59 Ohio App. 2d 125 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1977
The defendant-appellant, Mark E. Lamp, appeals his convictions for aggravated burglary (R. C.
No preliminary hearing was held. Lamp appeared for *126 arraignment in the Common Pleas Court. The court ordered the Summit County Psycho-Diagnostic Clinic to examine Lamp after Lamp's attorney questioned his competency to stand trial. The clinic reported that Lamp was competent to stand trial. Nevertheless, the court indicated a desire to send Lamp to the Lima State Hospital for a further examination. However, after it was established that Lamp could be fully examined locally, the court referred him to a local psychiatrist. Both the state and the defense agreed to this procedure.
The defendant's attorney thereafter filed a motion, requesting an evidentiary hearing pursuant to R. C.
Lamp entered a plea of no contest to the aggravated burglary count. A trial was ordered to commence the next day on the theft count. The defendant then pled no contest to that count on March 1. The prosecuting attorney indicated that he would recommend that the remaining count be nolled if Lamp would aid in the investigation of other crimes.
Lamp was sentenced on March 7 and the aggravated robbery count was nolled.
There is no constitutional right to a preliminary hearing pursuant to R. C.
A prosecutorial decision to proceed by indictment does not, of itself, unlawfully deprive an accused of a preliminary hearing. Consequently, this assignment of error can be upheld only if the specific decision to indict the defendant was arbitrarily discriminatory.
Lamp was indicted pursuant to the prosecutor's "Career Criminal Program." The program is designed to swiftly mobilize the criminal justice system against persons arrested for designated violent crimes who have been previously convicted of two separate felonies or one felony of a class of designated serious offenses. Once a person who fits this profile is arrested, the prosecutor will usually obtain an indictment. The elimination of the preliminary hearing is an avowed goal of the program. After an indictment, the prosecutor seeks a high bail, an early trial date and a maximum sentence upon conviction.
We hold that the Career Criminal Program, on its face, does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment; Section
The Career Criminal Program is not based upon a suspect classification. See, e. g., Graham v. Richardson (1971),
The program bears a reasonable relationship to the legitimate interest of the state in the speedy, but fair, prosecution of those who have demonstrated a propensity for crime. See,McGinnis v. Royster (1973),
Since the program is fair on its face, the only question remaining is whether defendant has shown himself to be the victim of intentional discrimination, constituting an abuse of the prosecutor's discretion. See, Snowden v. Hughes (1943),
Prosecutors have traditionally enjoyed a wide degree of discretion in the discharge of their official duties. UnitedStates v. Alarik, (C. A. 8, 1971),
The defendant suffered no unlawful discrimination. He fell within the career criminal profile and was not deprived of any constitutional right during the disposition of his case.
The trial court ordered two examinations of the defendant. Both of these resulted in a finding that Lamp was competent to stand trial. At the February 28 arraignment, Lamp's attorney stated, after examining the second psychiatric report, "I agree then there's no question as to Mark's competency to stand trial." This can only be interpreted as a waiver of the hearing and concurrence in the psychiatric findings.
The court observed Lamp on several occasions and, before taking the no contest plea to the aggravated burglary *129 count, found that he was competent to stand trial.
We overrule all three assignments of error and affirm the judgment.
Judgment affirmed.
VICTOR and HARVEY, JJ., concur.
HARVEY, J., retired, of the Court of Common Pleas of Summit County, was assigned to active duty under authority of Section 6(C), Article IV, Constitution.