2004 Ohio 2232 | Ohio Ct. App. | 2004
{¶ 3} On April 24, 2003, appellant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the underlying statutory process pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 4} Via Entry filed August 7, 2003, the trial court denied appellant's motion to dismiss, finding R.C.
{¶ 5} It is from this conviction and sentence, as well as the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss, appellant appeals, raising the following assignments of error:
{¶ 6} "I. The trial court erred in overruling the defendant's motion to dismiss."
{¶ 8} R.C.
{¶ 9} "If either of the following occurs with respect to an individual who is an obligor under a child support order, the child support enforcement agency administering the child support order may determine whether the individual holds a driver's or commercial driver's license, motorcycle operator's license or endorsement, temporary instruction permit, or commercial driver's temporary instruction permit issued by the registrar of motor vehicles or a deputy registrar or, if possible, whether the individual has applied for or is likely to apply for that license, endorsement, or permit:
{¶ 10} "(A) court or child support enforcement agency makes a final and enforceable determination under sections
{¶ 11} "(B) The individual fails, after receiving appropriate notice, to comply with a subpoena or warrant issued by the court or child support enforcement agency with respect to a proceeding to enforce the child support order."
{¶ 12} A law passed by the general assembly is entitled to a strong presumption of constitutionality and the burden of proving a law unconstitutional lies with the moving party and must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Anderson
(1991),
{¶ 13} The operation of a motor vehicle is a privilege, not a right; therefore, the suspension of a license does not amount to a violation of a fundamental right. Doyle v. Ohio Bur. of MotorVehicles (1990),
{¶ 14} "It is well settled that the use of public highways by motor vehicles does not amount to an absolute and unqualified right, but, rather, is a privilege which may be limited, controlled and regulated by the responsible public authority in the exercise of the police power whenever, and to the extent, necessary to provide for and promote the safety, peace, health and general welfare of the people. However, in Bell v. Burson
(1971),
{¶ 15} The statute must only have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose and be neither arbitrary nor discriminatory for due process to be satisfied. State v.Fonseca (1995),
{¶ 16} Both parties agree this is an issue of first impression in Ohio. Appellee cites two cases in which courts held similar statutes to be constitutional. In the first, State,Dept. of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement Div. v. Beans
(1998),
{¶ 17} We now turn to appellant's procedural due process challenge to R.C.
{¶ 18} As stated supra, an operator's license in the State of Ohio is a privilege, and is not a property right. Doyle, supra, at 52. While an individual must be afforded due process, the judicial model need not be strictly followed in an administrative proceeding. Id. Generally, due process under the Ohio and United States Constitutions demands a right to notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner, where the state seeks to infringe upon a protected liberty or property interest. State v. Hochhausler (1996),
{¶ 19} R.C.
{¶ 20} R.C.
{¶ 21} We find the aforementioned procedure set forth in R.C. 3123 provided appellant with sufficient procedural due process safeguards.
{¶ 22} Appellant's sole assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 23} The judgment of the Fairfield County Municipal Court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Wise and Boggins, JJ., concur.
For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion, the judgment of the Fairfield County Municipal Court is affirmed. Costs assessed to appellant.