State v. LanierState v. Lanier
I. History of the Case
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Daniel Lanier, was originally convicted on one count of attempted murder
{¶ 2} The record shows that following a dispute, Lanier chased down Biondi Stevenson, pulled out a gun, and started shooting at him. One of the shots hit Stevenson, injuring him. Stevenson yelled that he had been shot, but Lanier continued to shoot. He did not stop until the gun jammed аfter he had fired at least four more shots.
{¶ 3} On appeal, Lanier argued that he should not have been sentenced for all three offenses, because they were allied offenses, of similar import. We affirmed the trial court’s findings of guilt, but vacated the sentences imposed and remanded the case fоr resentencing.
{¶ 4} We went on to hold that felonious assault under
{¶ 5} Finally, we held that felonious assault under
{¶ 6} We recognized that our decision was in conflict with the its decisions of another appellate district. Cоnsequently, we certified the case to the Ohio Supreme Court.
{¶ 7} Before the Supreme Court accepted the case, we decided State v. Love.
{¶ 8} Subsequently, the Supreme Court decided State v. Williams,
{¶ 9} Most recently, the Supreme Court decided State v. Johnson,
II. Allied Offenses of Similar Import
{¶ 10}
{¶ 11} “(A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses, but the defendant may be convicted of only one.
{¶ 12} “(B) Where the defendant’s conduct constitutes two or more offenses of dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more offenses of the same or similar kind committed separately or with a separate animus as to each, the indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses, and the defendant may be convicted of all of them.”
A. A New Test
{¶ 13} In Johnson, the Supreme Court stated, “When determining whether two offenses are allied offenses of similar import subject to merger under
{¶ 14} We agree with the analysis of Johnson set out in Craycraft. The court in that cаse stated, “The first inquiry focuses on whether it is possible to commit both offenses with the same conduct. It is not necessary that the commission of one will always result in the сommission of the other. Rather, the question is whether it is possible for both offenses to be committed by the same conduct. Conversely, if the commission of one offense will never result in the commission of the other, the offenses will not merge.”
{¶ 15} “If it is possible to commit both offenses with the same conduct, the court must next determine whether thе offenses were in fact committed by a single act, performed with a single state of mind. If so, the offenses are allied offenses of similar import and must be merged. On the other hand, if the offenses are committed separately or with a separate animus, the offenses will not merge.”
B. Application of the Test
{¶ 16} We turn now to step one of the analysis. To determine whether attempted murder and felonious assault under both
{¶ 17}
{¶ 19} We conclude that it is possible to commit all three of thesе offenses with the same conduct. When, as here, a defendant shoots another person with a gun and succeeds in injuring the other person but not in killing him, the defendаnt has attempted to and has caused physical harm with a deadly weapon and has engaged in conduct that, if successful, would have resulted in the victim’s dеath. Thus, the first part of the allied-offenses test is satisfied.
{¶ 20} Consequently, we apply the second part of the test and examine whether Lanier committed thе offenses by way of “ ‘a single act, performed with a single state of mind.’ ”
{¶ 21} Lanier fired the shots at the same victim with the same gun at the same location in rapid sucсession. He did not pause or reload the gun. This court has previously stated, “The murder or assault of a single victim by a single perpetrator who fires multiple gunshots often results in only a single punishment. The perpetrator’s discharge of gunshots in rapid succession either constitutes a single, continuous act or is evidenсe of a single animus to harm the victim with some of the attacker’s shots achieving his purpose and some striking wide of the mark.”
{¶ 22} Johnson supports the result that the conduсt in this case involved a single occurrence. In fact, the plurality opinion in Johnson stated, “We have consistently recognized that the purpose of
Sentences vacated and cause remanded.
Notes
.
.
. State v. Lanier,
. State v. Cabrales,
. Lanier at ¶ 22.
. Id. at ¶ 22.
. Id. at ¶ 23-24.
. Id. at ¶ 29-31.
. Id. at ¶ 31.
. Id. at ¶ 25-27.
. Id. at ¶ 33.
.
.
. State v. Love, 1st Dist. Nos. C-070782 and C-080078,
. Id. at ¶ 16-23.
. State v. Williams,
. State v. Johnson, 1st Dist. No. C-090413,
. Williams at paragraph two of the syllabus.
. State v. Johnson,
. State v. Rance (1999),
. Johnson at syllabus.
. State v. Lanier,
. State v. Moore, 2d Dist. No. 2010 CA 13,
. Johnson,
. State v. Craycraft, 12th Dist. Nos. CA2009-02-013 and CA2009-02-014,
. (Emphasis sic.) Craycraft at ¶ 11, citing Johnson at ¶ 48 and 51. See also State v. Burton, 8th Dist. No. 94449,
. Id. at ¶ 12, citing Johnson at ¶ 49-51.
. See id. at ¶ 13, citing Johnson at ¶ 48.
. Lanier I, at ¶ 23; State v. Byrd, 1st Dist. No. C-050490,
. Johnson,
. State v. Jackson, 1st Dist. No. C-090414,
. Johnson at ¶ 43.