State v. LeeState v. Lee
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
The defendant pleaded guilty to impairing the morals of a minor
(N. J. S. A.
2A:96-3) which is a misdemeanor carrying a maximum prison term of three years
(N. J. S. A.
2A:85-7). After examination at the Diagnostic Center he was found to come within the Sex Offender Act
(N. J. S. A.
2A:164-3
ei seq.)
and was committed for an indeterminate term not exceeding the three-year statutory maximum.
N. J. S. A.
2A:164-6. However, in calculating the three-year period, the defendant was given no credit for
Early in 1949 Governor Driscoll called a conference to consider the social and legal problems relating to repetitive sex offenders within the State. Elsewhere a model sex psychopath law had already been proposed. See Note, “The Legal Disposition of the Sexual Psychopath,” 96 U. Pa. L. Rev. 872, 884-87 (1948). It provided for indeterminate civil commitments but its provisions were generally considered too drastic in the light of the limited and uncertain state of the psychiatric and medical knowledge in the field. The need for further and continuing study was accepted but interim legislation was thought desirable and was enacted in April 1949. See L. 1949, c. 20. That legislation directed that whenever a defendant is convicted of a designated sex offense, the Judge shall order a mental examination and if the defendant is found to be suffering from an “abnormal mental illness” the Judge shall order his commitment to an appropriate institution for a term “the maximum of which shall in no event exceed that provided by law for the crime of which such person was convicted.” L. 1949, c. 20, p. 66. It is noteworthy that from inception the Legislature considered the primary safeguards of, (1) a criminal conviction and (2) a statutory maximum term, as sufficient to overcome any expressed doubts as to constitutionality and as to the adequacy of the professional knowledge and treatment in the field. See Vuocolo, The Repetitive Sex Offender 36 (1969).
On the date of the passage of
L.
1949,
c.
20, a Joint Resolution was approved creating a Commission to determine whether a new statute should be enacted to enable more ade
The 1950 statute eliminated from its scope certain offenses which the Commission considered minor and retained only the offenses and attempted offenses of “rape, carnal abuse, sodomy or impairing the morals of a minor” accompanied by violence or age disparity.
L.
1950, c. 207,
p.
454. However in 1951 the list of covered offenses was extended to include “open lewdness and indecent exposure”
(L.
1951, c. 44), in 1954 it was extended to include “assault with intent to commit rape, carnal abuse, or sodomy”
(L.
1954, c. 151), in 1956 it was extended to apply to “open lewdness or indecent exposure” whether or not accompanied by violence or age disparity
(L.
1956, c. 37), in 1958 the age disparity provision in the statute was altered (L. 1958,
c.
161), and in 1967 the list of covered offenses was extended to include “incest,” and
Although the Act has on several occasions been passed upon in this Court, our opinions have not heretofore dealt with the particular issue now presented to us. See
State v. Newton,
17
N. J.
271 (1955);
State v. Wingler,
25
N. J.
161 (1957);
State v. Horne,
56
N. J.
372 (1970). Nor have any Appellate Division decisions prior to the one now under review passed on it. Our present rules contain an explicit direction that the defendant shall receive credit on the term of a “custodial sentence” for any time he has served “in custody in jail or in a state hospital” between his arrest and the imposition of sentence.
R.
3 :21—8;
cf.
In State v. Wingler, supra, 25 N. J. 161, we sustained the constitutionality of the Sex Offender Act and in the course of our opinion we referred repeatedly to the defendant’s sentence under the Act. Similarly in State v. Horne, supra, 56 N. J. 372, we referred to the sentencing process within the Act and to the defendant’s sentence thereunder. Where, as here, the defendant was not placed on probation (N. J. S. A. 2A:164-6(a)) but was committed to an institution (N. J. S. A. 2A :164-6 (b)), his sentence under the Act was clearly a custodial one which comes within the letter as well as the purpose of the rule. In broadly applying the rule we are furthering the legislative goal in fixing the maximum statutory term as the outer limit of the defendant’s confinement. It is true that crediting the defendant with the time he was confined prior to his commitment will shorten the time available for his treatment, and hopefully his cure, but that would appear to be simply an accompaniment of the statutory policy which relates to the length of confinement and not to the length or success of treatment.
Finally, we note that the official records indicate that most defendants who have heretofore been committed under the Sex Offender Act have actually received credit towards their máximums for the period confined in jail or hospital prior to
Reversed.
For reversal — Chief Justice Weintraub and Justices Jacobs, Proctor, Hall, Sohettino and Mountain—6.
For affirmance — None.