State v. . Lawhorn
88 N.C. 634
N.C.
1883
Check Treatment
Ruffin, J.

There is no force in any of the exceptions taken for the defendant. By availing himself of the privilege of testifying in his own behalf, afforded him by the statute, he assumed the character of a witness and became subject to every rule adopted bjr the courts for the purpose of testing the credibility of witnesses. State v. Efler, 85 N. C., 585. In this state, it is well settled that a witness may be asked on cross-examination whether he has not been convicted of offences calculated to affect his standing as a witness. State v. Patterson, 2 Ired., 346; State v. Garrett, Busb., 357.

In State v. Davidson, 67 N. C., 119, it is said that the tendency of modern decisions is to allow almost any question to be put to a witness, and to require him to answer it, unless it should subject him to a criminal prosecution. The declarations of the defendant made in the hearing of the witness, Walters, were clearly admissible against him. Indeed it is hard to conceive of any case, whether criminal or civil, in which a party’s own declarations pertinent to the issue could not be given in evidence against him. We know of no rule under which they could have been excluded, as being fragmentary in their nature. This circumstance might well affect their weight with the jury, and was, therefore, properly the subject of comment by counsel, but it furnished no ground for the exclusion of the testimony itself, it being otherwise clearly germane to the issue, as tending to show *638 the violent condition of the defendant’s temper and disposition at the time. The case of Buie v. Carver, cited by counsel from 73 N. C., 264, is no authority in this case. That was a case in which a party undertook to show what a deceased witness had sworn on a former trial, and it was held that the witness was incompetent to do this, unless he was able to state the substance of all that was said by the deceased witness. But the rule seems to be confined to cases of that sort, and not even to extend to a case in which it is sought to impeach the testimony of a witness by showing contradictory statements made upon a previous examination in the cause.

In Ingram v. Watkins, 1 Dev. & Bat., 442, it was said that, on an indictment for perjury, it was not necessary that the prosecution should be able to prove all the evidence given by the defendant on the trial wherein he testified.

The law governing the defendant’s right of self-defence was correctly laid down to the jury, and certainly with as much favor to him as he had any right to ask. In no case can a man be entirely innocent, who either provokes a fight or willingly engages in it; and it may well be questioned, therefore, whether it was not Plis Honor’s duty to instruct the jury, that taking the defendant’s evidence alone to be true, he was guilty of the offence charged against him.

There is no error in the jugment of the court below, and the same is, therefore, affirmed. Let this be certified, to the end that that court may proceed according to law in the premises.

No error. Affirmed.