State of Ohio/City of Toledo v. Rayqwaun Deurice Edward Lear
Court of Appeals No. L-17-1261
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LUCAS COUNTY
Decided: May 11, 2018
2018-Ohio-1874
Trial Court No. CRB-17-09141
Laurel A. Kendall, for appellant.
MAYLE, P.J.
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, the city of Toledo, appeals the September 27, 2017 judgment of the Toledo Municipal Court, dismissing a misdemeanor charge of violation of a protection order filed against defendant-appellee, Rayqwaun Deurice Edward Lear. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the trial court judgment.
{¶ 2} On July 24, 2017, Rayqwaun Lear was charged in Toledo Municipal Court with domestic violence, a violation of
{¶ 3} On September 27, 2017, Lear appeared in the Toledo Municipal Court and was prepared to enter a plea for violation of the protection order. The court, however, believed that under
{¶ 4} The city appealed and assigns a single assignment of error for our review:
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE CASE PURSUANT TO CRIMINAL RULE 5(B).
{¶ 5} The trial court relied on
{¶ 6} Lear responds that all three misdemeanor charges arose from the same facts and circumstances. He claims that he “was indicted and pleaded no contest to a felony for arguably the same facts and circumstances as the facts and circumstances surrounding the violation of the protection order.” As such, he argues, “there is an issue of double jeopardy, because a person cannot be tried twice, or in two different courts, for the same offense.” Lear also claims that the trial court had authority to dismiss the criminal complaint under
A. Crim.R. 5(B)(1) .
{¶ 7}
In felony cases a defendant is entitled to a preliminary hearing unless waived in writing. If the defendant waives preliminary hearing, the judge or magistrate shall forthwith order the defendant bound over to the court of common pleas. Except upon good cause shown, any misdemeanor, other than a minor misdemeanor, arising from the same act or transaction involving a felony shall be bound over or transferred with the felony case.
B. Crim.R. 48 .
{¶ 9} Lear urges that even if
{¶ 10} Ordinarily, we review a trial court‘s decision to dismiss a criminal complaint under an abuse-of-discretion standard. State v. Neeley, 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 26190, 26191, 2012-Ohio-4027, ¶ 7, citing Busch at 616. Where, however, the court‘s decision raises a question of law, we review de novo. Neeley at ¶ 8 (reviewing de novo and reversing court‘s dismissal of complaint based on its incorrect determination that the Department of Public Safety lacked authority to bring charges).
{¶ 11} Here, the municipal court‘s explanation for dismissing the case was that “[p]ursuant to Criminal Rule 5 I don‘t have jurisdiction.” We find that the trial court‘s explanation for exercising its discretion to dismiss the criminal complaint was based on an incorrect interpretation of
C. Double Jeopardy.
{¶ 12} Finally, Lear argues that he has already been convicted of a felony “for arguably the same facts and circumstances surrounding the violation of the protection
{¶ 13} “The double-jeopardy protections of the United States Constitution‘s Fifth Amendment, which are applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment, and Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution prohibit multiple prosecutions for the same offense.” State v. Mutter, 150 Ohio St.3d 429, 2017-Ohio-2928, 82 N.E.3d 1141, ¶ 2. The Ohio Supreme Court has adopted the “same elements” test articulated in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 76 L.Ed. 306, 52 S.Ct. 180 (1932), to determine whether a defendant has been subjected to two prosecutions for the same offense. Mutter at ¶ 17. This test requires the reviewing court to evaluate the elements of each statute to determine “‘whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.‘” Id., quoting Blockburger at 304. The test focuses upon the elements of the offenses, not the evidence proffered in the case. Id. If each offense contains an element not contained in the other, double jeopardy does not bar successive prosecutions. Id.
{¶ 14} A conviction for felony domestic violence requires proof that the defendant (1) either knowingly caused or attempted to cause physical harm to a family or household member (
{¶ 15} The protection order is not contained in the record, and it is not clear from the record which provision of
{¶ 16} Accordingly, we find the city‘s sole assignment of error well-taken.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 17} The trial court erred in finding
Judgment reversed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Mark L. Pietrykowski, J.
JUDGE
Arlene Singer, J.
JUDGE
Christine E. Mayle, P.J. CONCUR.
JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio‘s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court‘s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.