33 Conn. App. 288 | Conn. App. Ct. | 1993
The defendant appeals from his conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ BSa-S
The jury could have reasonably found the following facts. On November 20,1991, Kim Goldsmith, an assistant manager of Arby’s Restaurant at the Trumbull Shopping Park, and the defendant, also an Arby’s employee, were working alone in the restaurant between 8 and 9 p.m. Goldsmith was taking food orders from customers and the defendant was preparing the food orders in the kitchen area located in the rear of the premises. At approximately 8:50 p.m., Goldsmith
At the 9 p.m. closing time, Goldsmith lowered the restaurant’s electronic gate to counter level, and he and the defendant cleaned the restaurant equipment. Goldsmith emptied the cash drawers and counted the money. At about 9:50 p.m., while Goldsmith was working at his desk, he was approached from behind. A hand covered his eyes and a knife was placed at his throat. The attacker called Goldsmith by name and told him that if he cooperated he would not be harmed. The attacker then shoved Goldsmith into a nearby walk-in freezer. As Goldsmith struggled to keep the freezer door from closing, the attacker flailed the knife up and down in the freezer doorway. Goldsmith then forced the freezer door open, and ran out of the restaurant into the mall hallway yelling for assistance. His attacker alsp fled the restaurant but in the opposite direction. The security gate, which could be operated only from within the restaurant, was fully open as the two fled.
Anthony Silva, a mall maintenance worker, heard the disturbance and ran to the restaurant. Inside Silva saw the defendant who pointed out the fleeing attacker, and Silva chased after the attacker. The defendant entered the hallway where Goldsmith was standing and asked what had happened. Goldsmith told him that he had just been robbed, and asked the defendant where he had been. The defendant said he had been in the bathroom and then ran down the hallway after Silva.
Meanwhile, Silva had caught the assailant who was identified as Castillo. The knife used in the robbery was recovered and determined to be from the restaurant. Money had been stolen but was not recovered. Goldsmith told police officers he suspected that the defendant was involved in the robbery.
“ ‘When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we first examine the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the jury’s verdict. State v. Avis, 209 Conn. 290, 309, 551 A.2d 26 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1097, 109 S. Ct. 1570, 103 L. Ed. 2d 937 (1989); State v. Rice, 25 Conn. App. 646, 650, 595 A.2d 947 (1991). We then determine on the basis of the facts established and the inferences that reasonably could be drawn from those facts whether the jury reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative effect of the evidence established the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Famiglietti, 219 Conn. 605, 609, 595 A.2d 306 (1991); State v. Hopes, 26 Conn. App. 367, 376, 602 A.2d 23, cert. denied, 221 Conn. 915, 603 A.2d 405 (1992). We note that the probative force of the evidence is not diminished because it consists, in whole or in part, of circumstantial evidence rather than direct evidence. State v. Robinson, 213 Conn. 243, 254, 567 A.2d 1173 (1989).’ State v. Lago, 28 Conn. App. 9, 30, 611 A.2d 866, cert. denied, 223 Conn. 919, 614 A.2d 826 (1992). Our inquiry into whether the evidence in the record would support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt does not require us to ask if we believe that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but rather if ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ (Emphasis in original.) State v. Boykin, 27 Conn. App. 558, 563-64, 609 A.2d 242, cert. denied, 223 Conn. 905, 610 A.2d 179 (1992). Once a defendant has been found guilty of the crime charged, we conduct our judicial review of all of the evidence in the light
“When applying the sufficiency of the evidence test, the court must ensure that [e]ach essential element of the crime charged . . . be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and although it is within the province of the [trier] to draw reasonable, logical inferences from the facts proven, [it] may not resort to speculation and conjecture. . . . Where it cannot be said that a rational trier of fact could find guilt proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then, a conviction cannot constitutionally stand, as it is violative of due process under the fourteenth amendment. . . . [T]he burden rested upon the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused, i.e., to prove each material element of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lee, 32 Conn. App. 84, 97-98, 628 A.2d 1318, cert. denied, 227 Conn. 924, 632 A.2d 702 (1993).
To prove accessory liability for the crime of robbery in the first degree under General Statutes § 53a-8, the state must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had solicited, requested, commanded, or importuned Castillo to commit the crime of robbery in the first degree.
At trial, no evidence was presented to establish that the defendant had requested, solicited, commanded, or importuned Castillo to rob the manager of Arby’s restaurant at knifepoint.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to render a judgment of acquittal.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
General Statutes § 53a-8 (a) provides: “A person, acting with the mental state required for commission of an offense, who solicits, requests, commands, importunes or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable for such conduct and may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender.”
General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) provides in pertinent part: “A person is guilty of robbery in the first degree when, in the course of the commission of the crime of robbery ... or of immediate flight therefrom, he or another participant in the crime ... (3) uses or threatens the use of a dangerous instrument . . . .”
The state charged that the defendant “did solicit, request, command and importune” Castillo to commit robbery. General Statutes § 53a-8 assigns accessory liability to anyone “who solicits, requests, commands, importunes or intentionally aids another person to engage in” criminal conduct. That the state did not include “intentionally aids” to its charge is immaterial for the purpose of our analysis.
Castillo, who pleaded guilty to the Arby’s robbery, testified on direct examination at the defendant’s trial that the defendant had asked him to commit the crime and had provided him with the knife. Because Castillo invoked his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination and refused to submit to cross-examination, the trial court properly ruled his testimony be stricken. State v. Roma, 199 Conn. 110, 117, 505 A.2d 717 (1986). As a result, the jury could not consider the only direct evidence linking the defendant to the crime charged.
“An accessory must have both the intent to help the principal and the intent to commit the crime. State v. Vincent, 194 Conn. 198, 207, 479 A.2d 237 (1984).” State v. Smith, 15 Conn. App. 122, 127, 543 A.2d 301 (1988).