4 Ohio St. 3d 13 | Ohio | 1983
Lead Opinion
Where successive prosecutions are at stake, the double jeopardy guarantee serves “a constitutional policy of finality for the defendant’s benefit.” United States v. Jorn (1971), 400 U.S. 470, 479. That policy protects the accused from attempts to relitigate facts underlying a prior acquittal. See Ashe v. Swenson (1970), 397 U.S. 436. The question in this case is whether that guarantee would be violated were the state to be allowed to proceed on an aggravated murder charge pursuant to R.C. 2903.01(B) after the accused had already been acquitted of the underlying felony at a previous trial.
The United States Supreme Court has held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel is embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy. See Ashe v. Swenson, supra, at 445. In State v. Thomas (1980), 61 Ohio St. 2d 254 [15 O.O.3d 262], this court fully applied this concept in holding, at paragraph four of the syllabus, that “* * * successive prosecu
By definition, felony murder requires proof of the underlying felony in order to sustain a conviction under R.C. 2903.01(B). So too does the language of the instant indictment.
Accordingly, we hold that the guarantees of double jeopardy prohibit retrial of an accused under R.C. 2903.01(B) after the accused has already been acquitted of the underlying felony at a previous trial. The judgment of the court of appeals is therefore affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
The indictment for aggravated murder reads as follows:
“* * * Defendant * * * unlawfully and purposely caused the death of another, to wit: Daniel J. Greene while committing or attempting to commit, or while fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to commit Aggravated Arson. ” (Emphasis added.)
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. It is my position that although the principle of double jeopardy would preclude the retrial of the appellee for aggravated arson, such principle would not bar the retrial of appellee for aggravated murder. Consequently, I dissent.
The central question on appeal is whether the state must prove that appellee committed aggravated arson in order to convict him for aggravated murder. In my opinion, it is not necessary to do so here.
The state’s theory was not that appellee actually committed aggravated arson; rather, that he participated in a scheme that had the murder of Daniel Greene as its ultimate goal.
As Judge Parrino said in his well-reasoned dissent to the court of appeals’ decision:
“Where an accomplice enters into a common design which is reasonably
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand for a new trial on aggravated murder.