State v. LeeState v. Lee
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Winmill
In this case, the appellant, Richard A. Lee, challenges the district court’s denial of his Rule 35 motion, in which Lee contended that the imposition of consecutive sentences for two counts of vehicular manslaughter arising out of a single accident was illegal. Lee raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether his sentences were illegal because the Idaho vehicular manslaughter statute,
The relevant facts can be stated briefly. On August 16, 1985, Richard A. Lee drove his pickup truck into the wrong lane of a two-way highway. He drove erratically, *516 forcing other motorists off the road. Lee ultimately struck another vehicle, killing two of its occupants. A subsequent test showed that Lee had a blood-alcohol level of .19 percent.
Lee was charged with and pled guilty to two counts of vehicular manslaughter. He was sentenced on the first count to a seven-year fixed term, and received a consecutive seven-year indeterminate sentence on the second count. Lee appealed, arguing that the district judge abused his discretion by failing to make both sentences indeterminate and concurrent. The sentences were upheld on appeal. State v. Lee, 111 Idaho 489, 725 P.2d 194 (Ct.App.1986). However, our focus in that appeal was limited to the question of sentencing discretion, and the issues raised here were not considered. Id. at 490 n. 2, 725 P.2d at 195 n. 2. Following the appeal, Lee filed a motion for sentence reduction under I.C.R. 35 and the consecutive, indeterminate sentence was reduced to five years by the district court. Later, Lee filed another motion in the district court pursuant to I.C.R. 35 — this time challenging the legality of consecutive sentences on two charges arising from a single act. Lee’s motion was denied, and this appeal followed.
Initially, we note our standard of review. For the purpose of Rule 35, an illegal sentence is one in excess of a statutory provision or otherwise contrary to applicable law. United States v. Huss, 520 F.2d 598 (2d Cir.1975). It is self-evident that this determination involves a legal question on which we exercise free review. Standards of Appellate Review in State and Federal Courts, IDAHO APPELLATE HANDBOOK § 3.2.1 (Idaho Law Foundation, Inc.1985). Furthermore, unlike a legal but allegedly excessive sentence, an illegal sentence may be corrected “at any time.” I.C.R. 35; see State v. Vetsch, 101 Idaho 595, 618 P.2d 773 (1980).
The first two issues raised on appeal concern the language of the statute defining vehicular manslaughter. The relevant text of
Manslaughter defined. — Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being, without malice. It is of three (3) kinds:
3. Vehicular — in which the operation of a motor vehicle causes death because of:
(a) the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony, with gross negligence; or
(b) the commission of a violation of section 18-8004 or 18-8006, Idaho Code [driving while under the influence of alcohol, drugs or intoxicating substances]; or
(c) the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony, without gross negligence.
In his first argument, Lee suggests that the statute defines vehicular manslaughter as the operation of a motor vehicle which causes death because of an unlawful act. He contends that the primary thrust of the statute is to regulate careless and impaired driving. From this view, Lee argues that an act of driving that causes death constitutes a single offense, regardless of the number of deaths that result.
Lee’s argument ignores the operative language of the statute that “[m]an-slaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being____” The rest of the statute simply describes the ways in which the crime of manslaughter may be committed. Read as a whole, the statute clearly and unambiguously indicates the legislature’s intent to protect individual victims and to criminalize the unlawful killing of a human being. It necessarily follows that multiple deaths resulting from a single act of driving can be charged as separate offenses under the manslaughter statute.
This construction of the manslaughter statute is consistent with decisions of other courts which have addressed arguments similar to the one raised by Lee in this appeal.
See, e.g., Wilkoff v. Superior Court,
38 Cal.3d 345, 211 Cal.Rptr. 742, 744-46, 696 P.2d 134, 137-38 (Cal.1985);
State v. Miranda,
3 Ariz.App. 550, 416 P.2d 444, 452 (1966). We join this line of authority and conclude that the language
*517
of
Next, Lee poses the alternative argument that the manslaughter statute is, at the very least, ambiguous and under the doctrine of lenity must be construed in favor of the least harsh result for any defendant charged under its provisions.
State v. McKaughen,
108 Idaho 471, 473, 700 P.2d 93, 95 (1985). However, as noted above, we find no ambiguity in the purpose or language of
Finally, Lee contends that
An act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by different provisions of this code may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case can it be punished under more than one; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under either one bars a prosecution for the same act or omission under any other. [Emphasis added.]
Properly read,
This distinction is also suggested by the manner in which the statute has been applied in other cases. In each instance where
We are mindful of our Supreme Court’s observation that “Idaho’s multiple punishment statute,
In summary, we hold that the vehicular manslaughter statute is clear in making criminal the taking of human life. In view of that purpose, a single act of driving which results in the death of more than one person may properly be charged as separate offenses. The statute is not ambiguous in this regard, and it is not necessary to employ the doctrine of lenity in interpreting the statute. We also conclude that the imposition of consecutive sentences in this case does not conflict with the language of