State v. LeeState v. Lee
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Kenneth Nestre Lee challenges his conviction of first degree robbery contending that the prosecuting attorney‘s office violated state law by failing to follow its own guidelines in determining the initial charge and that the charge was then amended to a higher degree based on vindictiveness of the prosecuting attorney.
1
Finding that, pursuant to
Facts
On August 13, 1990, as Laurie Tsutakawa was exiting her home and proceeding toward her car, her purse was grabbed. She was wearing her purse around her neck and waist. She was knocked down and dragged for approximately 20 feet by her assailant before the purse strap broke. During this inci
On August 15, 1990, appellant was charged by information with second degree robbery in connection with the incident. The prosecutor‘s omnibus application, filed September 6, 1990, stated that the State would move to amend the charge to robbery 1 (injury). In the omnibus order, dated September 7, 1990, it was noted that the matter would be presented for jury trial.
The information was amended to robbery in the first degree on September 27, 1990. Appellant was found guilty by jury trial. This appeal followed.
Discussion
I
Charging Decision
Appellant first contends that his conviction must be overturned because, given the evidence against him, the prosecutor charged him with too severe a crime under King County prosecuting attorney charging standards, in violation of
It is true that the United States Supreme Court has recognized that state statutes may create liberty interests which require constitutional due process protection if the
As stated by Professor Boerner in Sentencing in Washington, a work relied on by our Supreme Court in denying judicial review of a prosecutorial charging decision in another context, 3
[t]he minutes of the Sentencing Guidelines Commission make it clear that this result [judicial review of charging decisions] was not intended. . . .
This provision was taken from the Department of Justice policies, where its intent is stated to be “to foreclose efforts to litigate the validity of prosecutorial actions alleged to be at variance with these principles or not in compliance with internal office procedures ....
It is clear the Sentencing Guidelines Commission and the Legislature intended to prevent judicial review of these decisions.
(Footnotes omitted.) D. Boerner, Sentencing in Washington § 12.24, at 12-47 (1985). 4
II
Amendment of Charge
Appellant next contends that the judgment must be overturned because he was convicted of a crime which the prosecutor charged out of vindictiveness. Specifically, appellant alleges that the charged crime was amended from robbery in the second degree to robbery in the first degree based on his refusal to plead guilty to the crime with which he was originally charged. He also argues that by failing to follow the applicable charging standards, the prosecutor prima facie acted vindictively. “Prosecutorial vindictiveness is [the] intentional filing of a more serious crime in retaliation for a defendant‘s lawful exercise of a procedural right.” State v. McKenzie, 31 Wn. App. 450, 452, 642 P.2d 760, review denied, 96 Wn.2d 1024 (1981). Prosecutorial vindictiveness must be distinguished, however, from the rough and tumble of legitimate plea bargaining.
In
Bordenkircher v. Hayes,
434 U.S. 357, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663,
reh‘g denied,
435 U.S. 918, 55 L. Ed. 2d 511, 98 S. Ct. 1477 (1978), the United States Supreme Court found no violation of a defendant‘s due process rights when a state prosecutor carried out threats made in the course of plea negotiations to seek a habitual offender indictment if the defendant refused to plead guilty to the initial charge.
Because the habitual offender charge was fully supported by the evidence, because the prosecutor disclosed his intentions from the outset of the plea negotiations, because the defendant was represented by counsel and fully informed of his options and because the defendant was free to accept or reject the prosecutor‘s offer, there was no violation of due process in the plea bargaining process. Hayes, 434 U.S. at 359-65.
Plea bargaining is a legitimate process, so long as it is carried out openly and above the table, between prosecutors and defendants who are represented by counsel and fully informed. That a prosecutor may offer “hardball” choices to a defendant does not make the process constitutionally unfair, so long as the choices are realistically based upon evidence and options known to both sides.
Just as a prosecutor may legitimately reduce an initial charge as the result of a successful plea bargain, 6 he or she may legitimately increase an initial charge which was filed in the expectation that a fully informed and represented defendant would plead guilty to the lesser charge, when that expectation proves to be unfounded. United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 378-80, 73 L. Ed. 2d 74, 102 S. Ct. 2485 (1982).
Prosecutors have broad discretion with respect to charging decisions. An individual charging decision will depend upon many factors, including the prosecutor‘s analysis of the
An initial charging decision does not freeze prosecutorial discretion. A mere opportunity for vindictiveness is an insufficient reason for limiting prosecutorial discretion. Although a given defendant may be able to prove objectively that there has been actual vindictiveness in a charging decision following unsuccessful plea negotiations, absent such a showing, there is no violation of due process merely because a prosecutor “ups the ante” by amending to a higher charge. Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 382-84.
Our Washington case law is in accord with these federal cases. See McKenzie, 31 Wn. App. at 453; State v. Bockman, 37 Wn. App. 474, 488, 682 P.2d 925, review denied, 102 Wn.2d 1002 (1984); State v. Lass, 55 Wn. App. 300, 306, 777 P.2d 539 (1989).
Here, Lee has presented no evidence of actual vindictiveness. Although the prosecutor‘s charging guidelines suggest an initial charge of first degree theft or second degree robbery for purse snatching, these same guidelines state that first degree robbery should be charged in any robbery where substantial injury is inflicted on the victim. Ms. Tsutakawa received a serious although not a life-threatening injury. Her injury could fairly be viewed as substantial. Here there is no evidence whatsoever that the prosecutor‘s ultimate charging decision had anything to do with Lee‘s request for a jury trial. In fact, Lee received notice of the prosecutor‘s intention to amend the charge before he requested a jury trial. 7
A defendant‘s ultimate protection against overcharging lies in the requirement that the State prove all elements of
Were we to accept Lee‘s premise, a legitimate plea negotiation tool would be removed from the plea bargaining process. Prosecutors would not be likely to exercise their legitimate discretion to charge a lesser offense initially in the reasonable expectation of obtaining a guilty plea, thus saving the State from the necessity of protracted plea negotiations and/or a trial.
Although Lee argues that the prosecutor “overcharged” him, the fact that his otherwise unchallenged conviction is supported by substantial evidence belies that claim. Lee rejected an offer to plead guilty to a lesser included charge. Having rejected that offer and suffered the consequences, he asks this court to reverse and remand “for the fifing of the proper charge.” Brief of Appellant, at 12. There being no support in fact or in law for this request, we reject it.
We affirm the judgment.
Pekelis, A.C.J., and Scholfield, J., concur.
Review denied at 122 Wn.2d 1003 (1993).
Notes
In his pro se brief, the appellant also challenges his conviction based on a claimed violation of his right to a speedy trial. A thorough review of the record indicates no evidence of such a violation. Accordingly, we reject this challenge.
But see Smith v. Shettle, 946 F.2d 1250, 1254 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Procedural regulations are not a source of constitutional entitlements“.).
See State v. Lewis, 115 Wn.2d 294, 299, 797 P.2d 1141 (1990).
Professor Boerner also recognizes the federal case law which indicates that legislative procedural enactments may create a substantive right, but rejects their application in cases such as this one, due to the clear legislative intent expressed.
This [federal case law] argument assumes, of course, that the prosecuting standards governing the initial charging decisions were intended to and did create rights enforceable by individual defendants or victims. It is clear that what the Legislature intended was to provide “guidance for prosecutors,” not to create “a right or benefit.” Since under current due process analysis the creation of the right is an essential precondition to the requirement of procedural protections surrounding its exercise, a finding that no individual right was created will be fatal to attempts to assert that the nonenforceability provision violates due process.
(Footnotes omitted.) D. Boerner, Sentencing in Washington § 12.24, at 12-48 (1985).
See, e.g., State v. Judge, 100 Wn.2d 706, 713, 675 P.2d 219 (1984) (Even with a prosecutor‘s broad discretion in charging, constitutional rights may be implicated if the charging decision is based on an illegal or unconstitutional motive.).
A prosecutor should not overcharge to obtain a guilty plea, however. Cf. ROW 9.94A.440C2) “ALL OTHER UNCLASSIFIED FELONIES”, (2)(a), (b).
Even the reverse would not necessarily raise an evidentiary inference of prosecutorial vindictiveness. See Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 383.