State v. LinnearState v. Linnear
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Caraway, Moore, Lolley
CARAWAY, J.
The defendant, Stacey J. Linnear, was charged by bill of information with second degree battery in violation of
Facts
In the early morning hours of October 6, 2007, an unidentified man was carried out of Shreveport‘s Kokopelli‘s nightclub by club security after he was physically attacked by another patron. Security placed the man, who was unconscious, on the sidewalk outside the club. Police officers patrolling the downtown area immediately responded. The man was unresponsive to questioning and his face appeared severely disfigured. The victim was taken by ambulance to LSU Medical Center, where he was treated for multiple fractures of the jaw, an injury to his head and later, a decubitus ulcer on his back. Police were unable to locate any witnesses at the scene and surveillance videos failed to capture what went on inside the club.
The victim was later identified as John Fuggins. Fuggins recalled that prior to entering the club that evening he, along with his cousin and two other friends, attended a high school football game. Fuggins admitted that they then proceeded to ride around drinking, smoking marijuana, and taking Ecstasy. Around midnight, the friends arrived at Kokopelli‘s. Fuggins, only 20 years of age at the time, entered the nightclub through the VIP entrance. Fuggins remembers going to the bar to get a drink and then walking around the club with his cousin. He claimed that he was trying to stay out of trouble because he did not want to get thrown out for being underage. Fuggins’ last memory from the night in question was throwing a neighborhood gang sign in rhythm to the music. Fuggins testified that he was not affiliated with a gang and that he was merely representing the neighborhood in which he was raised.
On October 9, 2007, pursuant to an anonymous tip received by Fuggins’ mother, Detective Demery, of the Shreveport police department‘s homicide division, picked up defendant, Stacey J. Linnear, for an interview. After waiving his Miranda1 rights, Linnear agreed to make a statement, the admissibility of which is not contested. In his statement, Linnear recalled
After Detective Demery concluded the interview with Linnear, he was taken into custody and charged with second degree battery in violation of
Sufficiency of the Evidence to Convict
Linnear argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. He argues that because he was acting in self-defense, he lacked the specific intent to cause severe bodily harm. Linnear additionally asserts that it is unclear what actually caused Fuggins’ injuries. Therefore, the evidence used to convict the defendant was purely circumstantial and the state failed to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.
The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence claim is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Tate, 01-1658 (La.5/20/03), 851 So.2d 921, cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905, 124 S.Ct. 1604, 158 L.Ed.2d 248 (2004); State v. Cummings, 95-1377 (La.2/28/96), 668 So.2d 1132; State v. Murray, 36,137 (La.App.2d Cir.8/29/02), 827 So.2d 488, writ denied, 02-2634 (La.9/05/03), 852 So.2d 1020. This standard, now legislatively embodied in
The Jackson standard is applicable in cases involving both direct and circumstantial evidence. An appellate court reviewing the sufficiency of evidence in such
Where there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. State v. Allen, 36,180 (La. App.2d Cir.9/18/02), 828 So.2d 622, writs denied, 02-2595 (La.3/28/03), 840 So.2d 566, 02-2997 (La.6/27/03), 847 So.2d 1255, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1185, 124 S.Ct. 1404, 158 L.Ed.2d 90 (2004).
The trier of fact is charged to make a credibility determination and may, within the bounds of rationality, accept or reject the testimony of any witness; the reviewing court may impinge on that discretion only to the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental due process of law. State v. Casey, 99-0023 (La.1/26/00), 775 So.2d 1022, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 840, 121 S.Ct. 104, 148 L.Ed.2d 62 (2000).
Second degree battery is a specific intent crime and therefore the evidence must show that the defendant intended to inflict serious injury. State v. Fuller, 414 So.2d 306 (La.1982); State v. Speed, 43,786 (La.App.2d Cir.1/14/09), 2 So.3d 582. Specific intent is that state of mind that exists when the circumstances indicate the offender actively desired the proscribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act.
The determination of whether the requisite intent is present in a criminal case is for the trier of fact, and a review of this determination is to be guided by the standards of Jackson v. Virginia, supra. State v. Huizar, 414 So.2d 741 (La.1982); State v. Steward, 42,643 (La.App.2d Cir.11/14/07), 969 So.2d 804; State v. McGee, 37,919 (La.App.2d Cir. 12/10/03), 862 So.2d 452. State v. Hill, supra. In reviewing the correctness of such a determination, the court should review the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and must determine if the evidence is sufficient to convince a reasonable trier of fact of the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt as to every element of the offense. State v. Huizar, supra.
In this case, the state proved each of the essential elements of the crime of second degree battery beyond a reasonable doubt. There is ample evidence proving that the defendant committed a battery upon the victim and that he did so with the specific intent to cause serious bodily injury.
Linnear argues he struck Fuggins in self-defense, thereby negating the possibility he was acting with the specific intent to commit second degree battery. The use of force or violence upon the person of another is justifiable under
It is clear from the record that Linnear‘s actions were neither reasonable nor necessary. Although Fuggins may have bumped into Linnear once or twice and even waved gang signs in his face, the response of beating the defendant unconscious was unreasonable. The force was also unnecessary because Linnear admitted that after the first punch, Fuggins was not in a position to fight back. It is evident that Linnear was not fighting to protect himself, but rather because he felt disrespected by the young victim‘s actions. The fact that he continued to beat the victim after he had fallen unconscious is clearly indicative of a specific intent to inflict serious bodily injury. Although the defense‘s sole witness testified that Linnear was acting in self-defense, the jury‘s decision to reject his testimony is clearly supported by the law and evidence and must be given great deference.
Furthermore, the injuries sustained by Fuggins alone support a conclusion that Linnear had the specific intent to cause serious bodily injury. The statute defining serious bodily injury includes unconsciousness, extreme physical pain, and protracted and obvious disfigurement, all of which Fuggins suffered. The treating emergency room resident at LSU Medical Center, Dr. Brandon P. Smith, testified to the extent of Fuggins’ injuries. Fuggins remained in the Intensive Care Unit, sedated, and on mechanical ventilation for four days. As defined by the Glasgow Coma Scale, Fuggins suffered from a “severe closed-head injury.” Fuggins also sustained three fractures to his jaw, requiring two corrective surgeries. Additionally, his mouth had to be wired shut, confining him to a liquid diet. Moreover, Fuggins was forced to remain in bed for a prolonged period of time, causing a breakdown of skin on his back, resulting in a decubitus ulcer.
In addition to arguing he lacked the requisite specific intent to cause great bodily injury, Linnear asserts that there was insufficient evidence to show that Linnear
Finally, the defense claims discrepancies in the testimony given by state witnesses to discredit their veracity. These discrepancies were insignificant details, such as what type of alcohol the victim and his friends were drinking, whether the club was crowded or not, and whether Fuggins was asked for identification by club employees upon entering the club. These incongruities were provided by witnesses who did not see the altercation and therefore do not diminish the sufficiency of the proof of the crime.
From the evidence, the jury could have reasonably inferred that after feeling disrespected, Linnear intentionally attacked Fuggins with the specific intent to inflict serious bodily injury. When these facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have rejected Linnear‘s claims of self-defense and found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This assignment of error is without merit.
Excessive Sentence
Linnear additionally argues that the sentence imposed is unconstitutionally excessive. He contends that he was only induced to use violence after Fuggins acted aggressively toward him. He further claims that there is no indication that this type of behavior will be repeated, given that he is a first time felony offender and that he has participated in rehabilitative programs while incarcerated, including a course in anger management. Finally, the defense asserts that this sentence places an undue hardship on Linnear‘s family because he will be unable to work and provide support. Linnear is charged with the care of his disabled child who suffers from cerebral palsy, and he has recently endured other family difficulties, including the death of his father, a stroke suffered by his mother, and an attack on his wife.
The test imposed by the reviewing court in determining the excessiveness of a sentence is two-pronged. First, the record must show that the trial court took cognizance of the criteria set forth in
Second, a sentence violates
The trial judge is given a wide discretion in the imposition of sentences within the statutory limits, and the sentence imposed by him should not be set aside as excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of his discretion. State v. Williams, 03-3514 (La.12/13/04), 893 So.2d 7; State v. Thompson, 02-0333 (La.4/9/03), 842 So.2d 330; State v. Hardy, 39,233 (La. App.2d Cir.1/26/05), 892 So.2d 710. A trial judge is in the best position to consider the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of a particular case, and, therefore, is given broad discretion in sentencing. State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La.5/31/96), 674 So.2d 957, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117 S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996). On review, an appellate court does not determine whether another sentence may have been more appropriate, but whether the trial court abused its discretion. Id.
Under
In reviewing the sentence for constitutional excessiveness, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court‘s choice of sentence. Linnear became angered, lost control of himself, and knocked the defendant unconscious. He then left the scene, leaving the victim unattended in the middle of the dance floor. The beating was so severe that Fuggins was in intensive care for weeks and is still undergoing a lengthy and costly rehabilitative process.
In light of Linnear‘s criminal history of violence to persons and the seriousness of the injuries suffered by the victim, we find the near maximum sentence to be appropriately tailored to this defendant. Thus, the sentence imposed does not shock the sense of justice. This assignment is therefore without merit.
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of second degree battery proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury apparently believed the victim‘s account of the incident and rejected the defendant‘s assertion of self-defense. Moreover, the imposed sentence does not shock the sense of justice and is therefore not excessive.
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.