State v. LaFranceState v. LaFrance
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Michels, Gaynor
A ten-count indictment returned by a Passaic County grand jury charged defendant with second degree burglary contrary to
In appealing from his convictions and sentences, defendant advances the following contentions:
I. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE STATE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A GUILTY VERDICT FOR KIDNAPPING, ACCORDINGLY DEFENDANT‘S CONVICTION SHOULD BE REVERSED.
II. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE STATE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A GUILTY VERDICT FOR FIRST DEGREE ROBBERY.
III. THE CUMULATIVE UNDULY PREJUDICIAL TESTIMONY ADMITTED AT THE TRIAL BELOW DEPRIVED THE DEFENDANT OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL.
IV. THE SENTENCE IMPOSED BY THE COURT WAS EXCESSIVE AND THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER MITIGATING FACTORS.
At approximately 1:00 a.m. on February 17, 1985, B.R. was awakened in his home by the sound of breaking glass. He arose and walked to the back room where he was confronted by defendant. Upon being asked what he was doing in the R.
Upon being sure that Mr. R. was secure, defendant removed his right hand from his pocket and struck Mr. R. in the mouth. He immediately replaced his hand in the pocket and stepped back. Mrs. R. was then grabbed and dragged into the entry-way between the bedroom and the living room where defendant proceeded to sexually assault her. Seeing the bottom of his wife‘s feet and hearing what he believed to be a pants zipper being opened, Mr. R. managed to free himself. He grabbed a ceramic cheese crock filled with 26 rolls of pennies and walked into the entryway. He saw defendant, with his pants down, on top of his wife. Mr. R. struck defendant on the head with the crock and, when defendant stood up, charged at him driving him back against the wall, then hit him in the chest and drove his arms apart so he could not reach for the gun. At the same time, Mr. R. yelled for his wife to get a knife. She came back with a carving knife and at first tried to stab defendant. Fearing that defendant would seize the knife from his wife, Mr.
Upon their arrival, the police found Mr. R. on top of defendant holding a knife in his hand. R. got off of defendant and told the officers that Mrs. R. had just been raped by defendant. Defendant, whose pants and underwear were around his ankles, stated that Mr. R. had attacked him and was going to cut off his testicles. After conducting a pat-down search for weapons and finding none, the officer informed defendant that he was under arrest. Defendant resisted arrest and had to be subdued. He was taken to police headquarters where a further search disclosed $72 and assorted jewelry in his pockets. Although defendant refused medical treatment for the knife wound to his hand, he was transported to the hospital for necessary medical treatment. While there, a blood sample was taken which upon testing revealed an alcohol level of .194. Subsequently, one of the officers had his hand and shoulder x-rayed because of the kicks received from defendant while arresting him.
I.
Defendant argues that his motion for acquittal of the kidnapping charge was improperly denied in view of the asserted failure of the State to prove all the elements of the offense. Specifically, it is contended that the evidence did not establish the required element of the unlawful confinement of another for a substantial period.
That the “substantial period” requirement of
Once the robbers had left, there would be nobody to help the bound and gagged elderly victims if they were unable to breathe or suffered a heart attack. Had the victims been unable to free themselves for an extended period of time, as defendants obviously intended, there was a significant possibility of additional discomfort, physical injury or even death. The determination, therefore, by the trial judge that leaving the elderly victims bound and gagged constituted kidnapping within the meaning of
N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1b is supported by the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom. [217 N.J. Super. 81]
Here, however, the proofs failed to establish that the unlawful confinement of Mr. R. increased the risk of harm to him. While Mr. R‘s confinement facilitated defendant‘s assault of Mrs. R., thereby satisfying the purpose element of the offense, it did not render him more vulnerable to harm beyond that presented by defendant‘s unlawful entry into the home. Unlike the Bryant victims whose confinement and isolation after the robbers fled increased their risk of harm, Mr. R. would not have been left alone following defendant‘s flight after the commission of the crimes. Under the circumstances of the present case, a reasonable jury considering all the evidence in its entirety and giving the State the benefit of all reasonable inferences could not find defendant guilty of kidnapping within the meaning of
II.
We find no merit in defendant‘s contention that the trial judge erred in denying his motion for acquittal with respect to
A robbery is of the first degree “if in the course of committing the theft the actor . . . is armed with, or uses or threatens the immediate use of a deadly weapon.”
While the jury instructions did not contain a detailed explanation of the subjective standard set forth in
III.
Defendant‘s further argument that he was deprived of a fair trial because of the admission of unduly prejudicial testimony is unpersuasive. We discern no improper questioning of the victims as to other civil crimes or wrongs committed by defendant in violation of Evid.R. 55 or concerning Mrs. R‘s need to permanently move from the house.
The claimed violation of Evid.R. 55 assertedly occurred by permitting testimony by Mr. R. that defendant “was totally in control . . . he was in complete control the whole time,” and Mr. R‘s impression that “he (defendant) knew exactly what he was doing.” Mrs. R‘s testimony that defendant “seemed very, very sure of himself. Like he knew exactly what he was doing,” is also suggested as violating Evid.R. 55. This appellate argument is based upon a strained and unwarranted interpretation of the challenged testimony. These statements were not directed to any prior criminal activity of defendant but merely reflected the R‘s impression of defendant‘s mental awareness and deliberateness in executing the crime.
The claim that testimony concerning Mrs. R‘s inability to live in the house after the attack was so inflammatory and prejudicial as to have tainted the verdict lacks persuasiveness in light of the jury‘s knowledge of the details of defendant‘s criminal conduct toward both victims. Counsel‘s failure to object to this testimony also suggests that in the atmosphere of the trial it did not have the inflammatory and prejudicial effect now asserted by defendant. See State v. Wilson, 57 N.J. 39, 51
IV.
In reviewing the sentences imposed on defendant we are limited to a determination of whether the correct sentencing guidelines were followed, whether there was substantial evidence in the record to support the findings of fact upon which reliance was placed in applying those guidelines and whether the application of the guidelines resulted in sentences which were so unreasonable as to be shocking to the judicial conscience. State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-366 (1984). Our review of the record satisfies us that the sentencing guidelines were properly followed and that there was adequate evidentiary support for the conclusion of the sentencing judge as to the applicable factors relied upon in the fashioning of the overall sentence. Ibid.
The circumstances surrounding the offenses committed by defendant compels us to concur with the trial judge‘s observation “that based upon what took place in this courtroom, the evidence that was produced against Mr. LaFrance, almost any sentence would be appropriate and proportionate.” However, there clearly was factual support for the aggravating factors found by the judge to be applicable: the nature and circumstances of the offenses, the gravity and seriousness of the harm inflicted on the victims, the risk that the defendant will commit other offenses and the need for deterrence. While it was noted that defendant‘s offenses included assaults against the arresting officers, it is not clear that this was considered as an aggravating factor leading to a more severe sentence. See State v. Link, 197 N.J. Super. 615, 619-620 (App.Div. 1984), certif. den. 101 N.J. 234 (1985). In any event, in view of the other aggravating factors, such consideration did not render the increased sentences for such offenses unfair or unjust.
The record also supports the judge‘s conclusion as to the absence of any mitigating factors. Defendant‘s contention that
For the reasons stated, the convictions and sentences are affirmed except as to the conviction and sentence for kidnapping which is reversed. The matter is remanded to the Superior Court, Law Division, Passaic County, for the entry of a corrected judgment.