State v. LangoneState v. Langone
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Batchelder
On аppeal, the defendant claims that delays by the State in commencing his district court and superior court trials for driving while intoxicated, subsequent offense,
On August 15,1982, the defendant was arrested and charged with the offenses. Arraignment and trial were scheduled for September
On August 4, 1983, the defendant appealed to the superior court.
The defendant’s rights to a speedy trial derive from part I, article 14, of the State Constitution and the sixth amendment to the Federal Constitution. We begin, as we must, by first making an independent analysis of the protections afforded under the New Hampshire Constitution, State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231, 471 A.2d 347, 350 (1983), using decisions of the United States Supreme Court and other jurisdictions only as aids in our analysis, see Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3476 (1983). Thereafter, we need address federal
“In order to determine whether the defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, we must balancе four factors: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reasons for the delay, (3) whether the defendant asserted his right, and (4) any prejudice to the defendant.” State v. Weitzman, 121 N.H. 83, 86, 427 A.2d 3, 5 (1981) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-33 (1972)). We address these four considerations in the Barker v. Wingo test in turn.
The principal dispute between the parties concerns the proper measurement of the speedy trial period in cases such as this where a de novo trial in the superior court is held at the defendant’s request following a conviction in the district court. The defendant argues that the delays at the two levels should be сonsidered together for speedy trial purposes because his right to a jury trial was satisfied only at the superior court. We disagree. We hold that the delays at the district court and those at the superior court must be evaluated separately for speedy trial purposes.
The defendant was entitled under both State statutes and the Federal Constitution to a jury trial. Under
On appeal, the defendant argues that because he was entitled to a jury trial, the relevant time period for speedy trial purposes is the period running from his arrest to the commencement of his superior court trial. We reject this argument because it misapprehends the purposе of the defendant’s speedy trial rights.
By requiring that criminal trials be commenced with reasonable dispatch, the State and federal speedy trial rights pro
Since misdemeanor trials in district court are constitutionally permissible, N.H. Const, pt. II, art. 77, the period of time running from the charge or arrest of a defendant to the commencement of his district court trial is an appropriate subject for separate inquiry under the speedy trial requirements. If a defendant is convicted at the district court and appeals to the superior court, the protection of his speedy trial interests requires that the State not unduly delay commencement of the second trial. The period of time running from the entry of the appeal on the superior court docket to the commencement of the new trial therefore also merits independent consideration under the speedy trial requirеments. Cf. Super. Ct. R. app. at 73 (speedy trial policy effective upon entry of case on superior court docket).
In arguing that the delays at the district court and those at the superior court should be consolidated for speedy trial purposes, the defendant mistakenly relies on State v. Weitzman, 121 N.H. 83, 427 A.2d 3 (1981), and State v. Cole, 118 N.H. 829, 395 A.2d 189 (1978). In Weitzman, the thirteen-month period of delay at issue in that case was calculated from the date of the defendant’s appeal to the superior court and did not include the one month between his arrest and his district court trial. Weitzman, supra at 91, 427 A.2d at 8 (Douglas, J., dissenting). In Cole, a delay of fourteen months in commencing the defendant’s superior court trial on charges of trespass and contempt was held to be a denial of his speedy trial rights. Cole, supra at 831, 395 A.2d at 191. The defendant had been previously tried at the district court on only the trеspass charge. Id. at 830, 395 A.2d at 189-90. The periods of delay running from the defendant’s appeal of his trespass conviction and from his contempt arrest to the commencement of his superior court trial were each approximately fourteen months. We interpret the opinion in Cole as using these two periods as the subjects of its speedy trial calculations. We thus interpret the reference to “[a] delay of over fourteen months from
In the instant cаse, the delay between the arrest and the commencement of the district court trial was ten months, and the delay between the entry of the defendant’s appeal and the commencement of his superior court trial was eight months. The ten-month delay at the district court was sufficiently long to be “presumptively prejudicial,” and inquiry must therefore be made into the last three factors of the Barker v. Wingo test with respect to this delay. See State v. Quinlan, 122 N.H. 51, 53, 440 A.2d 13, 14 (1982). Because we find that the defendant was denied a speedy trial at the district court, we need not consider the rеasonableness of the delays at the superior court.
Of the ten months of delay at the district court, four and one-half occurred due to the actions of the defendant: two and one-half months of delay occurred when the court continued the сase to allow the defendant time to prepare for trial, and two months occurred when the court continued the case to allow the defendant time to locate a witness who had become unavailable.
The remainder of the delаys were due to the State. Delays totaling four months were due to the granting of three continuances necessitated by the absence of the arresting officer, and a delay of one month occurred due to the crowded docket of the court.
Citing State v. Zysk, 123 N.H. 481, 465 A.2d 480 (1983), the State argues that the delays caused by the absence of the officer should not be weighed against the State. We disagree. In Zysk, the delay caused by the absence of an unidentified prosecution witness was not held against the State. In this case, hоwever, the witness who failed to appear is a policeman, who, as such, is an agent of the State with an interest in bringing the defendant to trial. We hold that trial delays arising from the failure of law enforcement personnel to appear in court accordingly are to be held against the State, especially in instancés where no reasonable justification for the failure to appear is offered. In this case, no justification has been offered for two of the three delays caused by thе absence of the arresting officer. These two delays therefore weigh more heavily against the State than the delay caused by the explained absence of the arresting officer. The delay due to the crowded docket of the cоurt is likewise held against the State, although to a lesser extent
“This court puts substantial emphasis on the latter two of the Barker factors.” State v. Cole, 118 N.H. at 831, 395 A.2d at 190. The record reveals that the defendant frequently asserted his rights to a speedy trial and that the delays prejudiced his ability to defend himself at trial. The defendant objected to the State’s requests for continuances on December 9, 1982, and January 13, 1983, and moved to dismiss the case for lack of a speedy trial in February 1983. The defendant thus consistently demanded that his speedy trial rights be honored.
After thе district court granted three continuances due to the unavailability of the arresting officer and one due to the crowded docket of the court, a defense witness left the State and became unavailable for future hearings. Impairment of a defendant’s defense is a constitutionally significant form of prejudice. See State v. Weitzman, 121 N.H. at 87, 427 A.2d at 5.
In conclusion, we note that, although the impairment to the defense caused by the district court delays arose in this case at the district court, impairments to the defense due to district сourt delays may arise in other cases later on appeal to the superior court. A material defense witness, for instance, may, due to earlier delays at the district court, become unavailable during the superior court trial. Although the reаsonableness of the delays at the district court and of those at the superior court are to be independently evaluated, prejudice to the defendant in the form of an impaired defense at the superior court may properly be аttributed, in whole or in part, to delays at the district court. To hold otherwise would frustrate furtherance of a purpose of the speedy trial rights — the prevention of impairments to the defense. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 532; State v. Cole, 118 N.H. at 831, 395 A.2d at 190.
In light of all the circumstances, we find that the defendant’s State constitutional right to a speedy trial was denied.
Reversed.
All concurred.