The defendant was convicted of murder, and was sentenced to life imprisonment. He appeals from the judgment and an order denying new trial.
The information charges the murder of Ray Stapleton, assistant cashier of the Corona State Bank, at the bank by John Danielson and George Short on February 3, 1921, while they were engaged in the commission of a felony, to wit, the robbing of the bank (subdivision 3, § 4012, Rev. Code 1919), and contains the following charge against appellant:
“That the defendant Martin Lee before the said felonies were committed in the manner and in the form aforesaid, did feloniously, wilfully, with mialice aforethought, and with a premeditated design to effect the death of the said Ray Stapleton, excite, move, procure, aid, abet, counsel, and command the said defendant John Danielson and said George Short aforesaid to commit the said felonies in the manner and form aforesaid, contrary to the form of the statute,” etc.
Among the many assignments of error the one chiefly urged is that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict. After a thorough review of the record we can find no basis for the conviction. If the charge had been that of an accessory as defined in section 3595, Rev. Code 1919, we would without ques
The car was tracked through the north part of town; the track of the left rear wheel was made by a smooth tread tire, and
“I am quite positive that is my gun; the last time I saw it, it was in a box of old iron rubbish in my garage, and if the piece that is in my desk slips into its opening and fits, then I am positive that it must be my gurí.”
It was an old type of revolver which was loaded with powder and caps. At this time Lee stated that Short had made the following statement to him: “I killed the -, and G-d-you, don’t you tell.” He admitted that he owned a 1913 model Ford which' he permitted Short to use, and that this car had a tear in the rear curtain. Lee claimed to have had an arrangement with Short, whereby the latter was to pay him $25 for the use of the Ford car during the winter, and he admitted that Short paid him $50 within a few days after the bank robbery. Defendant in his direct examination testified that Short made the statement hereinbefore mentioned, to the effect that he had killed .Stapleton within two or three days after-the deputy state sheriff had been in Marvin. He also testified that Short was a drunkard, and admitted that he had heard that Short had once been convicted on a charge of selling liquor. Short, prior to the time defendant was taken into custody, had been arrested by federal authorities and! confined in a jail in Minneapolis. He admitted receiving a letter from Short asking him to get recommendations. Lee wrote to Judge Waite, which letter is in evidence as Exhibit 10. In this letter he stated that Short was a trustworthy and honest man. This was after Short had told defendant that he had killed Stapleton. Another letter was written by him to an attorney of Minneapolis, who acted in the capacity of a public defender, in which he commended Short for his honesty and good standing in the community, and stated that some people believed Short was peddling booze, but he didn’t believe it could be proved. He admitted having done this, though he knew that Short wás a drunkard, had been convicted in federal court, on a liquor charge, and that another action was pending' against Short in Grant county, in which his car had -been confiscated. One J. A. Falway testified that he overheard a part of a conversation between Danielson and Lee, in which the latter told Danielson that Short had
The only possible grounds for supposing that appellant might have been possessed of previous knowledge of Short’s contemplated. act are twou (1) The fact that Short drove appellant’s car; and (2) the fact that appellant came out of his garage several times .about the noon hour and looked east on the highway. The mere use of the car did not in any measure point to the previous guilty knowledge of appellant. Without more, that fact was insufficient to connect appellant with the crime, and there was no more.
Upon the second point the testimony of Mr. Eneboe, who had an office about 75 feet west of appellant’ garage, was as follows:
“Mr. Lee about noon, at times he came out and looked around and looked onto the road for a moment, and then he walked back into his workshop and: he stayed there a while, possibly ten minutes or thereabouts and' — a little more or less — and he came out again and looked down east on the trail, and then he repeated that two or three times, and the last time he came out he looked down the trail for quite a moment, and he pulled the door shut and went on homle and passed my office, and he lives west of my office down the trail, and after he got past the office a little ways he stopped, and it appeared as if he stopped to listen as of some noise or something coming from the east along the trail, and he started back, and I was in the doorway and my attention was called to a car that was coming from the — from up the hill, and as Mr. Lee was passing by on the street this car came up the street and turned in toward Martin Lee’s garage, and there stopped. Martin Lee hurried back; that is, .he went back and opened the door, and let this car into the garage. The door was shut and they stayed there quite a while, possibly 10 or 15 minutes, and Lee came out and went on home. As the car came up I seen the person that
But upon cross-examination Eneboe admitted that he had seen Lee come out of the garage and look up and down the road at other times; that Lee’s children would be coming from the east fronn school about the noon hour, and that Lee would frequently go 'home .with them to dinner and come back with them after dinner.
At the most the testimony on this point raises a mere suspicion that Lee might have been looking for Short, but to suppose that because he might be looking to Short he knew of Short’s errand would amount to a suspicion on a suspicion. As was said in State v. Meyer,
All of the other evidence in the. case tends only to connect appellant with guilty knowledge of the crime after it was committed, and of attempt to conceal it. This, as we have before stated wtould have been sufficient to sustain a conviction as accessory under said section 3595, but it was not sufficient to sustain the conviction under the offense charged.
The judgment and order appealed from are reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial.
