delivered the opinion of the Court.
When it enacted N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1, the Legislature established aggravating and mitigating circumstances for a court to consider when it sentences a convicted defendant within the statutory range applicable to his or her offense. The first of thirteen enumerated aggravating factors focuses the court’s inquiry on “[t]he nature and circumstances of the offense, and the role of the actor therein, including whether or not it was committed in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner!.]” N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1) (aggravating factor one). The second aggravating factor addresses “[t]he gravity and seriousness of harm inflicted on the viсtim!.]” N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(2) (aggravating factor two). In determining whether aggravating factor two applies, the sentencing court considers whether “the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim of the offense was particularly vulnerable or incapable of resistance due to advanced age, ill-health, or extreme youth, or was for any other reason substantially incapable of exercising normal physical or mental power of resistance[.]” Ibid. While sentencing courts frequently apply both aggravating factors one and two, each requires a distinct analysis of the offеnse for which the court sentences the defendant.
This case raises an issue not previously addressed by the Court: whether a sentencing court, identifying relevant aggravating factors under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a), may consider the harm suffered by individuals who were physically injured by the defendant’s conduct but were not the victims of the offense of which the defendant was convicted. Defendant John J. Lawless, Jr. was charged with eight criminal offenses and several motor vehicle violations following a motor vehicle collision that killed another driver and seriously injured the deceased driver’s wife and daughter, who were passengers in his vehicle. Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to one of the criminal offenses, aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a), as well as driving while intoxicated (DWI), N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, a motor vehicle offense. The other charges pending against defendant were dismissed pursuant to his plea agreement. Accordingly, defendant was not convicted of any offense committed against either of the injured passengers. Nonetheless, the sentencing court considered the harm suffered by the injured passengers as “harm inflicted on the victim” for purposes of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(2) and relied upon aggravating factor two, among other aggravating factоrs, in imposing sentence. The Appellate Division reversed, ruling that injuries sustained by the victim’s family members were irrelevant to the court’s sentencing determination, and remanded for resentencing.
I.
The motor vehicle collision that gave rise to this case occurred on Saturday, September 12, 2009, in Lower Township. Defendant, a Pennsylvania resident with four Pennsylvania convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), was attending a “Mоtorcycle Weekend” in Wildwood. After consuming an estimated twelve beers over several hours, defendant left Wildwood at approximately 8:00 p.m., driving his Chrysler Sebring convertible. According to the account provided by defendant to the judge in his plea hearing, defendant crossed a bridge from Wildwood onto Route 47 and turned left onto Route 9 South. Defendant later testified that he “must have blacked out at that point” and claimed to have no further recollection of the events leading up to his hospitalization.
At approximately 8:27 p.m., Lower Township Police were called to Route 9. They observed defendant’s unoccupied and damaged Chrysler Sebring convertible in the middle of the highway. South of defendant’s vehicle on Route 9, officers saw a heavily-damaged Ford Escort with three occupants. The driver, Fredrick Shelton, was dead at the scene. His wife, Sheri Shelton, the front-seat passenger, was seriously hurt; her internal injuries, broken ribs and broken forearm required several surgeries and a month-long stay in the hospital. Fredrick and Sheri’s daughter, Brittany Shelton, riding in the back seat when the collision occurred, was less severely injured than her mother, but also required hospitalization.
Police officers found defendant lying in a grassy area, screaming. Defendant initially contended that an unidentified friend had been driving his vehicle. The officers, however, found a sandal matching one worn by defendant between the brake and the accelerator of the car. They detected the smell of alcohol on defendant’s breath. A blood test conducted with defendant’s consent after he was taken to a hospital confirmed that defendant was impaired by alcohol. In that test, defendant’s blood alcohol content was determined to be .229.
Police officers briefly interviewed defendаnt. He gave them a false name, address and Social Security number, and again attempted to blame an unidentified friend for the accident. Defendant then terminated the interview by requesting an attorney. While defendant was hospitalized, the officers determined that defendant’s Pennsylvania driver’s license had been suspended because of a prior DUI conviction.
A Cape May County Grand Jury indicted defendant for first-degree aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a), first-degree vehicular homicide within 1,000 feet of school property, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5, third-degree causing death while driving with a suspended license, N.J.S.A. 2C:40-22(a),
On September 13, 2010, the date scheduled for an N.J.R.E. 404(b) evidentiary hearing to determine the admissibility of defendant’s prior Pennsylvania DUI convictions, the State and defense counsel informed the judge that they had reached a plea agreement. By the terms оf the agreement, defendant would plead guilty to one count of first-degree aggravated manslaughter and one count of DWI. The plea agreement contemplated that all other charges, including the charges relating solely to the injuries sustained by Sheri or Brittany Shelton, would be dismissed. The prosecution and the defense did not agree on a recommended sentence.
The judge immediately held a plea hearing. The court confirmed defendant’s understanding of the rights that he would relinquish by virtue of his guilty plea, advised him that his sentence would be within a range from ten to thirty years’ imprisonment subject to the provisions of the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, and elicited a factual basis for defendant’s plea to the first-degree aggravated manslaughter charge. The judge found the factual basis to be adequate, ordered a presentenee report and denied an application for bail pending sentencing.
Defendant was sentenced on November 12, 2010. Defendant’s counsel expressed his client’s remorse for the accident, presented the testimony of defendant’s brothers about defendant’s alcohol problems and advised the court that defendant was involved in alcоhol counseling while in prison. The State called as witnesses members of the Shelton family, their pastor and several friends, who spoke of the loss of Fredrick Shelton and the impact of the accident on Sheri and Brittany Shelton. The State requested that the court find aggravating factor two, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(2), aggravating factor three, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3) (“[t]he risk that the defendant will commit another offense”), aggravating factor six, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(6) (“[t]he extent of the defendant’s prior criminal record and the seriousness of the offenses of which he has been convicted”), and aggravating factor nine, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9) (“[t]he need for deterring the defendant and others from violating the law”). The State did not ask the court to find aggravating factor one, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1). It urged the court to impose a maximum sentence of thirty years’ incarceration.
The sentencing court found aggravating factor two, citing the injuries suffered by Sheri and Brittany Shelton, and assigned “great weight” to this factor. It also found aggravating factor three, noting that defendant “consumes alcohol to a pathologic
Defendant appealed his sentence. The Appellate Division held that the sentencing court should not have found aggravating factor two on the record of this case. State v. Lawless, 423 N.J.Super. 293, 304-05,
We granted the State’s motion for leave to appeal. 209 N.J. 230,
II.
The State contends that the Appellate Division construed too narrowly the term “victim” in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(2). It argues that the statute’s reference to “harm inflicted on the victim” should be read to include the full range of harm suffered by an individual that can be аttributed to the defendant’s conduct, regardless of whether that conduct ultimately resulted in a conviction. It asserts that the interests of uniformity in sentencing compel a court to consider the number of victims of the offense and the extent of each victim’s injuries. The State also urges the Court to consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, citing N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1). The State argues that the panel’s ruling is inconsistent with the discretion that our sentencing laws afford to trial judges. It urges the Court to adopt a concept of a “victim” analogous to that set forth in the Victim’s Rights Amendment to the New Jersey Constitution (VRA), N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 22, and the Crime Victim’s Bill of Rights, N.J.S.A. 52:4B-34 tо - 38, which would include Sheri and Brittany Shelton.
Defendant argues that while a sentencing court should consider the totality of the circumstances when it sentences an offender, defendant pled guilty to a crime involving only one victim, and no findings on aggravating factor two that derive from the injuries of other victims should be sustained. Defendant counters the State’s reliance on constitutional and statutory provisions addressing victims’ rights by arguing that the Crime Victim’s Bill of Rights, N.J.S.A. 52:4B-36, is designed
III.
We assess the judge’s sentencing determination under a deferential standard of review. An appellate court does not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the sentencing court. State v. Cassady, 198 N.J. 165, 180,
[A]n appellate court ... can (a) review sentences to determine if the legislative policies, here the sentencing guidelines, were violated; (b) review the aggravating and mitigating factors found below to determine whether those factors were based upon competent credible evidenсe in the record; and (c) determine whether, even though the court sentenced in accordance with the guidelines, nevertheless the application of the guidelines to the facts of this case makes the sentence clearly unreasonable so as to shock the judicial conscience.
Appellate courts are “ ‘expected to exercise a vigorous and close review for abuses of discretion by the trial courts.’” State v. Natale, 184 N.J. 458, 489,
Consistent with this limited appellate role, we consider whether the sentencing court properly construed the term “victim” in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(2) to include the two injured passengers in the decedent’s vehicle. That inquiry invokes established principles of statutory construction. “When construing a statute, our primary goal is to discern the meaning and intent of the Legislature.” State v. Gandhi 201 N.J. 161, 176,
The statute that defines the aggravating and mitigating factors, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1, is a primary component of a sentencing scheme whose “dominant, if not paramount, goal ... is uniformity in sentencing.” Kromphold, supra, 162 N.J. at 352,
The statutory scheme and our case law define in detail the task of the sentencing court following its determination that a term of incarceration should be imposed. Although the Court in Nótale did not establish an inflexible rule regarding the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors, it commented that “reason suggests that when the mitigating factors preponderаte, sentences will tend toward the lower end of the range, and when the aggravating factors preponderate, sentences will tend toward the higher end of the range.” Natale, supra, 184 N.J. at 488,
In their application of the N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1 factors, sentencing courts are cautioned to avoid “double counting” circumstances that the Legislature has already incorporated as an element of the offense. See State v. Carey, 168 N.J. 413, 425,
Within the parameters of the statutory aggravating and mitigating factors, the sentencing court evaluates “a range of information unconstrained by evidential considerations.” State v. Randolph, 210 N.J. 330, 348 (2012) (citing Natale, supra, 184 N.J. at 486,
When it drafted N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a), the Legislature chose comprehensive language to define aggravating
In that inquiry — focused on the magnitude of the offense as a measure of the need to shield the public and deter futurе crimes — courts applying aggravating factor one focus on the gravity of the defendant’s conduct, considering both its impact on its immediate victim and the overall circumstances surrounding the criminal event. See State v. Bowens, 108 N.J. 622, 639,
In formulating aggravating factor two, the Legislature prescribed a more limited inquiry. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(2) compels “a pragmatic assessment of the totality of harm inflicted by the offender on the victim.” Kromphold, supra, 162 N.J. at 358,
Consistent with this principle, if a defendant is convicted of offenses against multiple victims, the harm inflicted upon all such victims can be considered when the sentencing court applies aggravating factor two. For example, in Carey, supra, 168 N.J. at 420,
The word “victim” in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(2), however, has never been held to extend beyond the direct victims of the offense or offenses for which the sentence is imposed. In a setting of family members suffering emоtional harm due to a relative’s death, the Appellate Division confirmed the limited scope of the tex-m “victim” in State v. Radziwil, 235 N.J.Super. 557, 575,
[T]he trial court erred in treating the emotional trauma to the victim’s family caused by his death as an aggravating factor. The wording of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1a(2), which includes consideration of the victim’s power of resistance, indicates that the Legislature intended this aggravating factor to relate to the harm inflicted on the “victim of the offense” rather than the victim’s relatives.
Ubid.]
Thus, subject to the bar on double counting an element of the offense in the analysis, the harm inflicted on the victim of the offense for which the defendant is sentenced is relevant to aggravating factor two. Neither the plain language of the statute nor case law applying it suggests that the term “victim” has a broader meaning. If the defendant has not been convicted of offenses involving other victims, then the harm inflicted on those victims is excluded from consideration under aggravating factor two.
The State argues that for purposes of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(2), the Court should adopt a definition of “victim” that would include the close family members of a deceased victim, as does the definition incorporated in the VRA, N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 22. The VRA defines “victim of a crime,” for purposеs of that paragraph, as
a person who has suffered physical or psychological injury or has incurred loss of or damage to personal or real property as a result of a crime or an incident involving another person operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and ... the spouse, parent, legal guardian, grandparent, child or sibling of the decedent in the case of a criminal homicide.
[N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 22.]
The State further cites the concept of a “victim” in the Crime Victim’s Bill of Rights, N.J.S.A. 52:4B-34 to -38.
“[V]ictim” means a person who suffers personal, physical or psyсhological injury or death or incurs loss of or injury to personal or real property as a result of a crime committed by an adult or an act of delinquency that would constitute a crime if committed by an adult, committed against that person. “Victim” also includes the nearest relative of the victim of a criminal homicide.
The provisions cited by the State serve important legislative objectives. The VRA is intended to guarantee crime victims and their families “fairness, compassion and respeet[ful]” treatment “by the criminal justice system,” a right to be present at proceedings and “rights and remedies as may be provided by the Legislature.”
In sum, for purposes of aggravating factor two, the “victim” constitutes any person who was directly harmed by the defendant in the exact offense of which he or she stands convicted. In contrast to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1)’s broad concept of “the nature and circumstances of the offense,” N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(2)’s plain language calls for a precise inquiry limited to the direct victim of the offense. Thus, if the defendant harmed other individuals but was not convicted of offenses against those individuals, they do not constitute “victims” within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(2).
IV.
Applied here, the plain language of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) requires thаt defendant be resenteneed for the serious offenses to which he pled guilty. In its discretion, the sentencing court may consider the severe injuries suffered by Sheri Shelton and the less serious but significant injuries suffered by her daughter Brittany as part of the “nature and circumstances of the offense” inquiry authorized by N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1). Defendant’s conduct in driving while intoxicated and colliding with the Shelton family’s vehicle not only put Fredrick Shelton at risk, but also imperiled the safety of his wife and daughter. The injuries that the surviving victims sustained in the collision between defendant’s vehicle and their own may be pertinent to the court’s review of aggravating factor one.
The harm to both Sheri and Brittany Shelton is, however, irrelevant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44—1(a)(2). Defendant’s aggravated manslaughter offense had a single victim: Fredrick Shelton, whose death is an element of the offense under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a). Because they survived the tragic collision that took Fredrick Shelton’s life, Sheri and Brittany Shelton were not “victims” of first-degree aggravated manslaughter within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(2). Consequently, their injuries should not be considered by the sentencing court to support the application of aggravating factor two when the court resentences defendant.
V.
The judgment of the Appellate Divisiоn is affirmed, and the matter is remanded to the sentencing court for imposition of defendant’s sentence in accordance with this opinion.
For affirmance and remandment — Chief Justice RABNER and Justices LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, HOENS, PATTERSON and Judge RODRÍGUEZ (temporarily assigned) — 6.
Opposed — None.
Not participating — Judge CUFF (temporarily assigned).
Notes
While the indictment refers to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(c)(3) as third-degree aggravated assault, it is evident based on the substance of the indictment, the presentence report and the judgment of conviction that the proper charge under N.J.S.A. 2C: 12—1(c)(3) was second-degree assault by auto.
The Appellate Division also ruled that the sentencing court should not have found aggravating factor six, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1 (a)(6), the extent and severity of defendant’s criminal record. Lawless, supra, 423 N.J.Super. at 305,
In addition to aggravating factors one, two, three, six and nine, relevant here, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) provides for eight other aggravating factors and N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b) provides for thirteen mitigating factors.
This construction of the term is consistent with definitions found in portions of the criminal code applying to specific offenses. For example, in the context of sexual offenses, a victim "means a person alleging to have been subjected to offenses proscribed by [N.J.S.A. 2C:14-1 to -10]." N.J.S.A. 2C:14-1(b). In domestic violence matters, a victim is defined as "a person protected under [N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35] and shall include any person who is 18 years of age or older or who is an emancipated minor and who has been subjected to domestic violence by a spouse, former spouse, or any other person who is a present or former household memberf,] ... any person, regardless of age, who has been subjected to domestic violence by a person with whom the victim has a child in common, or with whom the victim anticipates having a child in common, if one of the parties is pregnantf, and] ... any person who has been subjected to domestic violence by a person with whom the victim has had a dating relationship." N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(d).
The Crime Victim’s Bill of Rights guarantees crime victims, including in some instances designated family members, eighteen enumerated rights, including the rights ”[t]o be treated with dignity and compassion by the criminal justice system; [t]o be informed about the criminal justice process;” and "[t]o be free from intimidation, harassment or abuse by any person including the defendant or any other person acting in support of or on behalf of the defendant, due to the involvement of the victim or witness in the criminal justice process!.]" N.J.S.A. 52:4B-36.