45 P. 982 | Nev. | 1896
So long as the right of action upon the coupons upon which this application is founded is not barred, the petitioner is entitled to the writ of mandate applied for. By the act of 1877 they were to be paid as fast as the annual levy of 45 cents on each $100 of property in the county would produce sufficient *266 money therefor. How soon that would be would, of course, depend upon the amount of property in the county, and the amount of coupons that might be presented under the act, and the order of their presentation. They might be paid in one year and they might not all be paid in twenty years. The creditor accepted this proposition when he presented his coupons and had their presentation certified by the treasurer. This was in the nature of an agreement for an extension of time for their payment. The creditor agreed to wait, no matter how long it might take, for payment under that arrangement, and he has waited accordingly. As long as the tax was being levied and collected there was no occasion for him to bring an action, and if he had it seems very probable it could not have been maintained, had the proper defense been made. But when the money was collected he would be entitled to it; then his cause of action would be fully ripe, and if not prosecuted within the statutory period would doubtless be barred. If not levied or collected, his remedy would be the one he is now pursuing to compel the officers to do their duty in the premises.
This is in accordance with the view taken by the supreme court of the United States, upon coupons in all respects identical with those involved here, in the case of LincolnCo. v. Luning,
That this has become the settled law applicable to such cases is further shown by the decision of Sawyer v.Colgan,
Judgment reversed and cause remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.