State v. LewisState v. Lewis
JUDGMENT: Reversed and Remanded.
No Brief Filed, for Defendants-Appellees.
Dated: September 28, 2020
Robb, J.
{¶1} The City of Youngstown appeals the decision of Youngstown Municipal Court sua sponte dismissing the public indecency complaints against Defendants-Appellees Eldon Lewis, Marquise Lewis, and Markiese Smith. The trial court determined it did not have jurisdiction over the complaints because Appellees are inmates at the Ohio State Penitentiary in Youngstown and pursuant to the language of
Statement of the Facts and Cases
{¶2} This is a consolidation of six appellate cases involving three Appellees. Each Appellee is an inmate at the Ohio State Penitentiary in Youngstown, Ohio and was charged with public indecency under either subsection (A)(1) or (A)(2) of
{¶3} Appellee Eldon Lewis was charged with
{¶4} Appellee Marquise Lewis was charged with
{¶5} Appellee Markiese Smith was charged with
{¶6} The trial court held status court only hearings in each of these cases in June, July and August; a total of four court only status hearings were held in each case. Two weeks after the last status hearing, the trial court sua sponte dismissed the cases stating the court had no jurisdiction to hear the matter. 8/15/19 J.E. Based on the 1987 and 2002 opinions from the Ohio Attorney General the trial court found, “a prisoner in a state correctional institution may not be removed to stand trial on a pending misdemeanor charge.” 8/15/19 J.E. It then stated, “Therefore, it is in the interest of justice that the cases be dismissed, as this Court has been given no jurisdiction to hear such a matter by the General Assembly.” 8/15/19 J.E.
{¶7} The state filed a timely appeal from the trial court‘s decisions.
First Assignment of Error
“The trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint without holding an evidentiary hearing or affording the state an opportunity to object.”
{¶8} The city asserts the trial court abused its discretion when it dismissed the charges without giving it the opportunity to object and argue against dismissal. It asserts this amounted to an abuse of discretion.
{¶9} A trial court‘s dismissal of criminal charges is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Cole, 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 26190, 26191, 2012-Ohio-4027, ¶ 7, citing State v. Busch, 76 Ohio St.3d 613, 616, 669 N.E.2d 1125 (1996). An abuse of
{¶10} We have previously explained:
Generally, “[a] court has the ‘inherent power to regulate the practice before it and protect the integrity of its proceedings.‘” State v. Busch, 76 Ohio St.3d 613, 615, 669 N.E.2d 1125 (1996), quoting Royal Indemn. Co. v. J.C. Penney Co., 27 Ohio St.3d 31, 33-34, 501 N.E.2d 617 (1986).
Crim.R. 48(B) provides that “[i]f the court over objection of the state dismisses an indictment, information, or complaint, it shall state on the record its findings of fact and reasons for the dismissal.” The Ohio Supreme Court explained the effect ofCrim.R. 48(B) in the Busch decision: ”Crim.R. 48(B) recognizes by implication that trial judges may sua sponte dismiss a criminal action over the objection of the prosecution, since the rule sets forth the trial court‘s procedure for doing so. The rule does not limit the reasons for which a trial judge might dismiss a case, and we are convinced that a judge may dismiss a case pursuant toCrim.R. 48(B) if a dismissal serves the interests of justice.” (Emphasis added.) Id. * * * Generally, it is an abuse of discretion for the court to dismiss charges underCrim.R. 48(B) solely for the reason that the evidence is insufficient to support conviction. State v. Nihiser, 4th Dist. No. 03CA21, 2004-Ohio-4067, 2004 WL 1737862, ¶ 17. Nevertheless, a trial judge is allowed great flexibility in determining when the judicial process is no longer useful in a given case such that a dismissal underCrim.R. 48(B) is warranted. State v. Montiel, 185 Ohio App.3d 362, 2009-Ohio-6589, 924 N.E.2d 375 (2d Dist.), ¶ 15.
State v. Sanders, 7th Dist. No. 12 CO 35, 2013-Ohio-5220, 3 N.E.3d 749, ¶ 13.
{¶11}
[I]t is both appropriate and necessary to proffer evidence at a
Crim.R. 48(B) dismissal hearing since it is, by its very nature, an evidentiary hearing. State v. Anguiano, 2d Dist. No.2011 CA 9, 2012-Ohio-2094, 2012 WL 1657549, ¶ 12. The trial court is required to state on the record its findings of fact supporting the dismissal.Crim.R. 48(B) . Therefore, “[Crim.R. 48(B) ] contemplates an evidentiary hearing from which findings of fact may be made, and which is necessary for subsequent appellate review of any error assigned by the state regarding an objection by the state that the court overruled.” State v. Montiel, 185 Ohio App.3d 362, 2009-Ohio-6589, 924 N.E.2d 375, ¶ 22 (J. Grady, concurring).
State v. Sanders, 7th Dist. No. 12 CO 35, 2013-Ohio-5220, 3 N.E.3d 749, ¶ 21.
{¶12} Consequently, given the law, at minimum there was a requirement for the state to be permitted to file a brief in opposition to dismissal. In the case at hand, the state was not given the opportunity to present an argument opposing dismissal. While there were multiple status hearings, the court characterized those hearings as court only hearings. This assignment of error has merit.
Second, Third, and Fourth Assignments of Error
“The trial court erred as matter of law in describing its basis for dismissing the complaint in this matter.”
“The trial court erred as a matter of law in relying on the Ohio Attorney General opinion stating that misdemeanants incarcerated in a penitentiary may not be transported.”
“Assuming arguendo that the trial court did not err as a matter of law in interpreting
R.C. 2941.39 , dismissal was nevertheless improper.”
{¶13} These three assignments of error address the trial court‘s decision that it was without jurisdiction. The trial court relied on two Ohio Attorney General opinions - 1987 opinion and 2002 opinion - to conclude that it did not have jurisdiction.
{¶14} At the outset it is noted that opinions from the Ohio Attorney General have no precedential effect and are not binding. State ex rel. Van Dyke v. Pub. Emp. Retirement Bd., 99 Ohio St.3d 430, 2003-Ohio-4123, 793 N.E.2d 438, ¶ 40. However, they are considered persuasive authority. Id.
{¶15} In the 1987 decision, two questions were posed to the Attorney General. The first was whether an inmate in a penitentiary can be removed from the institution to be tried on a misdemeanor charge. Ohio Attorney General Opinion 87-068 (1987). The second question was if the removal was proper, what statutory authority enables a law director to prosecute the inmate. Id. The Ohio Attorney General answered the first question by indicating the inmate could not be removed. Id. Therefore, the Attorney General did not answer the second question. Id.
{¶16} In deciding the first question, the Attorney General referenced
R.C. 2941.39 and .40 specifically apply only where the inmate has been formally charged with the commission of a felony. Thus, by expressly providing for the removal of inmates who have committed felonies, the General Assembly has demonstrated that it did not intend to allow for the removal of inmates who have committed misdemeanors.
Id.
{¶17} The Attorney General specifically noted that its resolution of the first question rendered it unnecessary to determine under what authority would the Municipal Law Director be able to prosecute inmates. Id.
{¶18} The 1987 Attorney General opinion, only addressed
{¶19} In 2002, the Ohio Attorney General issued a second decision specifically noting the above and provided an analysis regarding the application of
The duty to bring a prisoner in a state correction institution to trial within the time specified in
R.C. 2941.401 clearly implies the power to remove the prisoner from the institution and transport the prisoner to the court at the time of trial. If the court and prosecuting authorities are not able to have a prisoner in a state correctional institution transported to the court for prosecution of a pending misdemeanor charge, the court and the prosecutor would not be able, in most cases, to bring the prisoner to trial within 180 days. As a result, the court would no longer have jurisdiction over the matter, the charging instrument would be void, and the court would have to enter an order dismissing the action with prejudice.The General Assembly assuredly did not intend to impose a duty on courts and prosecutors that could not be performed. It is a basic principle of statutory interpretation that “the General Assembly is not presumed to do a vain or useless thing, and that when language is inserted in a statute it is inserted to accomplish some definite purpose.” Thus, the General Assembly must have intended for a prisoner in a state correctional institution to be removed from the institution and taken to a court for final
disposition of a pending misdemeanor charge that is set forth in a complaint when the prisoner exercises his right to a speedy trial under R.C. 2941.401 . Moreover, the statutory framework authorizing the removal of a prisoner in a state correctional institution for a final disposition of a pending felony charge was already in place at the timeR.C. 2941.401 was enacted. It is well settled that the General Assembly is presumed to act with knowledge of existing statutes. Thus, it must be assumed further that, when the General Assembly enactedR.C. 2941.401 , the General Assembly was aware of the existing statutes authorizing the removal of a prisoner in a state correctional institution for final disposition of a pending felony charge.Nevertheless, the General Assembly did not limit the application of
R.C. 2941.401 to situations in which a prisoner in a state correctional institution has a pending felony charge against him. As discussed previously,R.C. 2941.401 applies in any situation in which “there is pending in this state any untried . . . complaint against [a] prisoner” serving a term of imprisonment in a state correctional institution. By not limitingR.C. 2941.401 to pending felony charges, the General Assembly has further demonstrated that it intended for a prisoner in a state correctional institution to be removed from the institution and taken to a court for final disposition of a pending misdemeanor charge that is set forth in a complaint when the prisoner exercises his right underR.C. 2941.401 to a speedy trial. If the General Assembly had intended to limitR.C. 2941.401 ‘s application to situations involving pending felony charges, the General Assembly could have used the term “felony” inR.C. 2941.401 , having used that term in other instances.Accordingly, pursuant to
R.C. 2941.401 , when a prisoner in a state correctional institution provides appropriate officials written notice of his place of imprisonment and a request for a final disposition of a pending misdemeanor charge that is set forth in a complaint filed with a municipal court, the prisoner may be removed from the institution and taken to the municipal court for final disposition of the matter.
{¶20} The Attorney General also considered the issue of whether a municipal court is authorized to order a bailiff, county sheriff, or municipal police officer to transport a prisoner in a state correctional institution to the municipal court for final disposition of a pending misdemeanor charge. The Attorney General opined that in general there is no statute explicitly requiring a municipal officer or county sheriff to transport the prisoner. However, it explained
{¶21} The Ohio Attorney General then made two advisements:
- Pursuant to
R.C. 2941.401 , when a prisoner in a state correctional institution provides appropriate officials written notice of his place of imprisonment and a request for a final disposition of a pending misdemeanor charge that is set forth in a complaint filed with the municipal court, the prisoner may be removed from the institution and taken to the municipal court for final disposition of the matter. - When, pursuant to
R.C. 2941.401 , a prisoner in a state correctional institution provides appropriate officials written notice of his place of imprisonment and a request for a final disposition of a pending misdemeanor charge that is set forth in a complaint, a municipal court, in which the matter is pending may issue a warrant that requires a bailiff of the court, a municipal police officer, or a county sheriff to transport the prisoner to the court for final disposition of the matter.
{¶22} The reasoning in the 2002 Ohio Attorney General opinion is sound. Furthermore, there is case law suggesting that municipal courts have jurisdiction over misdemeanors committed within its jurisdiction while the inmate is in a state correctional facility under
{¶23} Given the above, we conclude the trial court incorrectly determined it did not have jurisdiction over Appellees. Generally, a municipal court has both personal and subject matter jurisdiction over persons committing misdemeanors within its jurisdiction. The fact that it occurs at a penitentiary while an offender is serving a felony sentence does not negate that jurisdiction. The 1987 Ohio Attorney General opinion did not indicate the Municipal Court did not have jurisdiction over the inmate. Rather, the 1987 opinion stated
{¶24} Under
{¶25} This statute allows inmates to resolve the misdemeanor charges against themselves while serving a felony sentence. Since, the misdemeanor sentence would most likely run concurrent to the felony sentence, the misdemeanor sentence may be completed prior to the completion of the felony sentence. This permits an inmate to be released from incarceration without having active detainers and warrants. It also prevents the duplication of services. Many times the supervision that would be ordered as sentence for the misdemeanor will be fulfilled and/or have the opportunity to be fulfilled while the inmate is serving his sentence on the felony. Furthermore, this process allows for the municipality to determine whether or not it will pursue or dismiss the charges. The municipality may dismiss the charges, since the offender is already serving a felony sentence.
{¶26} Consequently, the trial court should not have dismissed the charges sua sponte unless a request under
{¶27} For the above stated reasons, the assignments of error have merit. The municipal court erred in dismissing the charges sua sponte and not following the procedures of
{¶28} All assignments of error have merit. The municipal court abused its discretion in sua sponte dismissing the charges. The matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Donofrio, J., concurs.
Waite, P.J., concurs.
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate in this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that a certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into execution.
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
This document constitutes a final judgment entry.