State v. LeeState v. Lee
- Reporters:
- , , ,
- Before:
- Levinson
Opinion of the Court by
The defendant-appellant Kenneth S.G. Lee, acting pro se, appeals from his convic
tion
I. BACKGROUND
On November 10, 1997, Lee was tried for one count of operation without no-fault insurance, in violation of
Q. ... [W]hen you stopped that person[,] did you ask him for identification?
A. Yes.
Q. And did he produce identification?
A. Yes, his driving license.
Q. And did you ask him for an insurance card?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. And was he able to produce the insurance card?
A. No.
Q. What was the circumstance of that conversation, if any?
A. Basically, I stopped him for registration and safety check being expired, at which time I asked him for his insurance card. He said he didn’t have one. And then I proceeded to issue him citations.
Q. And that’s the extent of your contact with him on that day?
A. Yes.
Lee proceeded pro se at trial. In his casein-chief, Lee was sworn in as a witness, but, instead of proffering testimony regarding the events surrounding the alleged violation, he advanced legal argument regarding the “validity of the State no-fault law as now applied to native Hawaiians.” Lee argued,
inter alia,
that
The district court discussed Lee’s arguments with him at length on the record, rejected them, and then found him guilty as charged. The district court sentenced Lee to seventy-five hours of community service, but stayed imposition of the sentence pending the filing of a notice of appeal. The district court’s judgment was entered the same day.
On November 19,1997, Lee filed a “Motion for Reconsideration or Motion for New Trial.” In his “Declaration” in support of the motion, Lee essentially reiterated his trial arguments. On the line denominated paragraph five of his declaration, Lee stated: “I cannot transfer the ownership of my car until I have a current safety check. I don’t want to buy no-fault insurance. Now[,] I have a no-fault ticket.” On December 5, 1997, Lee filed an “Additional Declaration in Support Of Motion for Reconsideration or Motion for New Trial.” The “additional declaration” contained more citations relevant to his argument with respect to the Constitution of 1840, as well as the following “clarification”:
I have to clarify paragraph 5 in my first Declaration. When I say transfer the ownership of my car[,] I mean to my name. I cannot buy no-fault insurance until the car is in my name. After the trial I did call AARP and they only insure if the car is already insured. I think this is oppressive. I also somehow forgot to mention how I got the ticket. After the officer stopped me, he called to check ownership and I heard the lady on the radio say “Hawaii Motors” and that is correct. The officer then gave me a ticket.
A hearing was held on Lee’s motions on December 5, 1997. Lee reiterated his legal arguments and also asserted that the evidence had been insufficient to support his conviction. Lee’s “clarification” of “paragraph 5” of his initial declaration unfolded as follows:
THE DEFENDANT: ... [T]he car is registered — is owned by Hawaiian Motors, and I believe it’s that officer’s duty to prove that it doesn’t have insurance.
THE COURT:..... If the registered owner of the vehicle was somebody else, in light since [sic] ... your case came up
[THE PROSECUTION:] —[T]here’s a subsequent—
THE COURT: — there has been a decision by the, uh—
[THE PROSECUTION:] —ICA—
THE COURT: — Intermediate Court of Appeals, appellate court. You’ve got two appellate courts: Supreme Court and Intermediate Court of Appeals that says [sic] that if you have a vehicle that is being driven by somebody that is owned by somebody else, that ... you’re actually supposed to cite both — both of you. You’re supposed to cite the owner and the guy who was driving it and maybe — it’s kind of a long story — but maybe the person who is driving it should not be ticketed or should be found not guilty on a good faith defense. But not the — -registered owner in the sense of ... like if you buy your vehicle and the registered owner is the bank because you still owe money on the car, I’m pretty sure that that’s not what they’re talking about.
[THE PROSECUTION:] Or failure to transfer.
THE COURT: Now, if you ... were to come in and say I can prove that the registered owner of the vehicle was your friend over there, then maybe he’s supposed to pay the ticket, not you. In light of that decision, then maybe you would have something. But not where the other owner is ... the lending institution.
Lee’s timely appeal of the district court’s judgment was filed on December 9, 1997.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Sufficiency Of The Evidence
“[Judgments] based on conflicting evidence will not be set aside where there is substantial evidence to support the [trier of fact’s] findings.” Tsugawa v. Reinartz, 56 Haw. 67, 71, 527 P.2d 1278, 1282 (1974). We have defined “substantial evidence” as “credible evidence which is of sufficient quality and probative value to enable a [person] of reasonable caution to support a conclusion.” See, e.g., In re Doe, Born on January 5, 1976, 76 Hawai‘i 85, 93, 869 P.2d 1304, 1312 (1994) (citations omitted) (brackets in original).
Aga v. Hundahl, 78 Hawai‘i 230, 237, 891 P.2d 1022, 1029 (1995). “[I]t is well-settled that an appellate court will not pass upon issues dependent upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence; this is the province of the [trier of fact].” State v. Buch, 83 Hawai‘i 308, 321, 926 P.2d 599, 612 (1996) (citation omitted). “We have long held that evidence adduced in the trial court must be considered in the strongest light for the prosecution when the appellate court passes on the legal sufficiency of such evidence to support a conviction.” State v. Batson, 73 Haw. 236, 248, 831 P.2d 924, 931 (1992), reconsideration denied, 73 Haw. 625, 834 P.2d 1315 (1992) (citations omitted).
State v. Bautista, 86 Hawaii 207, 210, 948 P.2d 1048, 1051 (1997) (some brackets in original and some added).
B. Plain Error
“We may recognize plain error when the error committed affects substantial rights of the defendant.” State v. Cullen, 86 Hawai‘i 1, 8, 946 P.2d 955, 962 (1997) (citations and internal quotation signals omitted). See also Hawaii Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 52(b) (1993) (“Plain error or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court.”).
State v. Davia, 87 Hawai‘i 249, 253, 953 P.2d 1347, 1351 (1998).
C. Motion For A New Trial
“ ‘As a general matter, the granting or denial of a motion for a new trial is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion.’ ” State v. Samonte, 83 Hawai‘i 507, 527, 928 P.2d 1, 21 (1996) (quoting State v. Furutani, 76 Hawai‘i 172, 178-79, 873 P.2d 51, 57-58 (1994) (citations omitted)). “An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court has clearly exceeded the bounds of reason or has disregarded rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant.” Roxas v. Marcos, 89 Hawai‘i 91, 115, 969 P.2d 1209, 1233 (1998) (quoting Davia, 87 Hawai‘i at 253, 953 P.2d at 1351 (citations and internal quotation signals omitted)).
D. Conclusions Of Law
We review the trial court’s [conclusions of law] de novo under the right/wrong standard. Raines v. State, 79 Hawai‘i 219, 222, 900 P.2d 1286, 1289 (1995). “Under this ... standard, we examine the facts and answer the question without being required to give any weight to the trial court’s answer to it.” State v. Miller, 4 Haw.App. 603, 606, 671 P.2d 1037, 1040 (1983). See also Amfac, Inc. v. Waikiki Beachcomber Inv. Co., 74 Haw. 85, 119, 839 P.2d 10, 28, reconsideration denied, 74 Haw. 650, 843 P.2d 144 (1992). Thus, a [conclusion of law] “is not binding upon the appellate court and is freely reviewable for its correctness.” State v. Bowe, 77 Hawai‘i 51, 53, 881 P.2d 538, 540 (1994) (citation omitted).
Roxas, 89 Hawai‘i at 115, 969 P.2d at 1233 (quoting State v. Kane, 87 Hawai‘i 71, 74, 951 P.2d 934, 937 (1998) (quoting Aickin v. Ocean View Inv. Co., 84 Hawai‘i 447, 453, 935 P.2d 992, 998 (1997)) (brackets in original)).
A. The Evidence Was Sufficient To Support Lee’s Conviction.
1. The evidence was sufficient to establish that ■ Lee and the vehicle were uninsured.
Lee first argues that the district court erred in (1) convicting him of a violation of
In support of his argument, Lee also quotes the following characterization of the elements of
... [T]he three elements that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, in order to convict a driver who is not the owner of the vehicle, [ 4 ] are, pursuant toHRS § 431:10C-104(a) : (1) the vehicle was being driven on a “public street road or highway of this State”; (2) the vehicle was not insured by no-fault insurance or some form of bond, surety or self-insurance; and (3) pursuant toHRS § 702-204 , relevant ease law and legislative history, the driver acted with the requisite state of mind.
(Emphasis in original indicated by underlined text and added emphasis indicated in bold face.) Although Lee does not clearly raise the issue, we note that the
Shamp
court’s iteration of the elements of
Self-insurance. The motor vehicle insurance required bysection 431:100-104 may be satisfied by any owner of a motor vehicle if:
(1) Such owner provides a surety bond, proof of qualifications as a self insurer or other securities affording security substantially equivalent to that afforded under a no-fault policy, providing coverage at all time for the entire motor vehicle registration period, as determined and approved by the commissioner under regulations; and
(2) The commissioner is satisfied that in case of injury, death or property damage, any claimant would have the same rights against such owner as the claimant would have had if a no-fault policy had been applicable to such vehicle.[ 5 ]
Accordingly, even assuming that Lee did not have a no-fault policy pursuant to
Elements of an offense. The elements of an offense are such (1) conduct, (2) attendant circumstances, and (3) results of conduct, as:
(a) Are specified by the definition of the offense, and
(b) Negative a defense (other than a defense based on the statute of limitations, lack of venue, or lack of jurisdiction).
Defenses. (1) A defense is a fact or set of facts which negatives penal liability.
(2) No defense may be considered by the trier of fact unless evidence of the specified facts has been presented. If such evidence is presented, then:
(a) If the defense is not an affirmative defense, the defendant is entitled to an acquittal if the trier of fact finds that the evidence, when considered in the light of any contrary prosecution evidence, raises a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt; or
(b) If the defense is an affirmative defense, the defendant is entitled to an acquittal if the trier of fact finds that the evidence, when considered in the light of any contrary prosecution evidence, proves by a preponderance of the evidence the specified fact or facts which negative penal liability.
(3) A defense is an affirmative defense if:
(a) It is specifically so designated by the Code or another statute; or
(b) If the Code or another statute plainly requires the defendant to prove thedefense by a preponderance of the evidence.
(Emphases added.)
If self-insurance is “a fact or set of facts which negatives penal liability” (ie., a “defense”), rather than “conduct,” “attendant circumstances,” or “results of conduct” “specified by the definition of the offense,” see
As noted above,
Shamp
contains language suggesting that self-insurance is “conduct,” “attendant circumstances,” or “results of conduct,” rather than a defense, for purposes of
In State v. Nobriga, 10 Haw.App. 353, 873 P.2d 110 (1994), overruled on other grounds by State v. Maelega, 80 Hawai‘i 172, 178-79, 907 P.2d 758, 764-65 (1995), 6 the ICA set forth a framework for determining whether an “exception” is a “defense” to or an “element” of an offense:
The general and well-settled common law rule is that where an exception is embodied in the language of the enacting clause of a criminal statute,[ 7 ] and therefore appears to be an integral part of the verbal description of the offense, the burden is on the prosecution to negative that exception, prima facie, as part of its main case. Annotation, Burden of Averment and Proof As to Exception in Criminal Statute on Which the Prosecution Is Based, 153 A.L.R. 1218, 1226 (1944); 1 Wharton’sCriminal Evidence § 20, at 35 (C. Torda 13th ed.1972).
... [W]hen the exception appears somewhere other than in the enacting clause, and is thus a distinct substantive exception or proviso, the burden is on the defendant to bring forward evidence of exceptive facts that constitute a defense. Annotation, 153 A.L.R. at 1277-78; 1 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence § 20, at 35. The prosecutor is not required in such instances to negative, by proof in advance, exceptions not found in the enacting clause. 1 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence § 20, at 33-34.
Nobriga, 10 Haw.App. at 358, 873 P.2d at 112-13.
“[O]ur foremost obligation [when interpreting a statute] is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself.” State v. Aluli, 78 Hawai‘i 317, 320, 893 P.2d 168, 171 (1995) (citation omitted).... “The legislature is presumed not to intend an absurd result, and legislation will be construed to avoid, if possible, inconsistency, contradiction^] and illogicality.” State v. Arceo, 84 Hawai‘i 1, 19, 928 P.2d 843, 861 (1996) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Bautista,
86 Hawai‘i at 209, 948 P.2d at 1050-51. Accordingly, self-insurance should be considered a defense,
9
which the prosecution need not disprove unless
some
evidence to support the defense has been introduced.
10
We therefore hold (1) that the prosecution adduced substantial evidence that neither Lee nor the vehicle he was operating were insured pursuant to a no-fault policy and (2) that it was not subject to the burden of disproving the defense of self-insurance.
2. The prosecution was not required to prove that Lee was the owner of the vehicle or otherwise to identify the registered owner.
Lee next argues that the prosecution failed to prove that he was the owner of the vehicle or to otherwise identify the registered owner. He notes that the “[ejvidence presented by the state shows [Lee] to be a vehicle operator and no more[.]” Granted,
3. The prosecution adduced sufficient evidence of the requisite state of mind.
Lee next argues that the prosecution failed to prove that he possessed the requisite state of mind to commit the offense of operation without no-fault insurance. In support of his argument, he first asserts that he was not the owner of the vehicle he operated. He cites Bolosan and Shamp, presumably for the proposition that
[t]he borrower of a motor vehicle has a statutory right to reasonably believe that the borrowed motor vehicle is insured. Evidence that the defendant borrowed and operated upon a public street a motor vehicle that was not insured under a no-fault policy is sufficient evidence to sustain [the lack of knowledge defense].
Bolosan,
78 Hawai‘i at 91 n. 9, 890 P.2d at 678 n. 9 (construing the “good faith lack of knowledge defense” codified in
As noted
supra
in section I, no evidence regarding the ownership of the vehicle was adduced at trial. Lee apparently attempted to adduce such evidence by way of his two “declarations,” which he submitted in support of his “Motion for Reconsideration or Motion for New Trial.” Of course, his declarations, as out-of-court statements, constituted hearsay and were therefore inadmissible as evidence.
See
Hawai‘i Rules of Evidence (HRE) Rules 801(3) (defining hearsay) and 802 (providing that hearsay is generally inadmissible) (1993). In any case, Lee’s “declarations,” proffered posttrial as they were, could
Lee suggests, without explaining his reasoning, that, where it is unclear whether a driver is the registered owner of a vehicle, the presumption should be that he or she is not the owner. In fact, inasmuch as a good faith lack of knowledge regarding the insured status of a borrowed vehicle is a
defense
pursuant to
In
State v. Lesher,
66 Haw. 584, 669 P.2d 146 (1983), this court held that, pursuant to
[G]iven the difficulty of proving the requisite state of mind by direct evidence in criminal cases, “[w]e have consistently held that ... proof by circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from circumstances surrounding the [defendant’s conduct] is sufficient.... Thus, the mind of an alleged offender may be read from his acts, conduct .and inferences fairly drawn from all the circumstances.” State v. Sadino, 64 Haw. 427, 430, 642 P.2d 534, 536-37 (1982) (citations omitted); see also State v. Simpson, 64 Haw. 363, 373 n. 7, 641 P.2d 320, 326 n. 7 (1982).
State v. Mitsuda, 86 Hawai‘i 37, 44, 947 P.2d 349, 356 (1997) (quoting State v. Batson, 73 Haw. 236, 254, 831 P.2d 924, 934, reconsideration denied, 73 Haw. 625, 834 P.2d 1315 (1992) (footnote omitted)) (some brackets in original and some added). In the absence of any evidence implicating the “good faith borrower” defensé, the district court could reasonably have inferred from the fact that Lee drove the vehicle without insurance that he did so either intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly. Accordingly, Lee’s requisite state of mind was supported by substantial evidence.
B.
Assuming, Arguendo, That The District Court Failed To Comply With The Requirements Of
Lee urges that his conviction must be reversed because the district court failed to comply with the requirements of
Assuming,
arguendo,
that Lee was not the registered owner of the vehicle he was driving, the district court’s failure to comply with
The Shamp court concluded in relevant part as follows:
We hold that the district court committed plain error when it convicted Defendant of violatingHRS § 431:100-104 because the State failed to prove one of the three, necessary elements of the offense. The State must prove each of the elements because, otherwise, a serious miscarriage of justice may occur: The wrong defendant may be convicted (the proper defendant being the vehicle’s registered owner). We therefore reverse the district court’s conviction of Defendant in regards to theHRS § 431:100-104 violation. We further conclude that the district court erred when it failed to require the owner of the vehicle to appear in court, pursuant toHRS § 805-13 .Section 805-13 properly applies to chapter 431:100 violations, in particularHRS § 431:100-104 .
... Enforcing the requirement that the registered oumer appear in court will ... help the district court and the State to determine who the true violator of the statute is: the vehicle’s registered owner, or, additionally, the vehicle’s driver. We therefore strongly encourage prosecutors, the district courts, and enforcement officers to follow the procedures set forth inHRS § 805-13(b) .
Id. at 343, 949 P.2d at 183 (emphases added).
Lee seizes on the first of the phrases highlighted above, arguing that
C. The 184-0 Constitution Of The Kingdom Of Hawai‘i No Longer Governs The Hawai‘i State Legislature.
Lee’s final argument is that HRS ch. 413 violates article III of the 1840 Constitution of the Kingdom of Hawai‘i, which, he asserts, remains in force through the provisions of
It is elementary that
[w]hen ... a[new] Constitution takes effect, it is a new departure in the government of the country, inasmuch as it states anew the principles upon which the government is to be administered, and rearranges the distributions and limitations of sovereign powers. What is not changed is re-affirmed. The new statement of the fundamental law takes the place of the old.
Ahlo v. Smith, 8 Haw. 420, 423 (1892) (holding that the requirements for voting rights provided for in the Constitution of 1864 had been abrogated by the new requirements of the Constitution of 1887). In other words, successive constitutions are consecutive rather than concurrent or cumulative, unless they expressly provide otherwise.
Although the ICA has suggested that it is an open legal question whether the “Kingdom of Hawaii” still exists, see State v. Lorenzo, 77 Hawai‘i 219, 883 P.2d 641 (App.1994), and State v. French, 77 Hawai‘i 222, 883 P.2d 644 (App.1994), it is clear that the various constitutions of the kingdom do not bind the current government of the state of Hawaii.
Lee’s argument that
Common law of the State; exceptions. The common law of England, as ascertained by English and American decisions, is declared to be the common law of the State of Hawaii in all cases, except as otherwise expressly provided by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or by the laws of the State, or fixed by Hawaiian judicial precedent, or established by Hawaiian usage; provided that no person shall be subject to criminal proceedings except as provided by the written laws of the United States or of the State.
Accordingly, regardless of whether the no-fault laws might have offended the provisions of the 1840 Constitution, Lee’s argument fails.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasoning, we affirm the district court’s judgment, conviction, and sentence.
Notes
. As of August 4, 1997, the date of Lee‘s alleged violation of
Conditions of operation and registration of motor vehicles, (a) Except as provided in section 431:100-105, no person shall operate or use a motor vehicle upon any public street, road, or highway of this State at any time unless such motor vehicle is insured at all times under a no-fault policy.
(b) Every owner of a motor vehicle used or operated at any time upon any public street, road, or highway of this State shall obtain a no-fault policy upon such vehicle which provides the coverage required by this article and shall maintain the no-fault policy at all times for the entire motor vehicle registration period.
(c) Any person who violates the provisions of this section shall be subject to the provisions of section 431:10C-117(a).
(d) The provisions of this article shall not apply to any vehicle owned by or registered in the name of any agency of the federal government, or to any antique motor vehicle as defined in section 249-1.
The section was amended, effective January 1, 1998, in respects immaterial to the present appeal. See 1997 Haw. Sess. L. Act 251, §§ 14 and 70 at 525, 553 (replacing the phrase “no-fault policy,” as employed in subsections (a) and (b), with the phrase “motor vehicle policy”).
. At the time of Lee’s alleged violation of
[i]n all cases of citation for alleged violations of chapter 294 or section 286-116, the court shall require the appearance of the driver cited and the registered owner of the motor vehicle. If the registered owner is not the driver, the registered owner shall be cited by service of the citation on the driver who shall be deemed to be the owner’s agent for purposes of service and by naming the owner jointly with the driver in the citation....
(Indentation omitted.)
. We note that the Hawaii Rules of Penal Procedure do not provide for a “motion for reconsideration” of a guilty verdict.
. Lee’s claim that he was not the owner of the vehicle he was driving is discussed infra section III.B.
. Since the time of Lee‘s alleged violation of
. In
Maelega,
this court took issue with characterization in
Nobriga
of the defendant’s burden, pursuant to
. In criminal nomenclature, the term “enacting clause” has long been applied to the prohibitory declaration of the statute which contains the general or preliminary description of the acts prohibited; i.e., the clause which proscribes the offensive deed. Annotation, Burden of Averment and Proof as to Exception in Criminal Statute on Which the Prosecution Is Based, 153 A.L.R. 1218, 1226 (1944).
Nobriga, 10 Haw.App. at 357 n. 1, 873 P.2d at 112 n. 1.
.
Conditions of operation and registration. (a)(1) No person shall operate or use a motor vehicle upon any public street, road, or highway of this State at any time unless such motor vehicle is insured at all times under a no-fault policy. Every owner of a motor vehicle used or operated at any time upon any public street, road, or highway of this State shall obtain a no-fault policy upon such vehicle which provides the coverage required by this article and shall maintain the no-fault policy at all times for the entire motor vehicle registration period. (2) The requirements of this subsection may be satisfied by any owner of a motor vehicle’ if:
(A) Such owner provides a surety bond, proof of qualifications as a self insurer, or other securities affording security substantially equivalent to that afforded under a no-fault policy, providing coverage at all time for the entire motor vehicle registration period, as determined and approved by the commissioner under regulations, and
(B) The commissioner is satisfied that in case of injury or death or property damage, any claimant would have the same rights against such owner as the claimant would have had if a no-fault policy had been applicable to such vehicle.
. Self-insurance is not expressly designated in
. Likewise, the exceptions listed in
. At the time of this court’s opinion in
Bolosan,
[A]ny person cited under this section shall have an opportunity to present a good faith defense, including but not limited to lack of knowledge or proof of insurance. The general penalty provision of this section shall not apply to:
(C) Any operator of a borrowed motor vehicle if the operator holds a reasonable belief that the subject vehicle is insured.
.