State v. LaGrand

Arizona, Appellee, STATE of LaGRAND, Appellant. Burnhart

Walter

No. 6457.

Supreme Court Arizona.

Jan. sentences;

challenge their convictions however, their con appeals have not been and we address issues raised solidated separate opinions. juris We each appeal to hear Walter LaGrand’s diction 5(3) to Ariz. art. pursuant Const. § and -4033. A.R.S. §§ series This case arises from a of events during bungled attempt occurred a which Maraña, Valley National Bank in to rob the Arizona, morn- January on 1982. That from ing Walter Karl LaGrand drove lived, Tucson, in- where Maraña They tending to rob bank. arrived the 8:00 Be- sometime before a.m. Maraña empty closed and cause the bank was pass drove around Maraña to LaGrands El Taco They eventually drove time. adjacent to the Ronald restaurant bank. Taco, Schunk, manager of El testified that at at 7:50 The mo- he arrived work a.m. arrived, he a car with two men inside ment up to the El Taco. Schunk described drove car as with a chocolate-colored white driver, by identified top. The car’s Schunk LaGrand, asked Schunk when as Walter replied, opened. “Nine the El Taco Schunk then left. o’clock.” LaGrands Lopez arrived for work at Dawn approximately a.m. she 8:00 When bank she noticed three ve- arrived at bank parking motor parked in the lot: a hicles home; belonging to the man- a truck bank Hartsock; a car she ager, Ken which recognize described but which she did Corbin, Gen., J. Atty. Robert K. William top. a brown as white off-white Counsel, Div., III, Di- Schafer Chief Crim. that Hartsock Lopez believed Because Fadell, Ramsey, Gary M. At- ane A. Asst. conducting desire might business and Gen., Phoenix, tys. appellee. for parking lot and privacy she left some O’Dowd, Lundquist by Bruce A. Burke & minutes. for several drove around Maraña Burke, Tucson, appellant. and noticed Hart- to the bank She returned anoth- standing bank door with by the sock GORDON, Justice. Chief recognize. Lopez she did not er man whom bank car walked toward the parked her February appellant On Walter standing. was where Hartsock half-brother, Hinze entrance LaGrand and his Karl Walter LaGrand, passed the LaGrands’ car by of mur As she were convicted and asked her what emerged from the car degree; attempted in the murder der first “Ten Lopez replied, attempted opened. bank degree; in the first rob time the armed walking and Lopez continued Both bery; kidnapping. and two counts of o'clock.” she into the bank. When entered death for first de went sentenced to standing by the saw Hartsock gree terms of bank she murder and to concurrent Karl wear- was charges. Karl LaGrand. years for brothers vault with the other Both ing carrying lights. a coat and tie and her Upon briefcase. return to the bank her opened her to Karl told sit down his hands were retied. Hartsock was still jacket gun, reveal a gagged later bound and in the chair. same Lo- police toy pez pistol. chair, to be a found was seated and turned to- through the Lopez Walter then came bank en- ward a comer room. testified Lopez stood trance and the vault. testi- that soon thereafter she heard sounds of a said, you “If struggle. Fearing fied that Walter then can’t that Hartsock was be- time, open just ing hurt, let’s waste it this them and Lopez up, tape stood broke open Hartsock was leave.” unable around help her hands and turned to him. only Lopez vault because had one-half of the that for testified a few seconds she vault combination. struggling saw Hartsock with two men. Karl was holding behind Hartsock him by Lopez The LaGrands then moved and the shoulders while Walter was front. Hartsock into Hartsock’s office where they Lopez, According to Walter then came to- together bound their victims’ hands with began stabbing Lopez ward her her. and tape. black electrical Walter accused Hart- floor, fell to the where she see only could lying put opener sock of and a letter to his scuffling the lying feet and Hartsock throat, threatening to kill him if he was not face down the on floor. She then heard telling Lopez truth. and Hartsock then say, someone sure twice “Just make he’s gagged with bandannas. dead.” Rogers, bank employee, Wilma another The left LaGrands the bank and returned at approximately had arrived the bank at to Lopez help. Tucson. was able to call Upon Rogers 8:10 arriving a.m. noticed person- When law enforcement and medical and, two strange parking vehicles in the lot nel arrived at the bank was dead. Hartsock fearing something might amiss, Lopez, He had been stabbed times. who wrote plate down license numbers of times, multiple had also been stabbed was the two unknown vehicles. She then went University Hospital taken to in Tucson. nearby to a grocery telephoned store and Lopez phone the bank. personnel quickly answered after Law iden- enforcement removed; gag her suspects. By was her hands tified the remained LaGrands as 3:15 Lopez’ p.m., tied. Karl held the to police plate receiver ear traced license had and to the Lopez listened conversation. number to white and a brown vehicle phone. Rogers girl friend, answered the asked for owned the father of Walter’s Lopez Hartsock Libby. apartment but denied that he Karen where was there, Rogers staying which struck as odd Libby because LaGrands were with Karen placed she had his truck in bank parking Shortly seen was surveillance. under Rogers Walter, Lopez lot. then told that her Libby car thereafter Karl and Karen headlights on, were still indeed they apartment began driving. as left and Rogers Lopez were. told that if They pulled she did were followed and soon over. go off, headlights out to turn her then Walter and Karl were then arrested and she call the A Libby’s would sheriff. few minutes the car was searched. Karen Rogers apartment later asked someone else to call the also searched a steak was and bank and also were knife one found bank told Hartsock similar to at the was Rogers was not fingerprint there. then called the seized. Karl’s found at was town containing toy gun, marshal’s office. bank. A a briefcase bandanna, tape, black electrical a red After telephone the first call objects other found was beneath desert Lopez LaGrands decided to turn off bush and turned over to police. headlights. her Her hands were freed and go lights she was told to turn off the After but their arrest Walter Karl were “If you try go—if you headquarters was warned that taken to DPS in Tucson. At leave, try just we’ll him headquarters shoot and leave. DPS Mary’s and later St. going just Hospital, We're to kill him and leave.” Karl confessed to the crimes to Lopez to her went car and turned off the Detective Weaver Barkman but stated that give lesser included offense Lopez refusal to Hartsock and while he alone stabbed murder, (3) regarding felony ad- out of the room. Karl main- instruction Walter panicked gruesome photographs that he when Hartsock mission of without tained foundation, (4) leg grabbed letter adequate kicked him the excuse for cause against which he victims. opener juror scruples with stabbed the the death of a with venue, (5) change of a penalty, denial any At trial Walter testified and denied (6) penalty in propriety of the death stabbings. in the role Walter admitted this case. that he intended to rob the bank but testi- parking fied that he was outside in the lot OF CONFESSIONS ADMISSIBILITY stabbings when the occurred. He testified custody Karl LaGrand twice While get upon his return to the bank stabbing the victims but confessed keys shaking crying car he found Karl in the room at claimed that Walter was not “I I say, and heard Karl killed him. didn’t of confessions was the time. Admission panicked. mean to do it. I He kicked me.” eventually hearsay grounds on denied psychologist Dr. Walter also called Geof- saving exception, no but not before a series frey expert testify Loftus as an witness to legal worthy of Lewis Car- of maneuvers regarding upon memory. effects of stress roll. stress, Loftus testified that extreme such death, by injury as that induced fear of however, begin, We with an examination ability accurately reduces the recall de- surrounding Karl’s of the circumstances testimony to

tails. Walter used Loftus’ arrested confessions. The LaGrands were Lopez’ testimony attack that Walter was January in late the afternoon during stabbings had present and they separated and After their arrest stabbed her. headquarters in Tuc- transported to DPS Miranda warn- given his con- son. Both men were Karl did not take the stand and ings, rights to re- fessions were not admitted into evidence. and both invoked their speak attorney. jury The trial court instructed the on first main silent and to an (both However, degree premeditated personnel murder and felo- enforcement deter- law murder), murder, degree ny second at- mined that Karl was a “weak emotional degree murder, interrogation. po- tempted attempted ripe first state” and The County Attorney’s robbery, kidnapping. armed and After a lice consulted with the interrogate Karl two-week trial the convicted Walter office which told them (Count I), degree despite of first murder his clear invocation of Miranda.1 and Karl II), degree (Count attempted first murder approximately questioning lasted for (Count III), robbery attempted armed and hours, during time Karl was which (Counts kidnapping two counts of IV upset hyperventilating. Detec- often V). danger- were found to be Counts II-V point Barkman testified that at one tive repetitive. ous and Walter and Karl were enforcement Karl had a nosebleed but law death; identically: on Count I to sentenced hitting him. Barkman ad- personnel denied aggravated of 28 II to sentences on Count him Karl to calm mitted that he “shook” aggravated III sen- years; on Count slapped him once. may down and years; and on Counts IV and tences of range psycho- Barkman also described were con- years each. Sentences V to logical Karl admit tricks he used on Karl. II-V but consecutive current on Counts Lopez he Hartsock and ted that stabbed being then any I and sentence Count he only because claimed that he did it but served. he alone in panicked. said that was Karl the time and the victims at the office with six issues for consideration raises Walter front entrance. placed Walter at the bank’s (1) to admit Karl the refusal Court: this kicked him and evidence, (2) that Hartsock the He stated confessions into LaGrand’s County Attorney’s office. ceived from the he decided to testified that Barkman 1. Detective independent advice re- interrogate defendant screaming, panic Lopez began involuntary. Accordingly, grant- he the court grabbed opener suppress. a letter and stabbed them ed Karl’s motion to The Pima County Attorney’s Special purpose”. “but not on Office filed a challeng- Action appeals with the court of confessing, After Karl was taken to the ing ruling. county charges. jail to be booked on With- point attorneys began At this arrival, to re- Karl fainted. He minutes positions “through examine their the look- Mary’s Hospital. The then driven to St. ing glass.” Walter filed a motion to deter- triage Mary’s nurse at described Karl St. mine the upset, voluntariness Karl’s state- crying hyperventilating. as At ments, joined by which was the state but point speak again asked to some Karl However, opposed by Karl. Karl then de- Barkman. Barkman was summoned to the join cided to forces with Walter and the hospital took into Karl an examination parties proposed state. All three filed a they spoke room where alone. Prior to stipulation with the court in their conversation Barkman re-read Karl stipulated that Karl’s his Miranda rights confessions were tak- taped por- and later en in violation of Miranda but were volun- tions of the interview. tary and not coerced. This unusual con- During questioning again Karl ad- gruity strategy arose because the state stabbing repeated mitted the victims and impeach wanted to use the confessions to room, his claim that Walter was out of the testified; if Karl he Walter wanted the although other details differed from his confessions to be admissible in order to confession. After Barkman fin- earlier testimony; corroborate his and Karl decid- questioning he ished Karl was examined ed wanted the confession to be usable at emergency physician. room The doctor sentencing they painted since a less damn- emotionally that Karl dis- stated ing picture of the events than the victims’ traught give power- and decided to Karl a testimony. anti-psychotic drug. ful The doctor admit- stipulation Pursuant to the of counsel the hyperventilation ted that could decrease reluctantly agreed modify trial court to impair judgment. mental faculties and previous order. The modified order vacat- Prior to trial both Walter and Karl ed the court’s determination of voluntari- suppress moved to the confessions on the concluded, ness and court makes no “[T]he ground they involuntary. In Ari that were findings ruling or thereon.” presumed zona confessions are to be invol sought Prior to trial Walter to have Finehout, 226, State v. untary. 136 Ariz. confessions ruled admissible under Karl’s 231, 570, (1983); State v. 665 P.2d Evid., 804(b)(3). 17A A.R.S. Rules of Rule Knapp, 114 Ariz. 531, 538, 704, 562 P.2d state, fought prove The had once denied, (1977), 908, cert. statements, of the now the voluntariness 1458, S.Ct. 55 L.Ed.2d 500 The opposed of the confessions on admission prove by burden rests with the state to ground untrustworthy that were preponderance of the evidence that a con hearsay. judge excluded The trial voluntary is free and fession trial. statements at product physical psychological or coer Adams, 566, 569, cion. 145 Ariz. A. (App.1985). Ordinarily 703 P.2d hearsay Arizona Rules of Evidence admit this determination is made at a “voluntari exculpate a confessions which co-defend- hearing” ness at which the trial court ex 804(b)(3)provides: ant. Rule totality of the circumstances amines Hearsay Exceptions; surrounding a confession and determines “Rule 804. De- burden. whether state has met its clarant Unavailable Knapp, supra. (b) Hearsay exceptions. following hearsay by are not excluded rule if suppression hearing After the the trial is as a the declarant unavailable witness: that were court ruled Karl’s confessions taken in violation of Miranda ^[*] # ^{[*] [*]} # ^[*] against interest. ring subject A to statements tend’ to (b)(3) Statement liability, declarant to criminal the Rule en- the time of its which was at statement compasses disserving statements a de- making contrary to the declarant’s so far interest, probative or so clarant that would have value in proprietary pecuniary or against United subject him or crimi- a trial the declarant.” to civil far tended Thomas, 288; accord, States v. a reasonable man 571 F.2d at liability ... nal Barrett, not have made the United States v. 539 F.2d position would his Cir.1976). (1st question it to be There is no unless believed statement tending expose subject the Karl’s statements tended to him to A statement true. indeed, liability; they were direct liability criminal and offered criminal declarant to guilt. exculpate the accused is not admissi- confessions corroborating circumstances unless ble the Rule is requirement The third clearly indicate the trustworthiness corroborating circumstances exist which the statement.” clearly indicate the trustworthiness “Unfortunately, exculpatory statement. Ordinarily, admission of evidence is with meaning precise of the corroboration in the trial court’s discretion and will not be uncertain, 804(b)(3) requirement in Rule is appeal disturbed on absent an abuse of legisla- and is not much clarified either Fisher, discretion. or the cases.” United States history tive denied, cert. Silverstein, (7th 732 F.2d U.S. 83 L.Ed.2d 436 Cir.1984). Although impossible it would be Macumber, complete to be to articulate a list factors denied, cert. evaluating considered when the trustwor- 58 L.Ed.2d 683 S.Ct. statement, we thiness of the declarant’s (1978). However, parameters of because presents believe evidence in this case seven 804(b)(3) yet Rule are not well-defined suggest factors that trustworthiness Arizona, important area of the law lack thereof. merits our attention. important The first and most factor is requirement 804(b)(3) The first of Rule corroborating the existence of and contra- A that the declarant be unavailable. de- cases, dictory In some trustwor- evidence. clarant is considered unavailable if he as- if readily apparent thiness corrobo- will be privilege against serts his self-incrimina- rating contradictory and evidence abounds Evid., tion. 17A A.R.S. Rules of Rule cases, is nonexistent. In other evidence Fisher, supra. A 804(a)(1); see State v. quickly negated by trustworthiness will be expressly declarant need not assert contradictory and an plethora evidence privilege “patent” if his unavailability is corroborating evidence. absence privilege and assertion of the mere is a cases, however, corrobo- majority of both Thomas, formality. United States v. ex- rating contradictory and evidence will (5th Cir.1978). F.2d Here Karl ist. This circumstance will make examina- throughout pretrial proceedings stated necessary tion of other factors before the stand, not take the and as a would can be resolved. issue trustworthiness he obviously co-defendant could not be compelled testify. Despite relationship A factor is the exist- the absence second ing formal assertion of his Amend- between the declarant and the listener. of a Fifth right ruling, plain A to a ment and court it is statement made law enforcement meaning attempt may curry “unavailable” official be made an Karl was within favor and obtain a reduced sentence. It of the Rules. product may also be a of coercion or force requirement The second is that the state- involuntary. and be Such a statement against interest. ment be the declarant’s might be as reliable as a statement 804(b)(3) require does not a direct Rule good family made to a friend or member. v. Ben- United States guilt, confession of veniste, (9th Cir.1977), relationship A third is the 564 F.2d factor between “Rather, though by strong here. refer- the declarant and the defendant. A that exists family factors, emotional or bond between the de- All of the above to some extent, veracity-reliability-credibility raise may clarant and defendant render the de- questions declarant, about the the state trustworthy clarant’s statement less be- ment, questions or both. Such traditionally may cause such a bond motivate the declar- fall province jury within the rather story. ant to fabricate his judge. than the We do not believe that a of times the The number statement judge should to bootstrap be able himself consistency multiple made and the state- into the evidentiary box via rules. We determining may ments assist trustwor- judge’s inquiry, therefore hold that a made repeated thiness. Statements which are to assure himself that the corroboration are consistent are more trustworthy 804(b)(3) requirement of Rule has been sab repeated isfied, than statements which are asking but should be limited to whether corroborating evidence the record inconsistent. contradicting the declarant’s statement passed The amount of time which has permit person would a reasonable to be between the event at issue and when the lieve that the statement could be true. If a statements are made also should con- be judge person believes that a reasonable degree sidered. The of trustworthiness could corroborating conclude from and con may inversely relate to the amount of time tradictory evidence in the record that the passes between event issue true, declarant’s statement could be then when declarant makes his state- must admit the statement into ments. judge’s A pass evidence. role is to on questions admissibility, and we believe Whether the declarant will benefit from judge impermissibly expands that the his his A statement is a sixth factor. state- 804(b)(3) role under Rule if he evaluates ment made a declarant who will benefit corroborating more than the and contra probably therefrom is less than reliable dictory determining evidence when statement which does not benefit the de- trustworthiness of the declarant’s state clarant. Only ment.2 after the statement is admit seventh, final, A necessarily but not con- ted into evidence should factors other than psychological physical sideration is the corroborating contradictory evi surrounding making environment considered, only by dence and then jury.3 the statement. Silverstein, essentially saying United States v. 732 F.2d contends in that it was un- Cf. (7th Cir.1984): trustworthy, jury, very great proba- language bility, is unclear from the rule's wheth- [I]t would not have been misled it. judge may beyond J., er the look the evidence (Murnaghan, concurring), Id at cert. offered in corroboration of the statement to 726, denied, U.S. S.Ct. directly contradicting evidence either the Drew, 951 65, Commonwealth v. 397 Mass. contradicting statement or the evidence of- (1986) 75 n. 489 N.E.2d 1241 n. 10 may fered to corroborate it. If he look be- ("In determining whether the declarant’s state yond, open objection is the rule to the that it sufficiently ment has been corroborated to mer credibility withdraws the determination from evidence, judge it admission in its should n light jury. probably may, But he of the stringent.... sufficiency If the issue of not be Advisory Committee’s admonition that “The close, of the defendant’s corroboration is requirement of corroboration should be con- judge admitting should favor the statement. In strued in such a manner as to effectuate its instances, good most such sense of the purpose circumventing fabrication.” any prejudicial impact."); will correct 4 WEIN 1347; MacDonald, Id at United States v. 804(b)(3)[3] STEIN’S EVIDENCE ¶ at 804-147 (4th Cir.1982): F.2d 224 (1986 ed.) ("The requirement corroboration that, my jury may belief if the be [It is] usurping should not be used as a means of trusted factual with ultimate resolution of the function.”). jury’s issues, opportunity it should not be denied the obtaining necessary picture, a rounded judge’s 3. We limit the consideration of trustwor- large questions, by the with- resolution holding corroborating thiness factors to and contradict- testimony of collateral consistent ing evidence in the record because this factor principal with and basic to the defendant’s alone, factors, unlike all other in and of exculpatory If itself contention. such evidence was government directly suggests persuasive, which is what the trustworthiness or lack thereof.

The record does not indicate that the trial than the defendant admitted had four times suggest- killing court limited its review factors This victim. refusal was ing or lack trustworthiness thereof under based on Mississippi’s hearsay rule. More- 804(b)(3) corroborating over, Rule though evidence even called Chambers the oth- contradicting and Karl’s statements. witness, er Mississippi’s man as a common Thus, apply we will our new standard to precluded law “voucher” rule him from im- the facts if ruling to determine the court’s peaching his own witness. Chambers was may upheld. duty It is our to affirm a subsequently convicted the murder. On trial ruling provided court’s the result appeal Supreme held Court that Fisher, legally correct. four confessions should been admitted 686 P.2d at 768. despite hearsay their nature. The Court circumstances, concluded that under some corroborating Evidence both and rights “where directly constitutional affect- contradicting Karl’s statements exists. ing guilt implicat- ascertainment of following evidence corroborated Karl’s ed, hearsay may applied rule not be statements: Karl did have a bruise on his mechanistically jus- to defeat the ends of leg stated; as Lopez he testified that she tice.” 410 U.S. at S.Ct. at 1049. someone; saw Lopez Hartsock kick testi only her; fied that person one stabbed present Those are not circumstances Walter testified was out of the here. great Chambers the Court took stabbings room when the emphasize occurred. The care to the hearsay state- following evidence contradicted Karl’s ments at issue were offered “under circum- Lopez statements: that she provided testified saw stances that considerable assur- struggling men; Hartsock Lopez two ance of their reliability.” U.S. at testified “positive” that she 1048; that Wal 93 S.Ct. at id. at see also ter her; Lopez had (“The stabbed testified testimony rejected S.Ct. at 1049 after being falling stabbed Walter and persuasive the trial court here bore assur- to the floor one trustworthiness____”); brother said to the other ances of Green v. twice, dead”; “Just make sure he’s Georgia, S.Ct. performed forensic (evidence consultant (1979) who an au 60 L.Ed.2d 738 cor- topsy on Hartsock testified that more roborating testimony than excluded was “am- one instrument was used to inflict ple” Hart- reasons “substantial existed to sock’s wounds. its reliability”). assume We excluded exculpatory Karl’s only statements after After reviewing corroborating the above concluding that a reasonable man could not evidence, contradicting we do not think that the believe statements could be true that a person reasonable could conclude reviewing after both evidence corroborat- corroborating from the same and contra- ing contradicting the statements. Un- dictory evidence Karl’s exculpatory circumstances, der such we do not believe statements could be true. The trial 804(b)(3) Rule applied that we have me- properly denied admission Karl’s state- chanistically, nor do we believe that exclu- ments. sion Karl’s statements violated Walter’s process rights. due B. issue, evidentiary In addition to the LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE appellant challenge raises a constitutional INSTRUCTION

to the based on exclusion of confessions 284, Appellant concedes the Chambers 410 U.S. 93 that trial court Mississippi, v. 1038, (1973). applied correctly felony S.Ct. In the Arizona law of 35 297 L.Ed.2d murder, 13-1105(A)(2), Chambers the refused to admit A.R.S. under trial court § into there are no lesser included offenses evidence the that a man other which fact indirectly suggest

All factors should be only other trust- considered factors jury. worthiness or this lack thereof. We believe which factors considered should be "direct-indirect" line delineates which best 30 charge. Appellant necessary satisfy chal- the mens rea to instead because

to the long- constitutionality of our lenges premeditation degree element of first first, standing rule. His attack is twofold: supplied by specific intent murder is give failure to lesser included offense that Arias, felony. required for the State v. the federal mandate of instructions violates 1287-88; 443-44, 131 Ariz. at 641 P.2d at 625, Alabama, Beck v. 447 U.S. 100 S.Ct. 255, Celaya, see 135 Ariz. at 660 State v. 2382, (1980), Spaziano 65 392 L.Ed.2d P.2d included at 856. Where no lesser Florida, 447, 3154, v. 468 104 S.Ct. 82 U.S. exists, it is not offense error to refuse second, (1984); to L.Ed.2d failure Florida, Spaziano 468 U.S. instruction. v. instructions, in give lesser offense included Arias, 455, 3160; at 104 S.Ct. at v. State charges to 13- contrast under A.R.S. § 445, 131 Ariz. at at 1288. P.2d 1105(A)(1)(premeditated murder), violates equal protection.

B. A. the felo Appellant argues also that Turning argument, first appellant's ny statute is unconstitutional be murder length already explained why at we have first sus degree cause it denies murder inapposite Arizona Beck is law. See He pects equal protection the laws. 441, 443-44, Arias, Ariz. A.R.S. suspects charged charge a sus- crime to what 1452 prose- the pect discretion of is within the sound (1983). prosecutorial abuse While a case 217, 221, Hankins, cutor, 141 Ariz. pattern of certainly possible, and an invidious (1984), including seek whether to conceivable, that appellant to make fails abuse Gretzler, Ariz. penalty. v. death State the case here. 60, 92, (1980), appeals 612 P.2d after weapon “A PHOTOGRAPHS hibit. similar to that used to GRUESOME may commit the crime be introduced in argues trial court Appellant next that the weapon evidence as illustrative of the admitting by erred state’s exhibits used to his the defendant assault objection. depicts Mr. 67 over Exhibit Watkins, v. State victim.” 126 Ariz. area, neck and exhibit Hartsock's wounded (1980) (quoting State 614 P.2d depicts the same area with a steak knife Mays, Ariz.App. 90, 92, 436 P.2d alongside. objected The defense to admis- (1968)). photographs upon sion of the their based prejudicial any foun- nature and the lack reviewing challenged After the exhibits tying pictured dation steak knife to the say we cannot that the trial court abused crime. by admitting photo- its discretion graphs. photographs are not so in- admissibility

The touchstone of flammatory outweigh probative as to their any exhibit is relevance. Thus “[i]f value, weapon photographs bearing upon and the ersatz was suffi- any any have they may ciently issue in similar to the actual article to avoid the case be received although they may tainting the tendency also have a exhibit. We find no error. prejudice jury against person who Mohr, committed the offense.” WITHERSPOON ISSUE 402, 403, (1970). 476 P.2d dire, During voir Ms. Eloise Atwater ex- However, any this does not mean that rele presséd capital punishment. an aversion to photograph may vant be admitted where appellant’s Both counsel and state’s coun- capacity the offered has a exhibit to incite questioned sel Ms. Atwater on whether this passion jury. or inflame the court “[T]he ability aversion would affect her to decide go beyond question must relevancy guilt the issue of or innocence. Relevant probative and consider whether the value portions colloquy of the between Ms. Atwa- outweighs danger prej of the exhibit ter, judge, the trial and both counsel fol- admission of the exhibit.” udice low: Chapple, 660 P.2d Atwater, (1983). THE Mrs. COURT: I’ve been The decision to admit trying anything might to find out that

such exhibits rests within the discretion of jurors any difficulty the trial court and cause in de- will not be disturbed ciding that discretion. just they absent an abuse of this case on what heard Day, courtroom, influenced not be something saw or heard or that happened upon to them once a time. Photographs may be admitted if you anything Will tell us there’s reasons, many including to illustrate and I you already can think of that haven’t explain testimony and corroborate you think you asked all folks about that theory state’s why how and the crime might you any being cause trouble Id. Here the photo was committed. you juror? that kind of a Do think graphs were admitted to illustrate the testi might anything that influence there’s mony expert, of the state’s medical who you you that I haven’t asked about that con testified that Hartsock’s wounds were lawyers ought and I to know in think the weap sistent with the use of two different selecting jury? this ons, photographs one serrated. The also Lopez’ testimony that corroborated Dawn I There’s one. would MS. ATWATER: defendants attacked Hartsock. capital punishment. both not vote for right. All Let me sim- THE COURT: no foundation Appellant is correct say you—and I did not tell ply pictured to establish that the knife was laid jury jurors this—the will the—all weapon actually used. in exhibit 67 was the giv- any no voice in sentence that's Indeed, agree knife seemed to all This will decide en in this case. merely an illustrative substitute. guilty However, ex- the defendants does not doom the whether this fact guilty and that’s the end of it. That’s there was a possibility of pen- the death jury’s the end of the in alty? function this

case. MS. ATWATER: Yes. want to move on to another this lawyers explore you enter into THE COURT: All MS. ATWATER: It Now,' think that the case, with that whatever your thinking that knowledge mind, possible punishment it if they right. might. might as a want to. in I’ll let the subject. be, juror? would do in I believe that That’s all the juror? MS. ATWATER: Yes. MR. BURKE MR. ALFRED: Okay. ^{[*] [*]} you questions [Defense Counsel]: ^[*] have a ^[*] duty I have. Thank ^[*] to serve as ^[*] you. You na law the crime is first-degree murder? while Judge words were capital punishment; case Thank you might MR. ALFRED: And that under Arizo- MS. ATWATER: Yes. MS. ATWATER: MR. ALFRED: You heard the Mrs. MR. ALFRED [State’s Counsel]: ^[*] charges was the fact that said that one of the ago say affect Hannah’s you, Atwater, either life ^[*] possible Your Honor. you you this case is a questions just ^[*] in could never vote for in prison being punishment for that Right. response is that correct? you—I this—that one ^[*] juror or the things ^[*] think your charge to one of a bit Judge on this possi- ^[*] ago, might case? have a role who are accused of crimes? you could questions sponse) ment? not to deal ready cutor MS. ATWATER: MS. ATWATER: I MR. BURKE: Do MR. BURKE: MS. ATWATER: MS. ATWATER: MR. BURKE: You understand that? MR. BURKE: And the advised advised instruct follow the laws that the with the as a citizen guilt you, you, you Okay. that as I think the I would you Right. on in innocence of question hope (No your And believe that in determining Judge deciding so. audible try. you function is punish- believe has al- people Judge prose- this you re- you try, MR. BURKE: And would bility of the death sentence also? not, you your job would to do as a citizen Right. MS. ATWATER: fairly and evaluate the evidence and hon- Judge MR. ALFRED: And the also estly? you told punishment that the matter of is MS. ATWATER: Yes. jury to be considered every good MR. BURKE: And make Judge’s job that’s the to decide after the you faith the in- effort could to follow you reaches a I verdict. take it that structions of the Court? strongly opposed capital punish- ment; Yes, is that correct? MS. ATWATER: sir. Defintely.

MS. ATWATER: ques- MR. I no more BURKE: tions, Your Honor. you MR. ALFRED: Do think that this have, you feeling, belief that would R.T., February at 572-79. At the perhaps maybe you influence a little bit questioning the chal- conclusion of state juror? as a cause, lenged Ms. Atwater for which was MS. ATWATER: It could. granted objection. appellant ar- over now, then, argue saying gued MR. ALFRED: What I’m and continues to Illinois, Witherspoon even—maybe you if even felt (1968), prohib- evidence showed that the defendants 20 L.Ed.2d 776 murder, guilty first-degree excusing potential jurors for cause its pen- you they oppose the death maybe merely would somewhat hesitant because guilty you alty. to vote because knew that

33 denied, Witherspoon cert. 888, 891, 1067, Supreme de In the Court 449 U.S. 101 v. opposed 796, (1980); veniremen to the death clared that S.Ct. 66 L.Ed.2d Ramirez, in penalty could excluded from service be 259, 263-64, 116 Ariz. 569 P.2d capital only if cases it was “made unmis 201, (1977). 205-06 automat takably clear would ... judge Ms. Atwater told the trial that her ically against imposition capital vote the of strong objections capital punishment to Id. at 522-23 21, punishment____” n. “might” thinking juror. a enter her as She 21 (emphasis original). S.Ct. at 1777 n. in told state’s counsel that her beliefs “could” However, Supreme recently the Court has “a juror” influence her little bit as a and Witherspoon modified the standard. that she would be hesitant to “somewhat Witt, Wainwright v. 412, U.S. guilty” penalty vote the death because 844, (1985), S.Ct. 83 L.Ed.2d 841 the Court Yet, imposed. could also de- she told potential juror may noted that a be exclud try” fense counsel that she eval- “would to ed for cause if the trial court believes “fairly uate and and honestly” evidence “prevent his substantially attitude will or every good “make effort” faith to follow impair performance of the his duties as a the court’s instructions. in Ms. Nowhere juror in accordance with his instructions colloquy Atwater’s does she state that her oath.” Id. 419, and his at 105 S.Ct. at 850 capital punishment “pre- Texas, views on would Adams 45, (quoting 38, substantially impair” ability vent or her to (1980)). 100 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d Moreover, Witherspoon applies comply with the court’s instructions and to the sen However, tencing phase trial, her juror. not to oath as a resolution the determi guilt. Only nation of hinge this term the Su presence of this issue not the does on preme rejected suggestion Court magical or absence of “buzz “[the] words.” “Rel- Witherspoon applica ... broad dire voir [has] questions evant addressed bility special capital outside the context of issue need exclusively not be framed in the sentencing____” Lockhart McCree, language controlling appellate opin- U.S. S.Ct. ion; is, opinion all, opinion the after an (1986). a will.” Wain- not an in intricate devise wright, 433-34, Because in Arizona judge the alone de- U.S. 105 S.Ct. at Witherspoon sentence, termines the its progeny appear would to have applica- little reviewing as duty Our court is not bility in capital Arizona selection agree disagree or However, with the trial court’s cases. consistently Arizona has rejected rigid findings, but guilt the to determine whether those distinction between sentencing. determination and findings fairly supported by the record Id. At best, procedure considered as a whole. Ms. Under the in in used Arizona cases, juror’s ambiguous death penalty duty to Atwater’s comments were is guilt innocence, determine or while inconsistent. Mindful that the trial solely responsi- sentence death is advantage had observing and assess bility Nevertheless, judge. of the trial ing demeanor, Ms. Atwater’s we believe questioning voir juror’s dire related ato that the trial court was entitled to resolve capital punishment permitted views on ambiguity inconsistency favor to determine whether those views would her on state conclude that views prevent substantially impair per- penalty “prevent the death would or sub juror’s formance duties to decide performance stantially impair” her as a case accordance with the court’s juror. We find no error. juror’s instructions and oath. Martinez-Villareal, CHANGE OF VENUE denied, cert. 702 P.2d appellant Prior trial moved for L.Ed.2d venue, Sparks, pub- change alleging pretrial See also 54-55, licity prejudicial Tucson area was so 708 P.2d Clark, fair to his case that could receive a publicity juror’s objectivity on a The were denied. trial there. Motions effect critical, following publicity. not the extent of days record reveals that newspaper, 302, tele- Chaney, v. replete 141 Ariz. at 686 P.2d State crimes with covering the Greenawalt, 1272; stories v. vision and radio 128 Ariz. at State at As crimes, the LaGrands. place victims 392, The trial took 626 P.2d 122. however, coverage waned. passed, time crimes, dire years after the the voir two disturbing publicity came pretrial The most individually as in a conducted as well was story of a on Karl the result about as quite exten- group, questioning was pub- attorney for a new request LaGrand’s pretrial publicity The effect of was sive. selection, morning jury first lished the developed counsel and sev- well defense potential jurors read several which was for potential jurors eral were excused waiting jury in the room.. re- jurors cause for that reason. Those nothing maining jury on the either knew change regarding of ven The law the case or satisfied the If can a defendant ue is well established. lay any preconceived aside notion and coverage so could was that media demonstrate only on evidence. pervaded it render a verdict based outrageous that extensive or a “carnival-like” find no error. proceedings or created We pre prejudice will be atmosphere then examina particularized sumed without DEATH PENALTY jury. publicity’s effect on the tion of the challenges impo Finally, appellant Greenawalt, 128 Ariz. 388, 391, v. State every death penalty. of the death sition denied, Tison v. 121, cert. 118, P.2d obligated indepen penalty case we are 167,

Arizona, 848, 102 S.Ct. for the record to determine Smith, dently review v. (1981); State L.Ed.2d 136 aggravating circum (1979). ourselves whether 187, 599 P.2d proven beyond a reason have been stances outrageous publicity, the Absent appropriate mitigation doubt and all able pretrial pub prove must that the defendant Rossi, 146 Ariz. 359, State v. considered. have the like licity prejudicial and will was v. (1985); State 365, 371, 706 P.2d depriving him of a fair trial. ly result of 689, 603, 598, P.2d Hensley, 142 Ariz. 295, 302, 686 Chaney, v. 141 Ariz. State Richmond, (1984); 136 Ariz. State v. Greena 1265, State P.2d denied, 67, cert. 57, 121; walt, 626 P.2d at 128 Ariz. at Crim.Pro., 10.3(b). Rule A.R.S. Rules of includes the (1983). necessarily Our review presump failed to demonstrate Appellant any given penalty propriety of the death pretrial publicity, and was tively prejudicial Hensley, 142 Ariz. at case. State charged of dem burden therefore 691 P.2d at ¶. prejudice. onstrating actual Greenawalt, P.2d at 128 Ariz. at aggra- that three The trial court found Schmid, 121; proven beyond a vating circumstances were The trial court’s 509 P.2d of a fel- prior conviction reasonable doubt: issue will be accorded def decision on this of violence involving use or threat ony Chaney, 141 Ariz. at State v. See erence. 13-703(F)(2); A.R.S. person, another on § at 1272. 686 P.2d something of receipt of of the expectation 13-703(F)(5); and value, A.R.S. pecuniary § of the record and Our review especially “in crime an commission the trial particularly of voir dire confirms manner,” A.R.S. heinous, depraved cruel jurors had decision. While some court’s three 13-703(F)(6). judge found The trial knowledge § of the case from gleaned prior (Wal- ages mitigating factors: defendants’ media, nothing of it. others knew time of 18 at the Karl was was 19 and ter However, knowledge of a case has prior lives, and their prior home killing), their grounds held to be automatic never been find these Smith, judge did not Id.; The trial remorse. disqualification. outweigh sufficient mitigating factors is the 599 P.2d at 192. It 123 Ariz. at aggravating the three circumstances desire infects all other de- conduct imposed penalty. the death fendant. following helpful cases are

A. Prior demon- Conviction strating expectation of pecuniary gain: Appellant any spe does not offer Smith, 491, 501-03, finding prior cific evidence to rebut (1985) (“defendant conviction, suggests but it solely committed the murder for the pur- proven beyond a doubt. We reasonable pose gaining reg- of access to the cash disagree. hearing A was held at which the ister, which was under the victim’s con- amply prior state demonstrated convictions trol”; killing “the of commission nec- robbery kidnapping. for armed These essarily expectation carried with it the of use felonies involved the or threat of vio gain”). pecuniary requirements lence and fulfill of A.R.S. Correll, State v. 468, 479, 148 715 Ariz. 13-703(F)(2). § 721, (1986) (defendant P.2d 732 robbed victims, home then of took victims Pecuniary B. Gain them; desert where he shot and killed held “very carefully that defendant exe- prove pecuniary We have stated that “to cuted robbery the armed mur- and the gain, the state must show the actor’s moti part ders were of scheme of the vation expectation of pecuniary was robbery”). Carriger, State v. gain____” 143 Ariz. Hensley, State v. 598, 604, 142 Ariz. 691 142, 991, cert. 161, 692 (1984), P.2d 1010 689, (1984) (during P.2d 694 robbery of denied, 1111, 2347, 471 U.S. S.Ct. 105 85 bar, defendant forced victims to lie on (1985). L.Ed.2d 864 “Pecuniary considera and, floor order no witnesses be murder, tion must be a cause of the not robbers, identify left defendant Libberton, merely a result.” State v. 141 style; shot each execution “the murders 132, 139, 1284, Ariz. (1984). 685 P.2d 1291 part of a the overall scheme of the Thus, unexpected “an or death accidental robbery specific purpose with the to facil- not was of furtherance defend escape”). itate the robbers goal pecuniary ant’s gain, which oc of Harding, State v. 492, 500, 141 Ariz. 687 during curs flight the course or of from 1247, (1984) (robbery P.2d 1255 victim robbery, does not itself provide a suffi gagged by who was bound and defend finding aggravating cient basis for cir ant “the asphyxiation; purpose died Hensley, v. State cumstance.” 142 Ariz. binding gagging was ... to facil 598, 603-04, 689, (empha P.2d 694-95 detection”), robbery itate and hinder added) Harding, State v. sis (quoting denied, cert. 1013, 465 U.S. 104 S.Ct. 278, 296-97, 383, Ariz. 670 P.2d 394-95 1017, (1984). 79 L.Ed.2d 246 appeal, later (1983), 492, 141 Ariz. Harding, State 278, 294, v. 137 Ariz. denied, 1247, cert. P.2d 465 U.S. (defendant robbed, (1983) P.2d Accord (1984). S.Ct. 79 L.Ed.2d 246 shot; gagged bound and victims who he Nash, 392, 405, 143 Ariz. 694 P.2d “in ob- murders committed the course of cert., denied, 222, 235, 471 U.S. taining personal property from valuable (1985). S.Ct. 86 L.Ed.2d 706 Evi victims”). ... pecuniary gain dence of must be shown Gillies, Contra see State 135 Ariz. Jor beyond a doubt. reasonable 500, 512, (1983) 662 P.2d dan, 283, 286, 825, 828, P.2d (defendant purpose of confessed that denied, cert. 986, 101 449 U.S. S.Ct. murdering rape to eliminate was victim (1980). L.Ed.2d 251 her, her cards and not steal credit making determination, In this we should cash; therefore, tangible “Without some not, however, ignore the sentencing reason for defend- evidence, it for the presence ant’s money at the scene of the crime. court to conclude because rob, taken, When the purpose defendant comes the de- items were ap- later expects gain gain.”), pecuniary pecuniary fendant this murder (1984), finding support cruelty, death. To 691 P.2d 655 peal, Ariz. denied, suffering pain experi- cert. evidence of the (1985). apparent.” enced the victim must be Wallace, the defendant We do not believe (1986)(citations omitted). 232, 237 to kill as well as to beforehand must intend requisite pain can be either and distress A.R.S. 13- satisfy the statute. rob to § Gretzler, physical or mental. 703(F)(5). Nor do we believe that an ab receipt money of actual or valu sence finding expectation negates a ables indicating in this case Evidence abounds gain aggravating as an circum

pecuniary physical that Hartsock suffered mental and stance. gagged, anguish. He was bound and case, attempted robbery liar, and threatened with death called of the defend permeated the entire conduct opener once. He had a letter more than irra may ant. The defendant have reacted He placed against his throat. received tionally inability to the failure or of the only wounds of which five twenty-four stab open to the safe but the murder was victim immediately killed him. Thus would have unexpected. The neither accidental nor reasonably assume that the victim we can expec reason defendant was there was his instantly rather suffered did not die but pecuniary gain the reason he tation of and dying. physical prior torment We some the victim was because the victim stabbed do not hesitate to conclude that Hartsock’s safe, frustrating open was unable to especially cru- murder was committed an continuing attempt pecuni defendant’s el manner. gain. goal pecuni of ary The defendant’s “[Sjtatutory concepts of and de- heinous gain the murder and the murder ary caused state of mind praved involve a killer’s vile goal. agree in furtherance of his We was murder, by evidenced at the time of the as finding the de with the trial court’s that Gretzler, 135 the killer’s actions.” State v. gain expectation pecuniary fendant’s Specific 10. factors Ariz. at 659 P.2d at aggravating was an factor.5 or de- leading finding a of heinousness relishing apparent pravity include the Cruel, Depraved Heinous or C. killer, gratu- by infliction of the murder challenges Appellant trial victim, muti- on the needless itous violence finding murder was court’s that Hartsock’s victim, of the of the senselessness lation cruel, especially in an heinous or committed crime, helplessness of the victim. Id. depraved 13- manner under A.R.S. § P.2d at 11. 659 703(F)(6). sepa We consider the elements disjunctively rately, as the statute is second, third, factors are The and fifth phrased. here.6 To stab a bound present clearly times consti- gagged man two dozen pain “Cruelty defined as the has been gratuitous on and needless tutes violence distress suffered a victim before pecuni- beyond proves doubt that respectfully of the reasonable dissent from this section I My majori- opinion, expresses ary Hartsock’s murder. the view of the desires motivated majority's ty agree suggests equally, I with the it is if Court. the record that review of law, my more, panic of the as it reiterates belief likely statement caused Hart- that the gain pecuniary be the cause of the leg, pecuniary that must to Karl’s rather than sock’s kick desires, be in further- murder and that the murder must kill Hart- the LaGrands to motivated pecuniary gain. goal See State v. ance of the sock. 278, 296-97, Harding, P.2d 137 Ariz. 670 judge’s one of the trial Because I would strike V.C.J., (1983) (Gordon, specially concur- 401-02 ring). mitigating cir- aggravating circumstances However, disagree pecuniary I de- exist, for resentenc- I would remand cumstances necessarily murder caused Hartsock’s sires Wallace, ing. Ariz. 728 State v. See merely intended to rob because the LaGrands Gillies, (1986); State v. P.2d 232 agree Hartsock’s mur- the bank. Nor do I P.2d 1007 any pecuniary desires. Hart- der furthered present. ‘The need be all five factors 6. Not provided LaGrands with neither sock’s death helplessness or of senselessness escape money mere existence valu- to nor other access victim, isolation, always lead need not Finally, I not believe that evidence ables. Vickers, (1983); State v. Only helpless P.2d mutilation of victim. (1981); Ariz. State v. depraved mind would 633 P.2d 315 heinous and state of Clark, (1980); person person to treat another P.2d 888 cause one mitigating cases where in- disregard callous for human circumstances with such see, e.g., unpleasant childhood, cluded an err in trial court did not con- worth. The Gretzler, supra; Clark, State v. State supra; cluding Hartsock killed in a was hei- mitigating where circum- cases depraved manner. nous or age, see, stances included defendant’s trial no mitigating court found Valencia, e.g., State v. Ariz. outweigh ag- circumstances sufficient Vickers, supra; (1982); P.2d 239 trial gravating circumstances. The Watson, (Walter ages considered defendants’ Clark, supra. Based on 19 and was 18 time of Karl at the decisions, our conclude review of these we lives, killing), prior their home and their imposition penalty death in this case obligated remorse. We consider proportional imposed to sentences in sim- Skip- “any mitigating relevant evidence.” ilar cases. Carolina, per v. South -, (1986) 106 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d E. Enmund Claim Oklahoma, (quoting Eddings challenges imposition Defendant 869, 876-77, grounds the death on the trial penalty (1982)). noting 1 In addition to defendants’ finding court failed to make a in conformi ages,7 relatively young have we reviewed Florida, with Enmund v. ty 458 U.S. upbringing, transcripts histories of their (1982). 102 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 73 1140 remorse, oral and written statements Enmund, Supreme Court ruled that and evidence that may defendants Eighth imposition Amendment forbids surprise killed out of Hartsock fear penalty the death on one aids and “who part rather than as of a calculated scheme. felony abets a in the which a course of cruel, heinous, especially Given the and de- murder is committed but who others praved conduct, nature of defendants’ how- kill, kill, attempt does not or himself ever, mitigating we conclude that these killing intend or place that a take outweigh existing factors aggra- do not lethal Id. employed.” force will at vating circumstances and do not thus war- Enmund determina 102 An S.Ct. at 3376. leniency. rant by jury, judge tion can be a or made trial Bullock, appellate court. Cabana v. D. Proportionality Review 386-387, purpose conducting pro Our in L.Ed.2d 704 The trial satis portionality review is to determine “wheth Enmund when “beyond fied concluded er the sentences of death are excessive or defendants reasonable doubt both disproportionate to penalty imposed killing of Mr. participated in the actual cases, considering similar both crime Hartsock both defendants intend and that Wallace, and the defendant.” R.T., 14, 1984, ed to kill him.” December (1986) (quoting Ariz. P.2d 14. at Richmond, 186, 196, v. Ariz. (1983)). P.2d We have considered CONCLUSION involving multiple aggravating cases cir Appellant’s and sentences convictions cumstances no mitigating circumstanc affirmed. see, e.g., State v. justifying es leniency; Martinez-Villareal, HAYS, (Retired), J. CAMERON Gretzler, 42, HOLOHAN, JJ., concur. 869, 877, (minor's (1982) age holding to a that the crime is heinous de- S.Ct. Gretzler, praved, weight”); however.” State great 135 Ariz. at mitigating is a factor of "relevant 52-53, P.2d at 11-12. Valencia, 132 Ariz. State v. 239, (1982) (age "is and rele- a substantial 13-703(G)(5) specifically 7. A.R.S. lists the de- § given weight”). great vant factor must be age mitigating fendant's as a factor. See also Oklahoma, Eddings v. Justice, FELDMAN, concurring

I decision and the court’s concur except portion pertaining

analysis, aggravating involving pe- circumstance

cuniary gain. 153 734 P.2d at portion respect With expressed by I in the

opinion, join views 5, at

Chief Justice in footnote Gordon

734 P.2d at 578.

734 P.2d 580 FORD, woman, single Fay

Leta

Plaintiff-Appellee,

REVLON, INC., Defendant-Appellant.

No. CV 86-0148-PR. Arizona,

Supreme Court of

In Banc.

Feb. 1987. April Denied

Reconsideration notes under P.2d see also State 13-1105(A)(2) included are denied lesser § (1983). 660 P.2d 849 Celaya, Ariz. charged instructions while those offense now, repeat except We decline ourselves 13-1105(A)(1)(premeditated under A.R.S. § upon an to reiterate that Beck was based murder) any entitled to lesser included law Arizo- very Alabama different from supported by the evi offense instruction aid Spaziano appellant’s na’s. Nor does Ariz. Dalglish, dence. See Spaziano Supreme case. In held Court Thus, 139, 639 P.2d lesser included offense instructions maintains, charged with fel appellant those not be given need where statute risk of ony suffer an enhanced murder expired limitations has on lesser included penalty relative to receiving the death crimes unless the defendant waives premeditated murder.4 charged those words, statute of limitations. other equal pro- give Appellant declined to defendants the bene- fails to establish an Court in- fit of both the lesser included offense suspects are not a tection claim. Criminal expired period limita- and an struction only suspect find a ra- and we need class rejected The Court the notion that tions. felony statute. tional for the murder basis in- lesser included offense Beck mandates supplied Celaya, basis was cases, specifically capital structions all felony- supra, we noted: “The wherein offense noting: “Where no lesser included rule, designed protect is to as it murder exists, offense a lesser included instruction life, public policy, represents human sound enhances, from, than rather detracts sought to end reasonably is related rationality process.” constitutionally accomplished, and 455, 104 S.Ct. at 3160. 255, 660 P.2d impermissible.” 135 Ariz. at Goodseal, 220 Kan. (quoting at 856 lesser no It is well established (1976)). P.2d felony murder exists offense to included (1981), remand, inequity is P.2d suggests Appellant also denied, given compounded by discretion cert. the enormous denied, charging. prosecutors reh’g The decision to whether and L.Ed.2d

Case Details

Case Name: State v. LaGrand

Court Name: Arizona Supreme Court

Date Published: Jan 30, 1987

Citation: 734 P.2d 563

Docket Number: 6457

Court Abbreviation: Ariz.