[¶ 1] Curtis Leinen appeals from the trial court’s December 10, 1998, criminal judgment and conviction. We affirm.
I
[¶2] On October 14, 1998, Leinen was found guilty by jury verdict of gross sexual imposition. On December 10, 1998, the trial court sentenced Leinen to ten years imprisonment, with eight years suspended for five years. Leinen appeals, arguing the trial court improperly admitted hearsay evidence during his trial.
II
[¶ 3] During the trial, on direct examination, the victim, a minor child, testified he had first told his biological father about Leinen’s inappropriate contact with him, and that he told his mother later, and his biological father also told his mother about the incident. On cross-examination, the child admitted he had stated in a deposition taken approximately a month before trial that he had told his mother about the inappropriate contact first shortly after it had occurred. During cross-examination, the child also testified his mother had talked to him before the trial and asked if he had just gotten confused during the deposition. On redirect examination, the child reiterated he had first told his biological father about the incident with Leinen. Quite clearly, on cross-examination the defense challenged the credibility of the child and his mother by implying his mother had influenced the child before trial. The de *104 fense continued its challenge during the cross-examination of the mother.
[¶ 4] During rebuttal, the State called Richard Van Camp, a social worker who had interviewed the child concerning the inappropriate contact with Leinen. Van Camp testified about his interview with .the child concerning the events surrounding the inappropriate contact with Leinen. Van Camp also testified the child told him he had first told his mother, then his biological father, and then a school counselor about Leinen’s inappropriate contact.
[¶ 5] Leinen timely objected to Van Camp’s testimony, arguing it was cumulative, hearsay, and improper rebuttal testimony. The State argued Van Camp’s testimony was not hearsay under Rule 801(d)(l)(ii), N.D.R.Ev. The trial court ruled in favor of the State finding the testimony admissible under Rule 801(d)(l)(ii), N.D.R.Ev.
[¶ 6] Oh appeal, Leinen argues Van Camp’s testimony was inadmissible hearsay evidence, and that it’s improper admission under Rule 801, N.D.R.Ev., constituted reversible error.
7] The trial court has broad dis-disin evidentiary matters and, absent an abuse of discretion, we will not reverse its decision.
State v. Neufeld,
[¶ 8] Rule 801, N.D.R.Ev., provides, in part:
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if:
(1) Prior Statement by Witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is ... (ii) consistent with the declarant’s testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive ....
[2] 9] Three elements are needed for qualification as nonhearsay under Rule 801(d)(l)(ii), N.D.R.Ev. First, the declar-declar-must have testified and been subjecLto cross-examination about the statements N.D.R.Ev. 801(d)(1). Second, the state-statemust be offered to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive.
Neufeld,
[3][¶ Here, the declarant, the child, testified and was cross-examined. The defense clearly implied an improper influence had affected the child’s testimony. testimostatements the child made to Van Camp during their interview were made before the charge of implied, improper influence inThe only question remaining reRule 801(d)(l)(ii), N.D.R.Ev., is whether the statements made by the child, and offered by Van Camp, were prior consistent statements.
[¶ 11] On rebuttal, the State called Van Camp to testify as to his entire interview with the child. Specifically, Van Camp recited the facts concerning the inappropriate contact with Leinen as told to him by the child. Van Camp also testified the child told him he had first told his mother, then his biological father, and also a school counselor. Under these circumstances, Van Camp’s entire testimony was inadmissible under Rule 801(d)(l)(ii), N.D.R.Ev.
[¶ 12] The first reason for inadmissability concerns the bulk of Van Camp’s testimony, recounting the child’s statements regarding the factual details of the inappropriate contact between the child and Leinen.
[¶ 13] Rule 801(d)(1)(h), N.D.R.Ev., does not accord nonhearsay status to all prior consistent statements.
See Tome v. United States,
[¶ 14] The second reason for inadmissibility concerns the testimony Van Camp gave regarding which of the child’s parents he had confided in first, the detail on which the charge of improper influence was based. During rebuttal, Van Camp testified:
Q. What did he say? (State’s Attorney)
A. He said that his first disclosure was to his mother. They were watching a movie.
⅜ # * *
Q. Did he say anything about disclosing to his father?
A. Yes, he did.
Q. What did he say?
A. He said they were watching — they were watching a late night TV show and he had disclosed to his father as well.
[¶ 15] On direct and again on redirect the child testified he had initially told his biological father. The testimony Van Camp gave is not consistent with the child’s testimony. In fact, it is exactly opposite and supports the prior inconsistent deposition statement which was used to impeach the child on cross-examination. This is not a prior consistent statement qualifying as allowable nonhearsay under Rule 801(d)(l)(ii), N.D.R.Ev. Because the testimony was inadmissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(h), N.D.R.Ev., we hold the trial court abused its discretion in allowing it.
[¶ 16] Under Rule 103(a), N.D.R.Ev., error may not be predicated on the erroneous inclusion of evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected.
See State v. Hart,
[¶ 17] The testimony Van Camp gave was merely cumulative to the other more direct evidence given during the trial. Erroneously admitted evidence which is cumulative to other properly admitted evidence is not prejudicial, does not affect substantial rights of the parties, and accordingly, is harmless error.
See State v. Messner,
Ill
[¶ 18] The criminal judgment and conviction entered by the trial court is affirmed.