2005 Ohio 6374 | Ohio Ct. App. | 2005
{¶ 2} This case arises from events occurring on September 27, 1996. On that date, an assailant fired multiple gunshots through a bedroom window, hitting and seriously wounding Toia Roberts, appellant's former girlfriend. Ms. Roberts' three-year-old son, William, and her boyfriend, James Ford, were also in the bedroom at the time, but were not injured.
{¶ 3} On September 18, 1997, following a jury trial, appellant was convicted on one count of attempted murder, three counts of felonious assault, and one gun specification, for the September 27, 1996 shooting. The trial court sentenced appellant to an aggregate term of 29 years in prison. This court affirmed appellant's convictions and sentence in Statev. Lee (Sept. 3, 1998), Franklin App. No. 97APA12-1629.
{¶ 4} On March 10, 2004, appellant filed in the trial court a motion for leave to file a motion for new trial. With his motion, appellant presented an affidavit of Kylon Jones, who stated that he was the person who shot into Roberts' window (aiming for Ford, not Roberts) and that Roberts told him in 2001 that she had not seen the assailant's face. Appellant also presented an affidavit of an investigator employed by the Ohio Public Defender stating that Jones had provided the statement to her when she visited Jones in prison in October 2003.
{¶ 5} On February 9, 2005, the trial court denied appellant's motion for leave, and appellant timely appealed.
{¶ 6} In this appeal, appellant raises a single assignment of error:
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.
{¶ 7} Crim.R. 33(B) governs motions for a new trial in a criminal proceeding. Pursuant to that rule, if a defendant fails to file a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence within 120 days of a jury's verdict, then he or she must seek leave from the trial court to file a delayed motion. To obtain such leave, the defendant must demonstrate by clear and convincing proof that he or she was unavoidably prevented from discovering the evidence within the 120 days.
{¶ 8} A party is "unavoidably prevented" from filing a motion for a new trial if the party had no knowledge of the existence of the ground supporting the motion and could not have learned of that existence within the time prescribed for filing the motion in the exercise of reasonable diligence. State v. Carr, Franklin App. No. 02AP-1240, 2003-Ohio-2947, citing State v. Walden (1984),
{¶ 9} Clear and convincing proof that the defendant was "unavoidably prevented" from filing "requires more than a mere allegation that a defendant has been unavoidably prevented from discovering the evidence he seeks to introduce as support for a new trial." Mathis at 79. In Statev. Petro (1947),
To warrant the granting of a motion for a new trial in a criminal case, based on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must be shown that the new evidence (1) discloses a strong probability that it will change the result if a new trial is granted, (2) has been discovered since the trial, (3) is such as could not in the exercise of due diligence have been discovered before the trial, (4) is material to the issues, (5) is not merely cumulative to former evidence, and (6) does not merely impeach or contradict the former evidence. * * *
See, also, State v. Hawkins (1993),
{¶ 10} The granting of a motion for a new trial is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Carr, citing State v. Schiebel (1990),
{¶ 11} As an initial matter, plaintiff-appellee, State of Ohio, argues that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to entertain appellant's motion, an argument with which the trial court agreed. R.C.
{¶ 12} The trial court agreed with appellee that R.C.
{¶ 13} Moreover, with or without a constitutional claim, this court and others have at least implicitly found that the Crim.R. 33(B) procedure for new trial motions exists independently from the R.C.
{¶ 14} Nevertheless, while we question the trial court's statement that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the motion, we find that the trial court did, in fact, consider the motion and dismissed it on alternate, substantive grounds. For our review of those substantive grounds, we find the analysis of the Second Appellate District in Statev. Coleman, Clark App. No. 04CA43,
In reviewing petitions for post-conviction relief, a trial court may, in the exercise of its sound discretion, weigh the credibility of affidavits submitted in support of the petition in determining whether to accept the affidavit as true statements of fact. State v. Calhoun,
[(1999),
"(1) whether the judge reviewing the post-conviction relief petition also presided at the trial, (2) whether multiple affidavits contain nearly identical language, or otherwise appear to have been drafted by the same person, (3) whether the affidavits contain or rely on hearsay, (4) whether the affiants are relatives of the petitioner, or otherwise interested in the success of the petitioner's efforts, and (5) whether the affidavits contradict evidence proffered by the defense at trial. Moreover, a trial court may find sworn testimony in an affidavit to be contradicted by evidence in the record by the same witness, or to be internally inconsistent, thereby weakening the credibility of that testimony." Calhoun [at 285].
One or more of the Calhoun factors, to the extent that any of them apply, may be sufficient to justify a conclusion that an affidavit asserting information outside the record lacks credibility. Id.
{¶ 15} Here, multiple factors support the trial court's finding that Jones' affidavit is not credible. First, the trial judge who decided appellant's motion below is the same judge who presided over appellant's trial in 1997. Thus, he is knowledgeable about the trial and the evidence presented. Second, Jones' affidavit contains hearsay. The public defender's office began its investigation based on Jones' statement that Roberts (whom Jones refers to as "Cakie") told him in 2001 that she had not actually seen the shooter. While appellant relies on this statement as support for his motion, he presents no direct evidence from Roberts. Third, while apparently not related to appellant, the trial court found that Jones is a friend of appellant's, perhaps providing an interest in the success of appellant's efforts. The court also noted that Jones is serving a 26-year sentence for complicity to commit murder and has nothing to lose by confessing to a felony that occurred just beyond the six-year statute of limitations. While we acknowledge that some courts have applied the newer 20-year statute of limitations to similar crimes, the trial court reasonably concluded that the timing of Jones' "confession" is suspicious.
{¶ 16} In addition, the information contained in Jones' affidavit contradicts the overwhelming evidence presented at trial. On appeal from appellant's conviction — notably, an appeal that questioned only his conviction for felonious assault against William and Ford, not his conviction for attempted murder and felonious assault as to Roberts — this court described the evidence, as follows:
Toia was able to identify the assailant as appellant. (Tr. 695.) After police had arrived, a caller telephoned the residence asking for Toia. Rosalie Roberts spoke with the caller and identified him as appellant. The phone call was traced to a public telephone booth nearby and the officer dispensed to investigate identified a car, a black Camaro, leaving the scene. The black Camaro was found abandoned in an apartment complex and identified as belonging to appellant's sister, Ophelia Lynn Lee. Ms. Lee testified that appellant had borrowed the car earlier and had not returned it. (Tr. 666.) A witness testified that she had seen a black car driving up and down the street near Rosalie Roberts' house the evening of the shooting. (Tr. 76-77.) Another witness testified that he saw a black Camaro leaving the area a short time after the shooting occurred. (Tr. 630-633.)
Lee, supra. Thus, at best, appellant's new evidence merely contradicts the trial record evidence and does not disclose a strong probability that it would change the result if a new trial were granted.
{¶ 17} Finally, the evidence does not support appellant's theory that Cooper provided him ineffective assistance because he failed to investigate Jones as a possible perpetrator. As the trial court noted, Jones' affidavit states only that Cooper represented Jones prior to appellant's trial and that Cooper also represented Jones on two matters after appellant's conviction. While appellant's motion included documents showing that Cooper represented Jones and appellant during the same time period, neither the affidavit nor any other evidence provides support for the notion that Cooper knew or should have suspected that Jones was the shooter. Jones' affidavit neither makes nor supports that assertion. Instead, Jones' statements go to the question whether Roberts actually saw the assailant. On that point, we reiterate that Jones' statements are hearsay, and they conflict with Roberts' testimony at trial.
{¶ 18} In the end, appellant has provided no evidence that explains how or when he became aware that Jones committed the crimes or that Roberts had changed her story. The trial court reasonably concluded that Jones' affidavit lacked credibility and, even if credible, failed to support appellant's theory that Cooper's representation of both appellant and Jones rendered him ineffective. Therefore, whether Crim.R. 33(B) or R.C.
{¶ 19} For these reasons, we overrule appellant's assignment of error and affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
Judgment affirmed.
Klatt and Sadler, JJ., concur.