STATE OF OHIO v. MATTHEW LINDSTROM
No. 96653
Court of Appeals of Ohio, EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
December 29, 2011
2011-Ohio-6755
BEFORE: Stewart, P.J., Cooney, J., and S. Gallagher, J.
[Opinion should not be cited as authority. See 2013-Ohio-731.] JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED. Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. CR-547876.
William D. Mason
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: Daniel T. Van
Assistant County Prosecutor
The Justice Center
1200 Ontario Street, 8th Floor
Cleveland, OH 44113
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
John B. Gibbons
2000 Standard Building
1370 Ontario Street
Cleveland, OH 44113
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, state of Ohio, appeals from the trial court‘s decision to dismiss its indictment and transfer the case to the Juvenile Division of the Court of Common Pleas. The state complains that its act of filing a complaint in juvenile court against then 20-year-old defendant-appellee, Matthew Lindstrom, did not constitute his being “taken into custody or apprehended” as contemplated by
{¶ 3} A complaint alleging four counts of rape was issued by the Brookpark Police Department and filed by the prosecutor in the Juvenile Division of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas on October 21, 2010, six days prior to Lindstrom‘s 21st birthday. Lindstrom was served by certified mail and appeared at his adjudicatory hearing with counsel on November 22, 2010. He entered formal denials to the complaint and was released on his own recognizance. Also, on November 22, 2010, the state filed a motion in the juvenile division for an order to relinquish jurisdiction for criminal prosecution, pursuant to
{¶ 4} On March 8, 2011, the state obtained from a Cuyahoga County Grand Jury a ten-count indictment against Lindstrom for rape and gross sexual imposition with sexually violent predator specifications and, on that day, filed the same in the general division of the common pleas court. A warrant was issued on the indictment on March 10, 2011. On March 9, 2011, the state filed in the juvenile court, a motion to dismiss
{¶ 5} On March 16, 2011, Lindstrom filed a motion requesting that the common pleas court remand the case to the juvenile court and a motion to hold arraignment or indictment in abeyance. A hearing was held on March 21, 2011 where the state argued that Lindstrom was never “apprehended” or “taken into custody” pursuant to
{¶ 6} On April 5, 2011, the state filed a motion requesting the common pleas court to clarify its order for purposes of appeal. The court issued a second journal entry that stated, “[t]his case is transferred to the juvenile court and the indictment is dismissed and all further proceedings are discontinued pursuant to
{¶ 8} Appellate courts conduct a de novo review when interpreting statutes and their application, without deference to the trial court‘s conclusions. State v. Sufronko (1995), 105 Ohio App.3d 504, 506, 664 N.E.2d 596.
{¶ 9} The “power to act as a court in an ordinary criminal case rests on jurisdiction of the person and of the subject matter,” and a court does not have jurisdiction to try anyone for a violation of law “except on proper complaint duly filed.” Evans v. Sacks (1960), 114 Ohio App. 179, 180, 174 N.E.2d 787; Taxis v. Oakwood (App.1935), 19 Ohio Law Abs. 498; see, also, State v. Treon (1963), 91 Ohio Law Abs. 229, 188 N.E.2d 308 (prerequisite of court having subject matter jurisdiction is the filing of an indictment). “The term ‘jurisdiction’ is also used when referring to a court‘s exercise of its jurisdiction over a particular case *** [and] encompasses the trial court‘s authority to determine a specific case within that class of cases that is within its subject matter jurisdiction.” Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, ¶ 12.
{¶ 10} “Jurisdiction over all crimes and offenses is vested in the court of common pleas, general division, unless such jurisdiction specifically and exclusively is vested in other divisions of the court of common pleas or in the lower courts.” State ex rel. McMinn v. Whitfield (1986), 27 Ohio St.3d 4, 5, 500 N.E.2d 875. “A statutory
{¶ 11} Juvenile courts have been granted exclusive initial subject matter jurisdiction to determine the case concerning any child alleged to be delinquent for committing an act that would constitute a felony. State v. Golphin, 81 Ohio St.3d 543, 544, 1998-Ohio-336, 692 N.E.2d 608. A juvenile court cannot waive exclusive subject matter jurisdiction. State v. Wilson, 73 Ohio St.3d 40, 1995-Ohio-217, 652 N.E.2d 196, paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶ 12}
{¶ 14} There is a paucity of case law specifically addressing the issue in this case. In State v. Steele, 146 Ohio Misc.2d 23, 2008-Ohio-2467, 887 N.E.2d 1255, ¶ 6, a defendant alleged to have committed the offense of rape when he was 17 years old was indicted in common pleas court. He filed a motion to dismiss claiming that the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction. The court agreed that the case should have been filed in juvenile court since “the defendant was a minor when the act was committed and was indicted prior to his 21st birthday.” Id. at ¶ 6.
{¶ 16} “A court acquires personal jurisdiction over a party in one of three ways: (1) proper and effective service of process, (2) voluntary appearance by the party, or (3) limited acts by the party or his counsel that involuntarily submit him to the court‘s jurisdiction.” Money Tree Loan Co. v. Williams, 169 Ohio App.3d 336, 2006-Ohio-5568, 862 N.E.2d 885, ¶ 8, citing Maryhew v. Yova (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 154, 156, 464 N.E.2d 538.
{¶ 17} A peace officer may cause an arrest or commence prosecution by filing “with a reviewing official1 or the clerk of a court of record an affidavit charging the offense committed.”
{¶ 18} Detective Edwin Biglang-Awa of the Brookpark Police Department commenced the present case by swearing to a complaint for rape against Lindstrom in the juvenile division. The state then filed the complaint and chose to compel Lindstrom to appear by use of a summons. The juvenile court served Lindstrom with the summons by certified mail on October 26, 2010 and secured personal jurisdiction over him on that date — one day before he turned 21.
{¶ 19} To determine whether the juvenile court properly had jurisdiction over this matter, we must decide if Lindstrom was “taken into custody or apprehended” before he turned 21. State v. Walls, 96 Ohio St.3d 437, 442, 2002-Ohio-1559, 775 N.E.2d 829 (“age of the offender upon apprehension [is] the touchstone of determining juvenile-court jurisdiction“). We find that he was.
{¶ 20} Whether a suspect is “in custody” is a mixed question of law and fact and is subject to a de novo standard of review. Thompson v. Keohane (1995), 516 U.S. 99, 112-113, 116 S.Ct. 457, 465, 133 L.Ed.2d 383. “Both the Juvenile Court Law and the Rules of Juvenile Procedure provide that a child may be taken into custody pursuant to an order of the juvenile court or pursuant to the law of arrest.” 48 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d,
{¶ 21} In U.S. v. Wendy G. (C.A.9, 2001), 255 F.3d 761, 765, the court determined that a juvenile was “in custody” at the point she was placed in a holding cell. See, also, U.S. v. Curb (C.A.6, 2010), 625 F.3d 968 (equating custody of juvenile with an arrest); but, see, In re L— (1963), 92 Ohio Law Abs. 475, 194 N.E.2d 797 (“the law of arrest does not apply to the taking into custody of minors [since] *** [d]elinquency has not been declared a crime in Ohio“). In this case, the state argues that Lindstrom had not been “taken into custody” when the complaint against him was filed in the juvenile court. We agree. However, our analysis does not end here.
{¶ 22} The fact that the legislature chose to use the phrase, “taken into custody or apprehended” in the disjunctive and as opposed to the phrase “taken into custody” alone, indicates that the legislature recognized a difference between being in “custody” and being “apprehended.” Nevertheless, we have found no authority that addresses what constitutes apprehension of a minor pursuant to
{¶ 23} “Where a statute is silent as to the meaning of a word contained therein and that word has both a wide and a restricted meaning, courts in interpreting such a statute must give such word a meaning consistent with other provisions of the statute and the objective to be achieved thereby.” Heidtman v. Shaker Hts. (1955), 163 Ohio St. 109,
{¶ 24} Two courts cannot take jurisdiction of the same person and the same subject matter at one and the same time. Kappes v. State (1904), 16 Ohio C.D. 111, 26 Ohio C.C. 111. As a general rule, “[w]hen a court of competent jurisdiction acquires jurisdiction of the subject matter of an action, its authority continues until the matter is completely and finally disposed of, and no court of coordinate jurisdiction is at liberty to interfere with its action.” John Weenink & Sons Co. v. Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga Cty. (1948), 150 Ohio St. 349, 355, 82 N.E.2d 730.
{¶ 25} The juvenile court had exclusive jurisdiction over Lindstrom at the time the indictment was filed against him in the common pleas court. Furthermore, the court of common pleas, as a court of general jurisdiction, possesses the authority to determine its own jurisdiction both over the person and the subject matter in an action. State v. Mohamed, 178 Ohio App.3d 695, 2008-Ohio-5591, 899 N.E.2d 1071, ¶ 12, citing State ex rel. Miller v. Court of Common Pleas (1949), 151 Ohio St. 397, 86 N.E.2d 464, paragraph three of the syllabus. The common pleas court in this instance determined that it lacked jurisdiction to proceed, noting that jurisdiction was proper in the juvenile court.
{¶ 26} In Gerak v. State (1920), 22 Ohio App. 357, 153 N.E. 902, syllabus, the appellant complained that because he was a minor, the common pleas court did not have jurisdiction to try him for the crimes he committed. The court overruled his assignment of error and noted that the common pleas court had the right to try him for his crime
{¶ 27} In the instant case, the state properly invoked the jurisdiction of the juvenile court by filing the complaint against Lindstrom. Therefore, the indictment filed in the common pleas court was void because the juvenile court had exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. See
{¶ 29} We therefore find that Lindstrom was apprehended before his 21st birthday, and jurisdiction over his case was properly in the juvenile court. Accepting the state‘s argument that Lindstrom was not apprehended would lead to an absurd interpretation of the statute. The complaint against Lindstrom charged him with felony offenses that subjected him to arrest if the state had so requested. The fact that Lindstrom was not physically taken into custody stems from the state‘s choice to serve him with a complaint and summon his appearance in the juvenile court for an adjudicatory hearing. “It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that a statute should not be interpreted to yield an absurd result.” State ex rel. Ohio Gen. Assembly v. Brunner, 114 Ohio St.3d 386, 2007-Ohio-3780, 872 N.E.2d 912, at ¶ 114. Accordingly, the state‘s assignment of error is overrruled.
Judgment affirmed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
MELODY J. STEWART, PRESIDING JUDGE
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCURS;
COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE OPINION
COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, J., DISSENTING:
{¶ 30} I respectfully dissent.
{¶ 31} I would reverse the common pleas court‘s judgment attempting to transfer the underlying case to juvenile court. The juvenile court properly dismissed the complaint against Lindstrom. I find the key issue to be whether Lindstrom was “apprehended or in custody” prior to his 21st birthday. Since the majority acknowledges he was “released” on his own recognizance after he turned 21, I find this release signifies he was not “in custody” until he first appeared in juvenile court, after he reached age 21.