State v. LewisState v. Lewis
{¶1} Defendant, Ramous Lewis, appeals from the judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. This Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} In 2013, Branson Price and Paris Wicks were shot while at a drive-thru convenience mart in Akron, Ohio. Mr. Wicks died from his injuries. Complaints were filed in the Summit County Juvenile Court alleging Mr. Lewis to be a delinquent child based upon his alleged involvement in this purportedly gang-related assault, robbery, and murder. Mr. Lewis waived his right to a probable cause hearing in the juvenile court, and the case proceeded to an amenability hearing on the State‘s motion for the juvenile court to relinquish jurisdiction. The juvenile court found that Mr. Lewis was not amenable to rehabilitation in the juvenile justice system, and the court transferred the case to the general division of the Summit County Court of
{¶3} The case proceeded to trial. During the course of the trial, Mr. Lewis changed his plea to guilty on one charge of aggravated murder together with attendant gun and gang specifications, one charge of felonious assault, and one charge of having a weapon under disability. The trial court then dismissed the remaining charges and specifications upon the request of the prosecutor. In a journal entry dated April 15, 2015, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of thirty years to life imprisonment.
{¶4} Mr. Lewis requested a delayed appeal from the sentencing entry, which this Court granted. He now presents one assignment of error for our review.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT TRANSFERRED 15-YEAR-OLD RAMOUS LEWIS’[] CASE FOR CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN VIOLATION OF
{¶5} In his sole assignment of error, Mr. Lewis contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in transferring his case to the trial court because he was amenable to treatment in the juvenile justice system. We disagree.
{¶6} We first note that Mr. Lewis pleaded guilty after his transfer to the trial court. The Ohio Supreme Court has held that “a defendant who * * * voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently enters a guilty plea with the assistance of counsel ‘may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.’” State v. Smith, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26804, 2015-Ohio-579, ¶ 25, quoting State v. Fitzpatrick, 102 Ohio St.3d 321, 2004-Ohio-3167, ¶ 78, quoting Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). “This Court has explained that ‘[a] defendant who enters a plea of guilty waives the right to appeal all nonjurisdictional issues arising at prior stages of the proceedings, although [he] may contest the constitutionality of the plea itself.’” Smith at ¶ 25, quoting State v. Quarterman, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26400, 2013-Ohio-3606, ¶ 4, quoting State v. Atkinson, 9th Dist. Medina No. 05CA0079-M, 2006-Ohio-5806, ¶ 21.
{¶7} However, the general division of the common pleas court lacks jurisdiction over a juvenile defendant absent a “proper” bindover proceeding. See State v. Wilson, 73 Ohio St.3d 40, 44 (1995) (“[A]bsent a proper bindover procedure pursuant to [former]
{¶8} “[A] juvenile court‘s determination regarding a child‘s amenability to rehabilitation in the juvenile system is reviewed by an appellate court under an abuse-of-
{¶9} Two types of transfer exist under
In instances of discretionary transfer, as in this case, “the juvenile court is * * * to determine the age of the child and whether probable cause exists to believe that the juvenile committed the act charged.
R.C. 2152.10(B) and2152.12(B)(1) and(2) . However, if probable cause exists and the child is eligible by age, the juvenile court must then continue the proceeding for a full investigation.R.C. 2152.12(C) andJuv.R. 30(C) . This investigation includes a mental examination of the child, a hearing to determine whether the child is ‘amenable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile system’ or whether ‘the safety of the community may require that the child be subject to adult sanctions,’ and the consideration of 17 other statutory criteria to determine whether a transfer is appropriate.Juv.R. 30(C) ;R.C. 2152.12(B) ,(C) ,(D) , and(E) .”
D.W. at ¶ 11, quoting In re M.P. at ¶ 12.
(1) The victim of the act charged suffered physical or psychological harm, or serious economic harm, as a result of the alleged act.
(2) The physical or psychological harm suffered by the victim due to the alleged act of the child was exacerbated because of the physical or psychological vulnerability or the age of the victim.
(3) The child‘s relationship with the victim facilitated the act charged.
(4) The child allegedly committed the act charged for hire or as a part of a gang or other organized criminal activity.
(5) The child had a firearm on or about the child‘s person or under the child‘s control at the time of the act charged, the act charged is not a violation of section 2923.12 of the Revised Code, and the child, during the commission of the act charged, allegedly used or displayed the firearm, brandished the firearm, or indicated that the child possessed a firearm.
(6) At the time of the act charged, the child was awaiting adjudication or disposition as a delinquent child, was under a community control sanction, or was on parole for a prior delinquent child adjudication or conviction.
(7) The results of any previous juvenile sanctions and programs indicate that rehabilitation of the child will not occur in the juvenile system.
(8) The child is emotionally, physically, or psychologically mature enough for the transfer.
(9) There is not sufficient time to rehabilitate the child within the juvenile system.
{¶11} Former
(1) The victim induced or facilitated the act charged.
(2) The child acted under provocation in allegedly committing the act charged.
(3) The child was not the principal actor in the act charged, or, at the time of the act charged, the child was under the negative influence or coercion of another person.
(4) The child did not cause physical harm to any person or property, or have reasonable cause to believe that harm of that nature would occur, in allegedly committing the act charged. (5) The child previously has not been adjudicated a delinquent child.
(6) The child is not emotionally, physically, or psychologically mature enough for the transfer.
(7) The child has a mental illness or is a mentally retarded person.
(8) There is sufficient time to rehabilitate the child within the juvenile system and the level of security available in the juvenile system provides a reasonable assurance of public safety.
{¶12} Here, at the amenability hearing, Dr. Thomas Webb testified as a court witness. Dr. Webb testified that he was the juvenile court psychologist, and he completed a psychological consult and amenability evaluation with regard to Mr. Lewis. The report was marked as a court exhibit and entered into evidence. With respect to Mr. Lewis’ background, Dr. Webb indicated that Mr. Lewis had experienced instability with respect to his parenting and housing. He had little relationship with his father, and his mother moved frequently between Akron and Cleveland, experiencing incidents of homelessness. Mr. Lewis’ mother had become involved with a person who had been violent toward her. Dr. Webb explained that witnessing this violence could have caused Mr. Lewis to have less strictures in thinking about the impact of violence, and it could raise the probability of him thinking about violence as an option in dealing with situations.
{¶13} In addition, Dr. Webb indicated that Mr. Lewis was close to his grandfather, who had passed away, at which point Mr. Lewis became very depressed, began having hallucinations, and became suicidal. His mother took him to a hospital, where he was prescribed medication for psychosis. During the course of his detention on the current charges, Dr. Webb stated that Mr. Lewis had begun to have a better understanding of his need to take his medicines.
{¶15} Dr. Webb concluded that he believed there had been a change in Mr. Lewis while in detention related to this incident, as he had benefitted from the structure that had been imposed, the supervision of his psychotropic medication, and the day-to-day access to emotional support from a drug counselor and a social worker.
{¶16} The State then presented its witnesses, including Branson Price, Christopher Smith, Sergeant Anthony Starvaggi, and Detective Rodd Criss. Mr. Price testified that he was 23 years old. On August 29, 2013, Mr. Price and his close friend, Mr. Wicks, decided to go to the mall. Mr. Price picked up Mr. Wicks, and Mr. Wicks handed a gun to Mr. Price because Mr. Price had a permit to carry concealed weapons. Mr. Wicks wanted to stop to get a t-shirt at the drive-thru on Lovers Lane and Arlington Road in Akron, Ohio. Mr. Price pulled into the parking
{¶17} Mr. Price testified that the shooting had changed his life. Although he had physically recovered, his state of mind had prevented him from finishing college and maintaining his previous full time employment. He had nightmares and thought about the incident every day. He tried to imagine different ways that he could have handled the situation, and it “haunt[ed]” him. He witnessed Mr. Wick‘s mother‘s pain, and he had not seen his own mother in six months because she lived down the street from the drive-thru, and he was concerned about returning to the area.
{¶18} Mr. Smith testified that he is an intensive probation officer at the Summit County Juvenile Court. Mr. Lewis was originally placed on traditional probation with him in January
{¶19} Sergeant Starvaggi of the Akron Police Department testified that he was one of the officers that responded to the scene of the shootings. The sergeant confirmed that four individuals were charged as a result of the shootings, and Mr. Lewis was the only one of those four individuals who was a juvenile. The other suspects were in their late teens or early twenties. Detective Criss, of the Akron Police Department‘s Gang Unit, testified that he recognized the monikers of the other individuals purportedly involved in the shootings, because those individual belonged to the KaiKa Klan Outlaw Gang, which had a known criminal presence in the area of the shootings. The investigation of the shootings had also revealed that an individual known by
{¶20} The defense did not put on witnesses, but in closing argument the defense maintained that there existed several factors in favor of retaining jurisdiction in the juvenile court. The defense argued that, as Mr. Lewis was only 16 ½ years old, there was ample time to rehabilitate him in the juvenile system. The defense pointed to Mr. Lewis’ cognitive delays, lack of structure in his life until his detention on the current charges, and the fact that he was prone to suggestibility. The defense also referenced Dr. Webb‘s testimony that Mr. Lewis was doing well in detention. The defense further pointed out that Mr. Lewis was not on court ordered supervision at the time of the offense. The defense additionally maintained that the evidence demonstrated that Mr. Lewis was not emotionally, physically, or psychologically mature enough for the transfer.
{¶21} In the juvenile court‘s transfer order, the court concluded that the factors weighing in favor of transfer outweighed those against transfer. On appeal, Mr. Lewis maintains
{¶22} Further, Mr. Lewis argues that Detective Criss’ testimony did not suggest that Mr. Lewis was “entrenched” in a gang. However, the juvenile court did not find that Mr. Lewis was “entrenched” in a gang, and instead referenced in its order that the crimes were alleged to have been part of gang activity. See
{¶23} Mr. Lewis also suggests that this case is similar to that in State v. Thrasher, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27547, 2015-Ohio-2504, where this Court held that a trial court abused its discretion in failing to adequately consider a defendant‘s traumatic history in mitigation at sentencing.2 Id. at ¶ 21. In Thrasher, the issue pertained to the weight that the trial court gave the seriousness and recidivism sentencing factors contained in
{¶24} Here, aside from the fact that the juvenile court was weighing factors relative to amenability as opposed to sentencing, this case is distinguishable from Thrasher in that we see no indication that the court below failed to give due weight to the statutory factors. The juvenile court‘s decision cites to factors both in favor of, and against, transfer, and it concludes that the factors in favor of transfer outweighed those against it.
{¶25} Mr. Lewis further cites the Second District‘s decision in State v. D.H., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26383, 2015-Ohio-3259, where the Second District held the juvenile court‘s order finding the juvenile to not be amenable to rehabilitation in the juvenile justice system must include sufficient findings so that the reviewing court can “identify how the court reached its conclusion that [the juvenile] could not be rehabilitated in the juvenile system.” Id. at ¶ 17-18. Mr. Lewis maintains that the trial court did not adequately explain why Mr. Lewis could not be rehabilitated in the juvenile court system, and he maintains that the trial court did not give due consideration and place greater weight on certain factors in favor of retaining jurisdiction. However, here, in the juvenile court‘s order transferring jurisdiction to the trial court, the juvenile court specified factors for and against transfer, and determined that the factors weighed in favor of transfer. Pursuant to former
{¶26} Although the separate opinion takes issue with the trial court‘s consideration of the gravity of the offenses in its finding pertaining to community safety, Mr. Lewis raised no challenge to the trial court considering the gravity of the offense in this manner. Nonetheless, we do not read State v. Watson, 47 Ohio St.3d 93 (1989) as precluding the trial court from considering the gravity of the offense in addressing the safety of the community. To the contrary, inherent in Watson is a presumption that the seriousness of the offense is part of an analysis of the safety of the community, and that both community safety and the seriousness of the offense could be considered in determining a juvenile‘s amenability to treatment under former
{¶27} Based upon our review of the record, we cannot say that the juvenile court was unreasonable in ordering Mr. Lewis to be bound over to the trial court. Accordingly, Mr. Lewis’ sole assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶28} Mr. Lewis’ assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
CARLA MOORE
FOR THE COURT
CARR, P. J.
CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY.
HENSAL, J.
CONCURRING IN JUDGMENT ONLY.
{¶29} While I agree that the trial court‘s judgment must be affirmed, I write separately to emphasize the fact that a juvenile‘s amenability to rehabilitation and the need for community safety are two separate issues under the statute. In this regard, Revised Code Section 2152.12(B)(3) provides that the juvenile court “may transfer the case if the court finds [that] * * * [t]he child is not amenable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile system, and the safety of the community may require that the child be subject to adult sanctions.” (Emphasis added.) While the statute reads in the conjunctive, prior case law interpreting the statute often read in the disjunctive. See State v. D.W., 133 Ohio St.3d 434, 2012-Ohio-4544, ¶ 11, quoting In re M.P., 124 Ohio St.3d 445, 2010-Ohio-599, ¶ 12 (stating that a hearing is necessary to “determine whether the child is ‘amenable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile system’ or whether ‘the safety of the community may require that the child be subject to adult sanctions,’ and the consideration of 17 other statutory criteria to determine whether a transfer is appropriate.”) (Emphasis added.) More recent precedent, however, reads in the conjunctive. See State v. Aalim, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2016-Ohio-8278, ¶ 27 (“The General Assembly has provided for
{¶30} Here, the juvenile court found that “[g]iven the gravity of the offense, community safety requires that the child be subject to adult sanctions.” The majority cites this finding, noting that “[t]he trial court concluded that rehabilitation could not be achieved in the juvenile system, and that, because of the gravity of the offenses, community safety required Mr. Lewis to be subject to adult sanctions.” The Ohio Supreme Court, however, has held that the gravity of the alleged offense may be considered when determining whether the juvenile is amenable to rehabilitation. State v. Watson, 47 Ohio St.3d 93 (1989), paragraph one of the syllabus. Any reliance upon the gravity of the offense (an issue relevant to the juvenile‘s amenability) in support of its finding regarding the need for community safety raises a concern as to whether the court relied upon one issue as a basis for finding the other. More specifically, it raises a concern as to whether the court considers the need for community safety as a factor in determining whether the juvenile was amenable to rehabilitation, or vice versa. To the extent that the juvenile court‘s decision or this court‘s decision can be construed as doing so, I would hold that such a finding is erroneous. Nevertheless, I concur with the majority‘s holding that the juvenile court gave due weight to the statutory factors and that its decision in favor of bindover did not result in an abuse of discretion.
APPEARANCES:
CHARLYN BOHLAND, Assistant State Public Defender, for Appellant.
SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and HEAVEN DIMARTINO, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.