State v. LackeyState v. Lackey
OPINION
{1} Defendant contends there was no reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle in which he was a passenger. We agree. Therefore, we reverse the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress.
FACTS
{2} On June 5, 2002, Officer Laurence Kauz of the New Mexico State Police was dispatсhed to investigate a one-vehicle accident on Cedar Creek Drive near the Village of Ruidoso. Tim Harvey, a sergeant with the New Mexico State Police, also responded to the accident in his own vehicle. When they arrived, they found that a 1985 Chevrolet truck had run off the road, gone through the safety barrier, and landed in a ditch. It appeared that the right front suspension was wrecked. The driver of the vehicle was not present and there were no witnesses to the accident. The State Police officers were joined by an officer of the Ruidoso Police Department who came in a third police vehicle.
{3} Shortly after the State Police officers began their investigation, a pickup truck with two passengers slowly drove by the accident scene. The truck continued for 200 or 300 yards down the hill, turned around, and drove by the accident scene again. According to Sergeant Harvey, the passenger was “rubbernecking” each time the truck passed the scene of the accident. Sergeant Harvey ordered the truck to be stopped because something was “suspicious.” When asked why he was “suspicious,” he said that in fifteen years of training and experience “it has become knowledge I guess you might call it that a subject that has been involved in a crash that is under the influence will leave the scene in order to attempt from being arrested for the DWI.” Officer Kauz added, “[i]t seemed they had more than a casual interest in the accidеnt. So, we thought they knew something about the accident.” If the truck had not stopped when it was ordered to do so it would have been pursued and forced to stop.
{4} Officer Kauz questioned the occupants after the truck was stopped, and he determined that the truck was being driven by Richard Malоne, a neighbor of Defendant. In response to subsequent questioning from Officer Kauz, Defendant admitted the 1985 Chevrolet truck was his and that he was driving it at the time of the accident. Officer Kauz noted that Defendant had bloodshot, watery eyes and smelled of alcohol. In response to further questions, Defendant admitted to Officer Kauz that he had consumed three or four beers earlier in the evening. After field sobriety tests were administered, Defendant was arrested at 10:30 p.m. Analysis of blood drawn from Defendant at 12:05 a.m. the following morning showed that his blood alcohol concentration exceeded the legal limit. See
{5} Defendant argued during trial that reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle was lacking, and on this basis, moved to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the stop. The motion was denied, and Defendant was convicted of driving while intoxicated. Defendant appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
{6} Whether the district court correctly ruled on Defendant’s motion to suppress is a question we review “to determine whether the law was cоrrectly applied to the facts, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.” State v. Cline,
DISCUSSION
{7} The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects the people of the United States against unreasonable searches and seizures by the government.
{8} “The Fourth Amendment аpplies to seizures of the person, including brief investigatory stops such as the stop of [a] vehicle.” United States v. Cortez,
{9} The circumstances in this case simply do not amount to reasonable suspicion to stop the truck oсcupied by Defendant. Neither Sergeant Harvey nor Officer Kauz testified that they believed that Defendant or Mr. Malone was committing or had committed a criminal act. Sergeant Harvey’s testimony regarding the fact that DWI suspects frequently leave the scene of an accident is unavailing. He observed Defendant returning to the scene not leaving the scene; no evidence was presented to suggest that Defendant’s return to the scene was consistent with someone who had previously been driving while intoxicated. Cf. State v. Guzman,
{10} In support of its argument that the officers had reasonable suspicion, the State refers us to People v. Hobson,
{11} The circumstances surrounding Sergeant Harvey’s order to stop the vehicle in this case differ significantly from the circumstances in Hobson. The defendant in Hob-son drove by three times “late at night when the ordinary individual would have no legitimate reason to visit the dump.” Id. Neither Sergeant Harvey nor Officer Kauz testified that it was unusual for a car to be driving on Cedar Creek Road when they first observed Defendant. Further, there were three police cars with their lights flashing at the scene of the accident. Officer Kauz admitted that slowing down to gawk or rubberneck at an accident scene is a common behavior among drivers and was not, by itself, suspicious. His own suspicion was not aroused until the vehicle made a second pass. A second pass of the scenе may have indicated any number of things ranging from knowledge about the accident, familiarity with the vehicle, or just plain curiosity.
{12} On similar facts, the Idaho Supreme Court, in State v. Wixom,
{13} Similarly, in Richcreek, police also responded to a single-car accident.
{14} The only significant factual difference between the case before us аnd Wixom and Richcreek is that Defendant passed by the scene of the accident twice. The Idaho and Arizona Supreme Courts held that passing slowly by the scene of an accident once is not enough for reasonable suspicion of criminal activity because the bare fact of an accident does not indicate that the accident was caused by criminal activity. We agree with their conclusions and do not believe that a second pass of the scene alone is sufficiently indicative of criminal activity to support a finding of reasonable suspicion. While a second pass might indicate, as the officers testified, more than a casual interest in the accident, that does not mean that the accident was criminally caused, such as would allow the officers to intrude on Defendant by stopping him.
{15} The State also argues that the stop of the vehicle Defendant was riding in was justified under the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement. Because the police were entitled to search the abandoned 1985 Chevrolet to determine the identity of its owner, the State argues that it could also stop Defendant to determine if he was the owner of the vehicle. We are unpersuaded.
{16} A “police officer may stop a vehicle for a specific, articulable safety concern, even in the absence of reasonable suspicion that a violation of law has occurred or is ocсurring.” Apodaca v. State ex rel. Taxation and Revenue Dep’t,
{17} Further, the State’s attempt to analogize the stoр to opening the glove box of the vehicle to determine the identity of its owner is unpersuasive. Even if we accept the State’s assertion Sergeant Harvey and Officer Kauz could have lawfully searched the wrecked 1985 Chevrolet, stopping Defendant implicates substantially different interеsts than opening the glove box of an abandoned and wrecked 1985 Chevrolet. And because Sergeant Harvey and Officer Kauz did not have a specific, articulable safety concern about Defendant or the vehicle in which he was riding, they could not lawfully stop the vehicle under the community caretaker exception.
CONCLUSION
{18} We hold that Sergeant Harvey did not have a reasonable suspicion to order a stop of the vehicle Defendant was riding in. As a result, the stop was an unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, we reverse the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress. We remand with instructions to grant the motion to suppress and for such further proceedings as may be warranted.
{19} IT IS SO ORDERED.