On Sеptember 14, 2011, a Clayton County grand jury indicted John James Lampl for the offenses of conspiracy in restraint of free and open competition (Count I), false statements and writings (Counts II-VII), andperjury (Count VIII). The grand jury’s indictment stemmed from an earlier investigation by a Clayton County special purpose grand jury which had been impaneled pursuant to OCGA § 15-12-100 for the purpose of investigating public corruption and various crimes allegedly committed by currently or previously elected county offiсials and county employees. As Lampl was neither a county official nor a county employee, he moved to dismiss all counts of the indictment, contending that he was the “target” of an unlawful investigation by the special purpose grаnd jury and that he should not have been compelled to testify at the special purpose grand jury proceedings.
The perjury charge was based on a portion of Lampl’s testimony to the special purpose grand jury. In its ruling on the mоtion to dismiss, the trial court found that the special purpose grand jury was not authorized to conduct an investigation of Lampl, who was an employee of the City of Morrow, and was not authorized to investigate Lampl’s involvement with “Olde Townе Morrow,” a real estate development project for the City of Morrow. The trial court further found that the special purpose grand jury was not authorized to subpoena Lampl to testify regarding matters which exceeded the sсope of its investigation. Accordingly, the trial court granted Lampl’s motion to dismiss with regard to the perjury count (Count VIII) of the indictment, and it also granted his motion to suppress the statements that he made to the special purpose grand jury Hоwever, the trial court denied Lampl’s motion to dismiss with regard to the remaining counts of the indictment (Counts I-VII), finding that the indictment was brought by a properly constituted grand jury which was authorized to indict Lampl for these offenses.
Both parties appeаl from the trial court’s ruling, and their cross-appeals are consolidated for our review. In Case No. A13A1071, the State contends that the trial court erred in dismissing the perjury count because the special purpose grand jury did not exceеd the scope of its investigation. The State argues that the investigation into the Olde Towne Morrow project, as well as the questioning of Lampl, potentially involved corruption at the county level. The State further contends that the trial court erred in suppressing Lampl’s statements because (1) the special purpose grand jury had the authority to subpoena Lampl; (2) Lampl testified voluntarily; and (3) there was no violation of Lampl’s constitutional rights. In Case No. A13A1072,
Case No. A13A1071
1. The State contends that the trial court erred in dismissing the perjury count (Count VIII) of the indictment. Essentially, the State argues that the special purpose grand jury was authorized to investigate the Olde Towne Morrow project because it potentially involved corruption at the county level, and that the special purpose grand jury did not exceed the scope of its investigative authority when it subpoenaed Lampl and questioned him with regard to his involvement in the city projeсt. We disagree.
A special purpose grand jury may be impaneled “for the purpose of investigating any alleged violation of the laws of this state or any other matter subject to investigation by grand juries as provided by law.” OCGA § 15-12-100 (a). Although a spеcial purpose grand jury is limited to investigative purposes and has no power to return an indictment,
In this case, the Clayton County Superior Court enterеd an order impaneling the special purpose grand jury “for the purpose of investigating public corruption and various crimes allegedly committed by currently or previously elected county officials and county employeеs.” It is undisputed that Lampl was an employee of the City of Morrow, and that he was neither a currently or previously elected county official or county employee. Furthermore, our review of the
Likewise, we agree with the trial court that the special purpоse grand jury lacked the authority to subpoena Lampl for the purpose of investigating the Olde Towne Morrow project and his involvement in the same. While a special purpose grand jury may subpoena witnesses and compel еvidence, its power to do so is limited to matters which relate directly or indirectly to the authorized investigation. See OCGA § 15-12-100 (c). Here, the special purpose grand jury was not authorized to investigate Lampl or the Olde Towne Morrow project. As Lampl’s perjury charge arose out of his testimony during this unauthorized investigation, the trial court did not err in dismissing the perjury count. See State v. Bartel,
2. The State makes the additional argument that we should reverse the ruling of the trial court and remand the case tо allow the State to present additional evidence regarding the authorized scope of the special purpose grand jury’s investigation. It contends that the trial court erroneously prevented the State from presenting evidence on this issue. Specifically, the State argues that the trial court erred by (i) failing to consider redacted portions of the superior court order impaneling the special purpose grand jury; (ii) refusing to permit the State to proffer an unredacted copy of the order; and (iii) refusing to accept testimony from the superior court judge who had been assigned to follow the progress of the special purpose grand jury. This argument is wholly without merit.
Prior to the hearing on the plea in bar and motion to dismiss, Lampl filed a motion with the trial court seeking to obtain a copy of the order impaneling the special purpose grand jury. Over the State’s objection, the trial court granted Lampl’s motion. In its ruling, thе trial court directed that redacted copies of the order be released to the parties, with the names of the specific targets of the investigation blacked out. The trial court further stated that Lampl’s name was not among those listed in the order as an authorized target of the special purpose grand jury investigation.
As the State was afforded an opportunity to present evidence at the hearing and failed to do so, we conclude that remanding the case to give the State a second opportunity to present evidence is inappropriate and unauthorized. See, e.g., Mosby v. State,
3. The State further contends that the trial court erred in suppressing Lampl’s statements to the special purpose grand jury.
Case No. A13A1072
4. While the trial court granted Lampl’s plea in bar and motion to dismiss with regard to the perjury count of the indictment (Count VIII), Lampl contends that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the remaining counts of conspiracy in restraint of free and open competition (Count I) and false statements and writings (Counts II-VII).
In his motion and in his argument at the hearing on his motion to dismiss before the trial court, Lampl argued that the district attorney had orchestrated the unauthorized investigation of Lampl and the Olde Towne Mоrrow project and, thus, had engaged in prosecutorial misconduct that was so outrageous and fundamentally unfair that it violated due process of law, warranting dismissal of the indictment in toto.
However, “[a] plea in bar is one which goes tо bar the [S]tate’s action; that is to defeat it absolutely and entirely.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) State v. Land-O-Sun Dairies, Inc.,
“Although federal and state courts possess the authority to dismiss an indictment for governmental misconduct, dismissal is an extreme sanction which should be infrequently utilized. Dismissal is only favored in the most egregious cases.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Robinson v. State,
The remedy for an alleged constitutional violation involving governmental misсonduct should be tailored to the injury suffered from the violation. Wilcox v. State,
Since the trial court granted Lampl’s motion to suppress the statements he made to the special purpose grand jury, there has bеen no actual prejudice to Lampl which would affect his ability to receive a fair trial. Under these circumstances, the remedy of dismissing the indictment is not warranted.
Judgments affirmed.
Notes
See Kenerly v. State,
The trial court found that Lampl’s statements could be used for the limited purposes of impeachment. This finding has not been raised as an enumeration of error on appeal.