15 Conn. L. Rptr. 611 | Conn. Super. Ct. | 1995
The complaint seeks relief in the form of specific performance and damages for the Lex's refusal to perform under the purchase option contained in the lease between the parties. (7/18/95 Second Amended Complaint). The May 16, 1991 counterclaim, which is the subject of this motion, seeks damages from the State under certain provisions of the lease.
Discussion
The doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss. Amore v. Frankel,
In its memorandum, the State alludes to a 1958 Constitutional amendment now Art.
Sec. 4. Claims against the state shall be resolved in such manner as may be provided by law.
The legislature enacted what is now §
This legislation expressly bars suits upon claims cognizable by the claims commissioner except as he may authorize, an indication CT Page 14647 of the legislative determination to preserve sovereign immunity as a defense to monetary claims against the state not sanctioned by the commissioner or other statutory provisions. General Statutes
4-148 (b),4-160 .
See also Fidelity Bank v. State,
Had there been no action by the State, it is clear that Lex would have had to seek the permission of the Commissioner of Claims pursuant to C.G.S. §
We have long held that, once involved in an action, the state enjoys
the same status as any other litigant. Thus, for example, the state, when it brings an equitable action, opens "the door to any defense or cross-complaint germane to the matter in controversy . . . .
A sovereign who asks for equity must do equity." State v. Kilburn, supra, 12.
Lacasse v. Burns,
The rule undoubtedly is that the State cannot be made a party defendant to an action without its consent; but if the State itself invokes the jurisdiction of the court to secure affirmative relief, it subjects itself to any proper cross demand involved in the subject matter of the action.
Here the State brought this action seeking specific performance of certain provisions of a lease. Lex counterclaimed, seeking damages under certain other provisions of the same lease.
In bringing this action the State has consented to the bringing of the counterclaim which arises from the subject matter CT Page 14648 of the complaint. The facts here are analogous to those in Statev. Hartford Accident Indemnity Co.,
The state brought the action by writ dated February 15, 1943. Thereafter the company was authorized by the General Assembly to sue the state on its claim. 24 Spec. Laws 287. The special authority so given was unnecessary. ". . . if the State itself invokes the jurisdiction of the court to secure affirmative relief, it subjects itself to any proper cross demand involved in the subject matter of the action" Reilly v. State,
119 Conn. 217 ,219 ,175 A. 582 . [Italics added.]
The court agrees with the reasoning of Justice Maltbie and does not find any indication that the Supreme Court has changed this position. See Lacasse v. Burns,
The State further argues that Count III should be dismissed because it seeks interest from the State, citing White OakCorporation v. Department of Transportation,
Alexandra Davis DiPentima, Judge