The opinion of the court was delivered by
Dеfendant Gail Lawrence appeals from a January 29, 2013 Law Division order denying her motion for reconsideration to reinstate her municipal court appeal, dismissed for failure to timely submit a brief. For the reasons below, wе reverse the dismissal, reinstate defendant’s trial de novo request, and remand the matter for further proceedings.
The facts are not disputed. The Palisades Interstate Park Police Department
The municipal court judge found defendant guilty of six traffic offenses, including speeding violations prohibited by Palisades Interstate Park Ordinance 413.1(b); following too closely, N.J.S.A. 39:4-89; failure to possess documents, N.J.S.A. 39:3-29; driving while suspended, N.J.S.A 39:3-40; having unclear plates, N.J.S.A 39:3-33; and careless driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-97. Additionally, he convicted defendant of two counts of obstructing administration of the law, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-l(a). The judge suspended defendant’s driving privileges for ninety days, imposed one year of probation, thirty days in jail as a condition of probation, and fines and penalties totaling $2,850.
On June 25, 2012, defendant, acting pro se, timely filed a notice of appeal and request for trial de novo of the municipal court convictions. In completing the standard “Notice of Municipal Court Appeal” form, defendant identified the municipal cоurt ticket, inserted her name and address, inserted the name of her municipal court counsel (former counsel) following the line “Lawyer’s Name,” and completed the statement “I, Gail Lawrence, am appealing to the Superior Court from a conviction entered in the Palisades Interstate Municipal Court on July 15, 2012.”
Within two weeks, defendant hired current counsel to represent her in the trial de novo. Counsel did not file a notice of appearаnce, but instructed defendant to be aware the scheduling notice would be sent to her because she filed the appeal. By August 6, 2012, defendant advanced approximately $3,000 to obtain the municipal court trial transcripts.
A scheduling letter set trial for October 10, 2012, and noted defendant’s brief was due on September 12, 2012. However, the letter was faxed to former counsel, not defendant. When current counsel learned defendant’s brief was past due, he wrote to the judge on September 20, 2012. He advised he represented defendant, who had filed the appeal herself, and explained the clerk’s office erred in transmitting scheduling notices, which were not sent to defendant. Current cоunsel advised he was prepared to proceed to trial, requested a new trial date, and the date to file a brief. On September 27, 2012, the judge dismissed defendant’s municipal appeal, without prejudice, citing only defendant’s failure “to diligently pursue her appeal.”
Current counsel moved to reinstate the appeal.
Current counsel stated when he learned notices were not sent to defendant and the brief deadline had passed, he immediately
On appeal, defendant argues:
POINT I
BECAUSE THE CLERK FAILED TO SEND DOCKETING AND HEARING NOTICES!,] AS REQUIRED BY RULE 3:23-4(b)0 IT WAS ERROR TO DISMISS THE APPEAL FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE.
POINT II
BECAUSE THE DISMISSAL WAS NOT ATTRIBUTABLE TO [DEFENDANT], AND THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN NO PREJUDICE TO THE RESPONDENT, THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING THE MOTION TO REINSTATE THE APPEAL.
In our review, we recognize the deferential standard applicable to determinations for reconsideration, Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J.Super. 374, 384,
Regarding the challenge raised in Point I, we note the uncontro-verted facts described in defendant’s motion set forth the confusion caused when the clerk’s office assumed defendant’s formеr counsel, listed on her notice of appeal as instructed, was representing her in the Law Division and sent all notices to him, not defendant. Even if strategies could have been employed to obviate this problem, defendant’s explanation appears reasonable and further discussion of the issue is unnecessary.
We focus on the arguments advanced in Point II. Following our review, we conclude, under the circumstances presented, dismissal of defendant’s municipal appeal and denial of the motion seeking its reinstatement represented an abuse of discretion. The orders must be vacated and the appeal reinstated.
Rule 7:13-1 governs appeals from municipal court convictions. The rule provides such appeals are presented in accordance with Rules 3:23 and 3:24. More specifically, Rule 3:23-2 defines the time and manner within which appeals from final judgments of municipal court actions are taken, and Rule 3:23-3 outlines the requirements and contents included in a notice of appeal. Once an appeal is filed, Rule 3:23-4 imposes the duty upon the clerk of the court to mail written notice of the hearing date “to the prosecuting attorney and the appellant, or, if the appellant is represented, the appellant’s attorney.” Finally, Rule 3:23-7 permits the court to dismiss a matter for failure to comply with
Although a trial judge is authorized to dismiss a municipal appeal for failure to submit a brief, R. 3:23-7, R. 1:2 — 4(b), enforcement of procedural rules must always be exercised with an eye “to secure a just determination” and maintain “fairness in administration” of cases; not solely to secure a completed disposition. R. l:l-2(a). Importantly, the public policy guiding the role of the judiciary demands judges decide contested matters on their merits and avoid the dismissal of actions because of inconsequential procedural deficiencies. See State v. Farrell, 320 N.J.Super. 425, 447,
We have cautioned “[n]o eagerness to expedite business, or tо utilize fully the court’s time, should be permitted to interfere with our high duty of administering justice in the individual case.” State v. Cullen, 428 N.J.Super. 107, 113,
Here, defendant’s brief was not submitted by thе imposed deadline. Once current counsel learned of this lapse, he expeditiously investigated what occurred and acted to inform the court of the confusion caused when the clerk, on the mistaken belief defеndant was represented, failed to send the self-represented litigant scheduling notices. Current counsel requested to file his brief out of time and related his ability to expeditiously proceed to trial. There is no evidence of bad faith or an attempt to delay the proceedings. Irani, supra, 281 N.J.Super. at 387-88,
When entering the initial order of dismissal and the order denying reinstatement of the appeal, the motion judge included no reference to the circumstances explaining the delay as related by counsel and defendant. The judge included no factual findings, contrary to his obligations
Current counsel correctly assessed the resulting difficulties posed were he to file a new notice of appeal, which was then beyond the twenty-day period permitted to do so. R. 3:23-2. Thus, the ordered dismissal without рrejudice effectively denied defendant her right to challenge the merits of her conviction in a trial de novo before the Law Division. R. 3:23-8(a). This result is particularly egregious because she faced a “consequence of magnitude,” including a possible jail sentence and license suspension. State v. Moran, 202 N.J. 311, 325,
Accordingly, we conclude the orders dismissing the municipal court appeal without prejudice and denying reconsideration of the dismissal erroneously barred defendant access to the court and represented an abuse of discretion. We reverse the January 29, 2013 order and the underlying September 27, 2012 order of dismissal. The matter is remanded to reinstate defendant’s appeal and for a scheduling order for briefing and trial to issue. We do not retain jurisdiction.
Reversed and remanded for trial.
Notes
Another matter involving an entirely distinct set of complaints-summonses issued to defendant by the Palisades Interstate Park Police Department is before this court. See State v. Lawrence, Docket No. A-3194-11. The separate appeal, involving a different incident, was listed back-to-back before the same panel and will be addressed in a separate oрinion.
The pleadings were captioned as a motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal. Current counsel explained he understood he could not simply refile a municipal appeal, which would be untimely, or seek appellate relief because the order was not a final judgment appealable as of right. R. 2:4-1.