— By indiсtment defendant was charged with the offense of breaking and entering as defined in section 708.8, Code of Iowa. Upon his plea of not guilty he was tried and found guilty by a jury. The trial court overruled defendant’s motions for new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and sentenced defendant to the penitentiary.
Fоr reversal defendant claims lack of corroboration of alleged accomplices and prejudicial error committed by the рrosecutor in final argument.
I. In the early morning hours of July 10, 1961, Jeanette Freeman and Helen Dolly Hill broke and entered a house in Des Moines and stole оne rug and half of another rug.
They were arrested on the afternoon of July 11, admitted the offense and implicated defendant. At the trial they testified fоr the State and against defendant.
At the trial there was testimony by arresting officers that in defendant’s presence the women identified defendant as the one who had helped them steal the rugs.
*515 There was testimony that defendant admitted he was at the scene of the crime and had carried the rugs from the premises and w7as with the women when the crime was planned.
In his own behalf defendant testified that he picked up the smaller rug from the parking in baсk of the premises, carried it to his car and took it to Mrs. Freeman’s house; changed his clothes and went back to the burgled premises and got the other rug and took it in his ear to Mrs. Hill’s house.
II. Section 782.5, Code of Iowa, provides:
“Corroboration of accomplice. A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an aсcomplice, unless corroborated by other evidence which shall tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense; and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shoAV the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof.”
Mrs. Freeman and Mrs. Hill were accomplices. Corroboration of their testimony wns necessary. “Whether there was some evidence of this character was for the court to decide; its sufficiency was for the jury.” State v. O’Meara,
In State v. Cotton,
“This court has repeatedly held that the corroboration need not be of every material fact testified to by the accomplice. The requirements of the' statute are met if it can fairly be said that the accomplicе is corroborated in some material fact legitimately tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense. The corrobоrating evidence may be either circumstantial or direct. Numerous cases could be cited to this point.” (Citations) See also State v. Gates, suрra.
The defendant himself may furnish the corroboration required. State v. Bosch,
In State v. Clay,
“If the testimony of an accomplice is corroborated by other witnesses in аny material point tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense, it is sufficient. [Citations]
“The evidence adduced to corroborate an accomplice need not be strong and any corroborative evidence legitimately tending to connect the accused with the commission of the crime and thereby lend support to the credibility of the accomplice is sufficient. It is not necessary that the tеstimony offered as corroboration be entirely inconsistent with innocence.” (Citations)
In the instant ease the arresting officers testified that defendant admitted helping the women haul the rugs from the burgled premises and that he was with the women when the plan of stealing was discussed. As a witness in his own behalf defеndant admitted carrying the rugs from the premises to his car and hauling them away. There was ample corroboration to generate a jury question.
Thе jury was fully instructed on the requirements for corroboration. The testimony of the accomplices, together with the corroborating testimony, was sufficient to support the verdict of the jury.
The court did not err in overruling the several motions of defendant urging lack of corroboration.
III. In argument to the jury, counsel for the State in commenting on the necessity for corroboration said, “A person’s testimony is corroborated if it is verified or substantiatеd or confirmed by any testimony which tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime. Now we have met this burden and if we have not met the burden of corroborating the accomplice's testimony, you would not receive this case because that is a legal point with- which you cаnnot be concerned at this time.” Objection ivas made and the court said, “The court will cover that matter- in an instruction. You may proceed.” Lаter in the same argument counsel for the State referred to one of the alleged *517 accomplices as defendant’s paramour or mistress. Objections were made.
The court commented that counsel was making an inference with which the jury might agree or disagree — “it is up to them.”
IV. Mrs. Hill testifiеd that she was defendant’s “girl friend”. There was evidence that defendant had been to her house on many occasions in the past. He furnished his car аnd was very solicitous in the late evening activities of his girl friend. Hauling rugs from strange premises at 1 a.m. for a girl friend might conceivably lead to inferences of conduct beyond the limits of propriety.
The argument in behalf of defendant is not before us.
Where the argument for the defense is not before ais the argument for the State is presumed to be in response thereto. If responsive it Avas not error. State v. Cameron,
V. The granting of a motion for neAV trial based on alleged misconduct is peculiаrly within the discretion of the trial court and this court aaúII not interfere AUiless it appears that defendant has not had a fair trial. State v. Dale,
Therе is nothing in the record before us to shoAV that the inferences of counsel deprived defendant of a fair trial or that there Avas any abuse of discretion by the trial court.
VI. The argument for the State relative to corroboration, quoted in Division III, \Afas not correct. See State v. Potter,
Where the inaccurate statement Avas followed by a сorrect exposition of the law relating to such matter there was no prejudice. See State v. O’Meara, supra, on page 628 of 190 Iowa Reports. See also State v. Burns,
This statement is not a categorical rule applicable to all situ *518 ations. Obviously a prosecutor’s statements may so violate the limits ol propriety and be so prejudicial as to constitute reversible error. Such was not the case here. The statement was not such a flagrant error as to be impossible of correction. The court correctly and in detail instructed the jury. There was no prejudicial error.
We have examined the whole record. The defendant had a fair trial.
The case is — Affirmed.