedo,
CONCLUSION
¶31 While the informant's tip was insufficient to support a reasonable suspicion or
¶ 32 Affirmed.
¶ 33 WE CONCUR: STEPHEN L. ROTH, Judge and MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN, Judge.
Notes
. Because analysis of Officer Powers's detention of Defendant pursuant to reasonable suspicion and analysis of the search of the vehicle pursuant to probable cause are both legally similar, though not identical, and involve the same facts, our analysis overlaps to some degree. See Kaysville City v. Mulcahy,
. We note that the police officers corroborated some details of the informant's tip as they approached the small, green car. See generally Salt Lake City v. Street,
. Contrary to Defendant's argument that there is no objective basis upon which reasonable suspicion and probable cause determinations could be made in this case, our courts have specifically indicated that although an officer's "subjective beliefs, no matter how sincere" cannot, standing alone, support a reasonable suspicion or probable cause determination, an "officer's specific experience ... is relevant in determining whether [an] officer had probable cause to arrest." State v. Spurgeon,
. Defendant makes much of the fact that Officer Powers had not been formally trained as a Drug Recognition Expert (DRE). Whether Officer Powers had been certified as a DRE is irrelevant to whether he was "qualified to know'" that the cat urine odor is suggestive of crack cocaine. DREs are not trained to identify drugs; rather, they are trained to "detect and apprehend drug impaired drivers." Utah Dep't of Public Safety, Drug Recognition Expert, http:;//publicsafety. utah.gov/highwaypatrol/programs/dre.html (last visited September 6, 2011).
. We also note that Officer Powers's partner, Officer Harris, testified that she, too, identified the odor emanating from Defendant's vehicle as a burning narcotic based on her experience in
. Defendant also argues that he was placed under arrest, not merely detained, while Officer Powers searched his car. To the extent that Defendant contends that his detention escalated from a level two investigatory stop to a level three arrest once Officer Powers placed him in handcuffs, we conclude that this claim is inadequately briefed because Defendant cites to no case in support of this claim.
Moreover, our courts have held that a police officer may place a suspect in handcuffs while carrying out a lawful search to ensure an officer's safety. See State v. Banks,
. We note that Officer Powers's primary concern when initiating the search of Defendant's car appears to have been locating the gun Defendant admitted to having. While this may be so, this does not negate the fact that from an objective standpoint, the information available to Officer Powers supported a determination that probable cause to search the vehicle for contraband existed.
. Indeed, Defendant was originally charged with possession of drug paraphernalia, among other things, but that charge was later dropped after he agreed to plead guilty to a charge of possession of a controlled substance.