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State v. Lair
301 A.2d 748
N.J.
1973
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*1 JERSEY, AND NEW PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT STATE OF CROSS-APPELLANT, LAIR, A. DEFENDANT- THOMAS APPELLANT AND CROSS-RESPONDENT. Argued March October 1972 Decided 1973.

389- *2 Jacobs, Mr. David P. Defender, Deputy Assistant Public for argued the cause defendant-appellant cross-respon- Ness, dent C. Stanley Van Public (Mr. Defender, attorney; Jacobs, Mr. counsel, and on the brief). Simon,

Mr. Sheldon M. Special Prosecutor, Assistant ar- *3 gued the cause for plaintiff-respondent cross-appellant and Jr., M. (Mr. Egan, Charles Prosecutor, Morris County at- Simon, counsel, Mr. of on torney; brief). and the Gicco, Mr. John De Deputy Attorney General, the argued Jr., cause as Amicus Curiae F. George Kugler, (Mr. At- Gicco, of New torney Jersey, attorney; General Mr. De of and counsel on the brief. of the Court was opinion delivered by J. Defendant was indicted for

Mountain, al- having legedly committed the crime of N. J. A. rape, 2A:138-1, S. as well as the crime of N. J. A. sodomy, 2A:143-1. He a was tried to jury convicted of and both Upon offenses. the appeal Division affirmed Appellate the sodomy convic- tion but reversed the conviction for rape, that is- remanding sue new for a trial. We both granted petition defendant’s and the State’s for cross-petition certification. 59 N. J. 288

The facts may be summarized. briefly Defendant admitted a he visit to the of paid apartment victim the during July 18, the of 1969. evening They ac- only were casual in fact he made welcome and was apparently but quaintanees which jury There from the testimony a meal. was served some following in evening, have found that later the might made to his conversation, defendant advances hos- desultory rebuffed. He nevertheless persisted which were at once tess her that manner so terrified threats, conduct his and by and of re- all effectively power her life and lost feared for she a thereafter over period He her disrobe and made sistance. in sexual natural hours, her to compelled engage of several oc- anal each three sodomy, in acts of intercourse hours of left, early in the morning After he had casions. of a home friend way victim made her the 19, the July until in the remained later fore- nearby, where she who lived the victim treated notified and when were police noon the a hospital. local sodomy affirmed conviction for Division the The Appellate for the reason that conviction rape but reversed or at other not, any either in charge did his judge trial trial, instruct that evidence jury point during had been in- convictions, criminal which prior defendant’s troduced, must be considered the issue only jury upon and for no other credibility purpose. be in prior may

Evidence criminal convictions credibility troduced for the purpose impeaching testifies, who criminal including defendant anyone N. J. S. A. 2A:81-12. trial who offers himself as witness. not, however, or taken into Such evidence be considered *4 the of the offense determining guilt account defendant’s Sinclair, 56, J. is v. 57 N. being for which he tried. State 259, v. 54 J. 269-270 Manley, 62-64 State N. (1970); Hawthorne, v. 49 N. J. A limit State 130 (1969); this by instruction to should be the trial given effect ing Evidence Rule 6. Here not done. Defend court. this was that, however, the in counsel, ant’s did not court request any objection an instruction its nor was- charge clude such to omission. came before point or taken its exception 392 (cid:127) —(cid:127) — Division as it now before as Appellate

the comes us error. plain

Thus the issue is failure to or charge whether this instruct “clearly otherwise the was jury capable producing result,” 2:10-2, an B. the unjust under known as commonly rule, “plain fairly error” whether be or it considered error, harmless the defend capacity prejudice the lacking ant. After a very careful have study entire record we reached the conclusion that did not a re the error require versal. We base decision over very largely nature of whelming testimony to defendant’s pointing and the relative the testimonial ref guilt insignificance erences to his His prior convictions. own narrative of events, uncorroborated in any way essentially implau sible, included the admission he had had normal sexual victim, relations with the he been insisted this had although with her consent. faced an with Upon being inculpatory arrest, statement made him after by shortly his he in effect admitted the acts of That the trial sodomy. concurred judge in the result is reached from his re jury apparent marks in motion for new trial. As have denying we said, no conclusion than other seems tenable on this guilt rceord, aside all leaving reference to defendant’s con past victions.

aWhere failure to inform the jury that evidence prior must convictions be limited solely of credibility issue urged error, as plain courts have not hesitated to sustain convictions where no real prejudice can be shown. United Carter, v. States 401 F. 2d 748, (3rd Cir. cert. 1968), 393 U. 1103, den. S. 89 S. Ct. 905, 21 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1969); States, Nutt v. United 335 F. 817, 2d 818-819 (10th Cir. cert. 1964), S. 909, 203, U. 85 S. Ct. 13 L. Ed. 2d den. Commonwealth (1964); Cook, 351 Mass. 231, E.N. 2d (1966), cert. den. U. S. Ct. 529, 17 L. Ed. Durham, 2d 443 (1966); People v. 66 Ill. App. 2d N. E. 2d 768 (1965). But see People Camel, 11 Mich. 219, 160 N. App. W. 2d 790 (1968). Cf. *5 McNair, 458-459 Div. 59 N. J. Super. (App. State v. Baker, 1966). Div. v. 90 N. J. Super. (App. State 1960); the jury, presented hold that this failure to instruct We a error, not warrant reversal. here as did plain charge. a the sodomy This us to consideration of brings attack upon in his Defendant three urges principal grounds statute, N. J. that conviction. He first contends A. and hence viola- 143-1, S. %A: unconstitutionally vague is of due act is with charged tive that the he process; secondly, fall within the interdiction having committed does not fact deemed bemay statute that unless consent finally, defense, a valid is unconstitutional. legislation The enactment reads as follows: nature, against with Sodomy, committed crime or infamous by punished misdemeanor, high beast, a and shall be man or is imprisonment $5,000, than for not more or than fine of not more years, 2A:143-1] A. [If. or J. S. both. certainly first it is argument, defendant’s Turning to conduct define forbidden must true that penal legislation he what to understand to enable one clarity with sufficient com infringing legislative not do to avoid may or may mand. property life, liberty required peril or at one be No meaning penal be speculate entitled to All are statutes. as to the [Lanzetta or forbids. commands

informed as to what the State 618, 619, Jersey, L. 59 S. Ct. New 306 U. State of (1939)] Ed. said, Or, as this Court has recognized penal must statute it must be At the outset proscribes

specify such with the elements the offense which it certainty apprise degree it those to whom as reasonable proscribed, com- that men of standard of conduct so addressed meaning guess intelligence necessarily or differ at its need not mon 179; (1961)] application. Joas, N. [State J. as to its *6 statutory It must also be that apparent vague language to be conducive an more may interpretation responsive to than the moral tribunal predilections adjudicating of the State, P. to Harris v. 457 2d 638 legislative (Alaska intent. 1969). does it

Our nor “sodomy” does not define statute does, It what meant nature.” specify “crime against Morrison, 25 N. J. however, Super. v. two. State equate or 534, 536 identical 1953). employing Ct. Statutes (Cty. of our similar are to be found in about one-half language Question Con Note, of “Sodomy states. Statutes: A failure 50 Neb. L. Rev. 568 stitutionality,” kind of to set forth more nature of this precisely pro de scribed conduct has been attributed to always legislative State description. sire to avoid the of indelicacy explicit Morrison, v. 536. While the courts of at least two supra, at states have held or indicated the words “crime against that and hence nature,” alone, are vague standing impermissibly State, P. Harris v. 457 2d supra, violative of due process, State, 257 2d Franklin v. So. 1969); (Alaska have ruled to the jurisdictions 1971), majority (Fla. words, “crime against the view that the contrary, accepting law which nature,” at common had definite meaning No state to today. appears attributed them be to properly ours, which, a statute like unduly vague have stricken as identical upholding the word Cases “sodomy.” includes also on the ground vague statutes attack against or similar State, P. Nev. 2d v. Hogan include ness 573, 197 N. W. 39 Mich. App. v. People Vasquez, (1968); W. 2d 314 478 S. Crawford, (Mo. 2d 840 State (1972); M. 494 P. 2d 173 N. (1972): State v. 1972); Trejo, White, State, State 1971); 268 N. E. 2d (Ind. Dixon v. State, 489 P. 2d 526 Warren v. 1966); A. 2d 212 (Me. statute, also, un is not hold that our 1971). Cr. We (Okl. constitutionally vague.

Defendant’s that his conduct does not come argument within the embrace of the statute rests the asserted upon that the acts are those prohibited only performed proposition Here, heterosexually. and not those homosexually performed course, a per defendant is with assaulted charged having son of manner. He claims sex in the forbidden opposite this kind enactment. of conduct to be the reach of the beyond an historical re Defendant’s contention rests largely view kind of and judicial treatment legislative crime has in this Suf country. received in England fice it find say persuasive, that we do not this argument nor are we aware or any policy private aspect public inter favor such a limited morality that should lead us to we note pretation of the Furthermore statutory language. adversely posi-' issue has been resolved precise *7 has been presented. tion taken defendant wherever else it by Daniels v. 205 A. 2d 295 Maryland, 71, (1964): 237 Md. Askar, N. W. 2d 888 95, (1967); v. 8 Mich. 153 People App. N. W. 2d 573, 197 v. 39 Mich. People Vasquez, supra, App. State, P. 2d 383, Cr. 142 840 LeFavour v. 77 Okl. (1972); State, 35 W. 372 37, Tex. Cr. R. S. 132 Lewis v. 36 (1943); State, 86 W. 334 90, Tex. Cr. R. S. Adams v. 48 (1896); Witham, E. 593, Ill. 94 N. 2d 506 v. State (1905); State, N. E. 318, 19 2d Connell v. 215 Ind. (1950); Garrett, E. 2d 367 345, 133 S. 219 Ga. Riley (1939); Putnam, P. 2d 77 M. 78 N. State (1963); includes and pro- statute We conclude that our here. involved heterosexual such as are hibits acts The refused con judge trial to instruct that jury he is a defense to In so charge sodomy. sent doing always adhered to the rule which has generally accepted Schlosser, Laws this State. 2 Criminal in prevailed Wharton, 95.5; New ed. Criminal Jersey (3rd 1970) § J. Sodomy Law and Procedure ed. C. S. (Anderson 1957); final 372. Defendant’s to the statute rests p. challenge § this failure to The sev upon charge. argument implicates that in constitutional theses. It is out initially pointed eral Connecticut, Ct. Griswold v. 381 U. S. invalid several

L. Ed. 2d 510 Court declared (1965), statutes the State of Connecticut which imposed penalties birth control and persons those who upon practicing upon had aided them in so The informa- doing. appellants given tion, instruction and medical advice to married as persons of preventing concep- available means appropriate they tion. statutes were held unconstitutional that to affect and control the sought marriage relationship, be private nature of which the Court declared to constitu- from Griswold tionally by intrusion the State. protected thus' to marital recognized privacy, constitutional right which in case was violated when the state right sought that who birth criminal sanctions those impose practiced control Defendant recognizes or who its use. propagated in his and, argument, of marital as one right privacy step what be deemed may claims that it extends also to protect consensually private deviate sexual acts when practiced our stat- and now hold that a married We by couple.1 agree the conduct does include within its prohibition ute not married couples. thesis,

Thus we reach the final thrust of defendant’s that if such consensual conduct is when protected practiced married by the doctrine couples, protection equal the laws it be licensed when requires equally practiced unmarried hence our consenting persons; sodomy statute violates the Constitution unless it latter recognizes this right by that consent be a providing defense.

We decline to this The accept argument. of Jus- opinion tice in Griswold Douglas state, the married eulogizes stresses the intimacies of married life and privacy concludes that a is so to fulfillment of important the marriage relationship as to a justify as of recognition right constitutional dimen- import private, consensual, 1“Tlie decision is that Griswold protected regulation by through marital are relations from the state penalty.” Henry, 873, the of a use criminal Cotner v. F. 394 2d 875 1968), (7th 847, 132, cert. Cir. den. 393 U. S. Ct. 21 L. S. Ed. 2d 118 a non a It rather obvious that as matter sequitur sion. is right some similar or to protection equal privacy equal order the sexual con- must be found to exist in to protect law, duct of the unmarried. Much of our criminal and other- wise, bespeaks contrary. the Baird, 438, Eisenstadt v.

Defendant that U. S. urges 92 Ct. 31 L. Ed. different (1972) requires 2d There the Court considered Massachusetts statute result. sell, any lend or anyone away it crime for to making give of birth control device under condi except, prescribed kind were tions, to married Unmarried to be en persons. persons from access to The Court tirely contraceptives. excluded struck down the statute as violative being equal protec that whatever of an ac tion, the individual to saying rights and be, to the the married contraceptives may rights cess must be alike. Court could discern ra unmarried no justify contracep tional basis to availability making marital status. It will be seen that upon tives depend in marital way touches no to upon right privacy case State, with which Griswold is concerned. In Hughes 497, 287 A. cert. App. (1972), Md. 2d den. 409 U. S. 93 S. Ct. 34 L. Ed. was 2d defendant (1972) the same pressed argument sodomy convicted of of Griswold. The based his here, reading advanced contention, that, out rejected pointing court Maryland holding eulogy Griswold from its [t]he rationale of the flows lacking such the rule has no founda- marital status and status see no invidious discrimination be- In such circumstances we tion. deny so and unmarried individuals as to married individuals tween any 2d, supra, equal protection [287 A. 305] event. of the laws at 305 F. Hogan, Raphael Supp. (D. also C. See N. Y. 1969). D.S. worth that several of mentioning

We think it the prob- arguments presented upon appeal raised lems We call readily respond appropriate legislation. would provisions appearing attention the proposed especial *9 New Penal Jersey Code submitted as of Final Re- part the the New port Jersey Criminal Law Revision Commission (1971). Section 2C:14-2 is entitled “Sodomy and Related Offenses.” This proposal “excludes from the criminal law all sexual practices force, not involving adult corruption of minors, or offense . . . on public based the grounds that no harm to the secular interests is involved community in a sex typical practice between private adult consenting This area of partners. is private morals the distinctive con- cern of 2 N. spiritual authorities.” J. Penal Code: Commen- tary, 196. The wisdom of this or of other any like proposal matter, is, of course, for purely legislative determination. We have examined the other made defendant arguments and find them to be without merit. entirely of the judgment Appellate Division setting aside conviction of rape is reversed and the judgment of convic- tion In reinstated. all other respects judgment Division is Appellate affirmed. C. J. I concur (concurring). in the result

Weintraub, I although have reservations as to the constitutionality application the sodomy statute to a consensual act between adults committed in private. As to a homosexual act I committed, thus doubt the existence of a in- public terest sufficient to an justify edict that the homosexual shall behave as heterosexual or not at all. The failure to recog- within nize status which homosexuals may lawfully follow the dictates of their nature makes the application of punitive measures still more questionable. And I doubt deal- with ing extramarital sexual criminally relations between heterosexuals the Legislature deal with a differently deviant act or inmay any event authorize the same punish- for a ment deviant act whether consented to or not. That punitive approach futile seems evident. Consenting adults are if prosecuted rarely at all. this is not case in which to grapple with the

.But con- stitutional issue. The factual versions the State and of *10 were such that there was no room finding the defense for anal consented to even though that the was penetration was was not. The there vaginal penetration finding an that there was attack necessarily finding involved rape all inflicted injuries victim and that were her will. against Justice For reversal in and part part affirmance —Chief and Mountain, Justices Jacobs,

Weintbaub, Hall Judge Sullivan — 5.

Opposed—Hone. ZAHORIAN, COMPLAINANT, FITT SANDRA v. RUSSELL AGENCY, REAL ESTATE RUSSELL A. FITT AND FANNING, MARION J. RESPONDENTS-CROSS-APPEL LANTS, RIGHTS, AND NEW JERSEY DIVISION ON CIVIL APPELLANT-CROSS-RESPONDENT. Argued Reargued November March 1973— Decided March 1973.

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Lair
Court Name: Supreme Court of New Jersey
Date Published: Mar 19, 1973
Citation: 301 A.2d 748
Court Abbreviation: N.J.
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