Defendant appeals his convictions for unlawful possession of cocaine, ORS 475.884, and unlawful possession of methamphetamine, ORS 475.894. He assigns error to the denial of his motion to suppress. He argues that the police officer’s observations leading to the search that produced evidence of drugs were made during an unlawful extension of an initially lawful traffic stop. We review the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress for errors of law.
State v. Chambers,
The pertinent facts are not in dispute. Around 3:00 a.m. on July 3, 2008, Portland Police Officer Thurman observed defendant riding a bicycle without a headlight, a traffic violation under ORS 815.280(2)(c). Defendant rode the bicycle into a garage, and Thurman called to defendant from the street to come and talk to Thurman. Thurman told defendant the reason for the stop and asked for his identification, and defendant handed him his Oregon driver’s license. Thurman proceeded to call in defendant’s identifying information to the police dispatch. While Thurman was speaking with the dispatcher, he noticed that defendant was fidgety and asked defendant to keep his hands in view. Defendant raised his hands, and, at that point, Thurman observed that defendant was carrying a knife clipped to the front pocket of his pants. Thurman asked if he could search defendant, and defendant consented to a search, which revealed drugs in addition to the knife. At around the time Thurman was conducting the search, dispatch responded that defendant was "clear and valid.”
Defendant moved to suppress the knife, the drugs, and incriminating statements that he made after he was arrested, arguing that he was stopped in viоlation of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, because he had been unlawfully detained before Thurman saw the knife, when Thurman had called dispatch.
1
At the suppression hearing,
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Thurman testified that he had taken defendant’s identification “to issue a citation, essentially. As he did give me the [identification] then, оf course, I ran his information through our service net.” When asked if he was running defendant’s name through the system for a “records check,” Thurman replied that he was. He indicated that it was “standard procedure” to check a person for warrants in the course of a traffic stop. Dеfendant argued that, after he had provided Thurman with his identification, Thurman had all the information he needed to issue defendant a citation for the bicycle violation, and that he impermissibly extended the stop by calling defendant’s identification in to the dispatcher. The trial court, rеlying on
State v. Smith,
On appeal, defendant argues that Thurman ran his information to check for outstanding warrants, which he contends was not reasonably necessary to the investigation of a routine, bicycle-related, traffic violation. Conducting a warrant check, according to defendant, was equivalent to a criminal investigation without reasonable suspicion, and thus unlawfully extended the duration of the stop. Defendant argues that Thurman’s request for consent and subsequent search of defendant’s person occurred while that unlawful stop was оngoing. Therefore, he contends, the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress.
As pertinent here, the state replies that an officer does not impermissibly extend a traffic stop by conducting a records and warrant check, because a records check can establish whether the identification provided to the officer is valid. The state further notes that there is no evidence that the performance of a “warrant check” at the same time as the “records check” takes any additional time and, thus, even assuming that checking fоr warrants alone might impermissibly extend a stop, a “records check” does not. The state relies on numerous cases from this court that indicate, at *125 least implicitly, that records and warrant checks are permissible in the course of a traffic stop.
As an initial matter, we agree with the state that the proper framing of the issue is whether a records check that includes a warrant check impermissibly extends a stop. As noted, the evidence showed that it was standard procedure for Thurman to run a “records check” and a “warrant check” before issuing a traffic citation. 2 Thus, to the extent that defendant is suggesting that, by calling defendant’s information in to the “service net,” Thurman began an impermissible “criminal investigation [into] whether defendant was a fugitive from justice,” we do not agree that the record establishes that that was what Thurman was doing. Rather, the record reflects that Thurman followed a standard procedure that involves performing a records and warrant check whenever a traffic citation is issued. Thus, the issue is whether, in the course of investigating a bicycle traffic violation, the officer unlawfully extеnded the stop by running such a check on defendant before issuing the citation.
As the state notes, on numerous occasions we have indicated that running a records or warrant check is permissible in the course of a traffic stop. As explained below, although much of our cаse law is implicit rather than explicit on this point, we agree with the state that conducting such a check before issuing a citation did not impermissibly extend or expand the scope of the stop in this case.
Under Article I, section 9,
“[plolice authority to perform a traffic stop arises out оf the facts that created probable cause to believe that there has been unlawful, noncriminal activity, viz., a traffic infraction. Police authority to detain a motorist dissipates when the investigation reasonably related to that traffic infraction, the identification оf persons, and the issuance of a citation (if any) is completed or reasonably should be completed. Other or further conduct by the police, beyond that reasonably related to the traffic violation, must be justified on some basis other than the traffic violation.”
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State v. Rodgers/Kirkeby,
Operating a bicycle without a light in the circumstances at issue in this case is a traffic violation, ORS 815.280, and a police officer “[m]ay stop and detain a person for a traffic violation for the purposes of investigation reasonably related to the traffic violation, identification and issuance of citation.” ORS 810.410(3)(b);
accord
Rodgers/
Kirkeby,
Additionally, in numerous cases, we have indicated that an оfficer’s action in contacting dispatch with a defendant’s identifying information is within the scope of a lawful traffic stop.
See, e.g., State v. Hampton,
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To the extent that defendant suggests that, even if a “records” check is permissible, a “warrant” check is not, we disagree that any such distinction is possible on this record. Neither the parties nor the trial court drew any legal distinction between a records check and a warrant check. Nor have we or the Supreme Court done so in any previous decision. Moreover, the record does nоt establish a factual basis for any such distinction. The trial court specifically found, and the record supports the finding, that the officer “asked the defendant for identification to issue a citation,” and he received a response from dispatch within a very few minutes. There is no indiсation that the dispatcher required additional time to check for “warrants.”
Cf. Smith,
Finally, we reject defendant’s suggestion that, because this case involves the stop of a bicycle rather than a motor vehicle, no check of any sort was permissible. It is truе that an officer stopping a motor vehicle may have more to check than the stopped person’s identification; for example, the cases cited above generally indicate that a check in a motor vehicle stop involves a check оf a vehicle’s registration and insurance coverage. However, that does not change the nature of the inquiry under ORS 810.410 and Article I, section 9, concerning whether “the investigation reasonably [is] related to that traffic infraction, the identification of persons, and the issuance of a citation[.]”
Rodgers /Kirkeby,
We conclude that, in the course of a lawful traffic stop, an officer’s act of contacting dispatch with a person’s identifying information is reasonably related to the identification of the person and the issuance of the citation. Determining that а defendant is, in fact, the person he or she claims to be is reasonably related to the identification of the person and the issuance of the citation.
See, e.g., State v. Hebrard,
In sum, the trial court correсtly concluded that the officer’s act of contacting dispatch with identifying information about defendant, who was lawfully stopped, was permissibly related to “the identification of [a person] and the issuance of a citation.”
Rodgers/Kirkeby,
Affirmed.
Notes
Article I, section 9, provides, in part, “No law shall violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure.”
We note that the record does not establish precisely what that process entails, other than the officer calling the stopped person’s identifying information in to a “service net,” and, as in this case, receiving a response of “clear” and “valid.”