State v. LittlefieldState v. Littlefield
This is an appeal from a final judgment discharging appellee, Mark Gerard Littlefield, due to a speedy trial violation.
Littlefield was arrested on January 20, 1983. He and nine other defendants were charged in a single information with possession of marijuana. On March 31, at a trial status call before the court eight of the defendants announced that they were not ready for trial and sought continuances. The state agreed that the continuances
The trial court ruled that prior to the expiration of the 180 days the state should have sought an extension due to exceptional circumstances under
Exceptional Circumstances. As permitted by (d)(2) of this Rule, the court may order an extension of the time periods provided under this Rule where exceptional circumstances are shown to exist. Exceptional circumstances shall not include general congestion of the court‘s docket, lack of diligent preparation or failure to obtain available witnesses, or other avoidable or foreseeable delays.
Exceptional circumstances are those which as a matter of substantial justice to the accused or the State or both require an order by the court: Such circumstances include ... (5) a showing that a delay is necessary to accommodate a co-defendant, where there is reason not to sever the cases in order to proceed promptly with trial of the defendant....
The state contends that it had no obligation to seek an extension and that discharge is barred by
Delay and Continuances; Effect on Motion. If trial of the accused does not commence within the periods of time established by this Rule, a pending motion for discharge shall be granted by the court unless it is shown that ... (ii) the failure to hold trial is attributable to the accused, a co-defendant in the same trial, or their counsel... .
The state argues that since the failure to bring Littlefield to trial was caused by continuances taken by his codefendants Littlefield is not entitled to discharge.
In Grimett v. State, 383 So.2d 698 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980), this court held that a codefendant‘s unanticipated failure to appear at trial and a consequent order of continuance because of the nonappearance was a sufficient basis to deny Grimett‘s subsequent motion for discharge. On the other hand, the Second District has suggested that a defendant‘s speedy trial rights should always be given precedence over the state‘s right to jointly try defendants charged in the same crime. Machado v. State, 431 So.2d 337 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
(b) Severance of defendants.
(1) On motion of the State or a defendant, the court shall order a severance of defendants and separate trials:
(i) before trial, upon a showing that such order is necessary to protect a defendant‘s right to a speedy trial, or is appropriate to promote a fair determination of the guilt or innocence of one or more defendants... .
In the present case, neither Littlefield nor the state moved to sever Littlefield from the other defendants prior to the expiration of the speedy trial time.
Having considered all three provisions of the criminal rules relating to the potential conflict between defendant‘s speedy trial rights and the state‘s right to consolidation, we believe the trial court acted properly in this case in placing the burden on the state to seek an extension under the provisions of
By making accommodation of a codefendant a basis for an extension, the provisions of
If the state had no obligation to seek an extension when it was aware of the need for delay to accommodate other defendants, then the state could simply rely on continuances extended to codefendants, whether or not there were sufficient reasons to also extend the non-movant‘s speedy trial time, as a means to avoid the non-movant‘s speedy trial rights. Such automatic reliance, in our view, ignores the scheme suggested by
Accordingly, we affirm the order of discharge.
DOWNEY, J., concurs.
DELL, J., dissents without opinion.